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This thesis explores the intersections of algorithmic systems and memory-making practices in 
everyday life, broadly asking what it means to remember with algorithms. The project investi-
gates these intersections from various perspectives, drawing upon data from 26 interviews and 
four focus groups along with a documentary analysis of the technologies themselves. Chapter 
four investigates what I call ‘algorithmic remembrance technologies,’ that is, the platforms, 
apps, and features that mediate people’s data past. Here, I examine their commercial rhetoric 
as well as their technical affordances and salient characteristics. In chapter five, the focus shifts 
to users and how people variously use and negotiate these technologies in everyday life. 
Drawing on interview and focus group data, the chapter argues that both people and algorithms 
participate in sociotechnical processes of ‘emplotment’, whereby mediated memories are used 
to weave stories of the self in the present. Chapter six also draws on interview and focus group 
data, and it examines how algorithmic systems affect and shape people’s remembrance of the 
past. More specifically, it focuses on questions of temporality and timing in relation to 
automated systems, asking when algorithms come to matter in everyday life. Finally, the thesis 
conclusion seeks to bring all these different analytical threads together into one conceptual 
framework. It ultimately argues that the intersections of algorithms and memory in everyday 
life suggests what I call a shift from ‘remembering to resurfacing’ as well as highlighting the 
processes that underlie and propel this shift. I argue that this shift is underpinned, firstly, by 
the eventfulness of algorithms, that is, the diverse encounters, intersections, and crossings 
between people, socialities, and algorithmic systems in memory making; and secondly, the 
positioning of users, signifying the ways in which users increasingly place themselves in the 
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1.1 ‘You Have a New Memory’ 
Late one evening in October 2018, I received a notification on my smart phone. The familiar 
ping of the typical iPhone notification is hardly enchanting. I was nonetheless curious to see 
what had grabbed my attention so late (or maybe reaching out and checking the notification 
was just an unconscious habit by now). It wasn’t a particular tweet nor a late Amazon recom-
mendation. It just read, ‘You have a new memory’. It was a notification from the Photos app 
on my iPhone 6. The subtitle of the notification simply read ‘Benjamin – Photos from 2018-
2019’ and it showed a variety of photos I had taken throughout the year. Other than the surprise 
of receiving this notification at such a late hour, I was struck by the notion that was being 
presented to me: that these memo-
ries, these digitals photographs, 
were somehow new. ‘You have a 
new memory’. This time the sub-
title read ‘At the Shore of Saint Paul’s Bay & Ghajn Tuffieha – Jul 21, 2018’. It showed a photo 
I had taken on a holiday in Malta with my family. It was unclear why I was being reminded of 
this particular picture at this particular time. Was it exactly six months ago or was I reminded 
of it on the day it had been taken? The answer seemed to be no in both cases. I didn’t understand 
its logic. Other interesting notifications popped up in the following days and months: ‘In Nature 
– 2018 – 2019’, ‘Best of the Year – 2018’, or ‘Gathering in Rabat-Malta – Jul 23, 2018’. My 
iPhone’s Photos app seemed to be a site where algorithms and my memories converged to 
create something novel, a site where memories can be algorithmically staged and performed. 
This variegated convergence, this particular staging of memories, seemed most salient in those 
recurrent reminders from the Apple Memories feature: ‘you have a new memory’.  What does 
it mean for such ‘memories’ to be new? What are the implications of such ‘new’ memories, 
and what does this peculiar notion reveal about the intersection of algorithms and people’s 
personal memories in everyday life? In other words, what happens when memory-making 
processes become, at least in part, algorithmic? What happens when algorithms meet remem-
bering? These are some of the questions that this project seeks to investigate.1  
 
1 This reference to ‘new memories’ should not be seen as a standalone concept within the project. Rather, I take 
it as emblematic of a particular logic that is emerging in contemporary society, where the mediation of memories 
in everyday life has become increasingly algorithmic. It is this logic which will also be explored in more depth 
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Our societies are densely populated with algorithmic systems. They help mediate and 
facilitate everything from border security practices (Amoore and Raley, 2017) and predictive 
policing (Andrejevic, 2020), to the mundane conveniences of smart homes (Goulden, 2019) 
and recommendation systems used by platforms such as Amazon or Netflix (Hallinan and 
Striphas, 2016). It is a society that has melded with algorithms to such an extent that they have 
become part of the ‘technological unconscious’ (Thrift, 2004). The diverse capacities of 
algorithmic systems – to automate, sort, order, classify, and prioritise – has been a source of 
great anxiety for some (O’Neil, 2016), whilst for others they promise great societal and 
structural change (Domingos, 2015). Regardless of these dichotomous responses, it is evident 
that automated processes, software systems, and algorithmic operations are an entangled part 
of contemporary society. As such, it is reasonable to suggest that in such an intricate media 
landscape, memory and how we remember have inevitably become increasingly interwoven 
with proliferating algorithmic technologies. As Andreas Huyssen (2000, p. 29) claimed around 
the turn of the century, we cannot speak of memory as somehow separate from ‘the enormous 
influence of the new media of all forms of memory’. If this was true around the turn of the 
century it has become even more relevant now. As memory and the experiences of revisiting 
and negotiating the past becomes increasingly dependent on and shaped by algorithms, it will 
also shape how we remember the past as well as how memory practices are understood and 
instantiated in everyday life.  
Drawing on data from 26 interviews and four focus groups along with an analysis of 
industry documents and reports, this project seeks to find out whether algorithmic systems do, 
in fact, shape how we remember and how. It is guided by two overarching research questions:  
1) to what extent and in what ways do algorithms affect people’s remembering 
of the past?  
2) what are the various (social) implications of algorithms mediating people’s 
memories?  
Given the recent developments in algorithmic media, machine learning, and AI, more research 
into their effects on memory are needed. In fact, the impact of algorithms on how memory is 
conceived and instantiated in everyday life have remained largely unexplored and under-
 
throughout the thesis. Moreover, ‘new memories’ should not be seen as a reference to Andrew Hoskins’ (2011) 
term ‘new memory’, although his conceptualisation of the term serves as a good reminder: ‘memory is always 
‘new’ given its continually emergent state availed through the metaphors and media and technologies of the day’ 
(Hoskins, 2011, p. 22). 
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researched (see Pereira, 2019; Prey and Smit, 2019; see also chapter two). However, there have 
been calls for more critical research into the ways memory is shaped by emerging technologies 
(e.g. Hoskins, 2018; van Dijck, 2007). There have also been calls for research into how apps 
such as Timehop, and now platform features such as Facebook Memories and Apple Memories, 
specifically ‘facilitate memory work through the reminding of previous traces’ (Özkul and 
Humphreys, 2015, p. 363). This thesis constitutes, in part, a response to these calls, seeking to 
unpack and investigate the various effects, dimensions, and implications of algorithms 
mediating memory and memory practices. Crucially, it seeks to grapple with and further 
examine the scope of the ‘social power of algorithms’ (Beer, 2009) by specifically asking how 
algorithms mediate memory. As such, this project aims to add to the research fields of both 
algorithm studies and memory studies as well as highlighting ways in which they can be used 
in conjunction with each other.  
 This thesis, as a result, focuses mainly on the social power and politics of algorithms 
and not on the data being recorded. Issues of data and data mining and how they relate to 
people’s memory making practices is explored in greater detail in forthcoming work (see 
Benjamin and Beer, 2021). The thesis explores how people’s encounters and orientations in 
the world are conditioned and shaped by algorithmic systems. As Taina Bucher (2018, p. 8) 
stated, I explore “how and when different aspects of algorithms and the algorithmic become 
available to specific actors.” In other words, the thesis explores how and when the past becomes 
available to different actors, as well as their underlying processes. 
As this thesis will demonstrate in more detail, the intense embedding of social media 
platforms in society are just one example of where memory and algorithms can be seen to 
intersect. Social media platforms, or ‘algorithmic media’ as Taina Bucher (2018) calls them, 
have incorporated and developed features that analyse, classify, and routinely resurface digital 
memories to users. Given the enormous volume of user data stored on platforms such as 
Facebook, and given the amount of time platforms have now been embedded in everyday life, 
it is reasonable to suggest that these are becoming increasingly influential memory devices. 
They have become, as David Beer (2019b, p. 39) suggests, technologies ‘giving us our own 
past back in digestible form.’ Such digestible bits of data are frequently seen on platform 
features such as Facebook Memories where one can be reminded of, for instance, one’s so-
called ‘winter memories.’ Another example of where memory and algorithms can be seen to 
cross in everyday life is through the numerous memory apps on App Store and Google Play 
(e.g. Timehop). Moreover, several smartphones have also embedded functionalities that 
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algorithmically curate and resurface people’s photos as ‘memories’ in the present (e.g. Apple 
Memories). As this project will show, we increasingly remember in and through algorithmic 
systems and platforms.2 In short, we seem to remember with algorithms. The rest of this thesis 
seeks to flesh out exactly what this means.  
Yet, memory features and platforms such as Facebook do not simply mediate or 
facilitate a backwards glance at our data past. As the thesis will show, they are also powerful 
actors operating within the social world. It is therefore vital that their politics, inherent 
assumptions, as well as their so-called ‘style of reasoning’ (Hacking, 1982), be questioned and 
investigated in more depth. It is also important to note that ‘politics’, in the context of this 
thesis, does not refer to specific political paradigms, but rather to ‘ways of world-making’ and 
‘the practices and capacities entailed in ordering and arranging different ways of being in the 
world’ (Bucher, 2018, p. 4). As such, the power and politics of platforms and algorithmic 
systems are more about their capacity to shape and create new realities, rather than merely re-
present whatever already exists. The same goes with memory and memory practices. Our rela-
tionship to the past is by no means neutral, nor does it remain fixed. Instead, memory is always-
already imbued with politics and has a historical dimension as well. As Ian Hacking (1995, p. 
200) observes, ‘Memory has always had political or ideological overtones, but each epoch has 
found its own meaning in memory.’ The ways memory is understood and practiced in daily life 
have always been sites of ongoing political tension, subject to wider societal and technological 
changes. Memory practices must therefore be further investigated and interrogated, paying 
particular attention to issues such as: who remembers, what is being remembered, what is not 
being remembered, and so on.  
Similarly, memory features such as Apple Memories or Facebook Memories must also 
be interrogated for their potential to shape what can and should be remembered. As I show in 
later chapters, these features have the capacity to shape and define the parameters of what 
memories come to matter in the present and which ones do not.3 Investigating the intersections 
of algorithms and memory in everyday life, both in terms of how algorithms mediate and how 
 
2 Throughout this project, I will use terms such as ‘algorithmic remembrance technologies’, ‘algorithmic memory 
features’, ‘memory features’, memory technologies’, ‘algorithmic technologies’ interchangeably. They all refer 
to contemporary technologies that algorithmically mine, analyse, classify, re-package, and resurface people’s past 
data as ‘memories’ in the present (e.g. Apple Memories’ tagline ‘you have a new memory’). These technologies 
will be discussed in more detail in chapter four. 
3 For other conceptualisations of the technological mediation of memory, see Heersmink and Carter’s (2017) 
‘technologies of memory’, Goodman and Parisi’s (2010) notion of ‘machines of memory’ and Stiegler’s (2010) 
‘mnemo-technologies’ and ‘industrialisation of memory’. 
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users are affected, are therefore crucial. We are ceaselessly shaped by such interlacing factors: 
what we remember, how we remember it, what we forget, why we forget it, what we constantly 
remind ourselves of, and what we are routinely reminded of. Similarly, we are shaped and 
affected by algorithmic systems to such an extent that ‘we are it, and it is us. We could never 
stand outside it, even if we might wish to’ (Amoore, 2020, p. 79). 
However, it is crucial to clarify what exactly is meant by terms such as ‘algorithms’ 
and ‘mediated memories’. Although they are analysed in much more depth in chapter two, it is 
worth briefly mentioning them here, since these are overarching concepts within the project. 
Moreover, with current algorithmic remembrance technologies, there is a heavy emphasis on 
visual representations of the past such via digital images. Indeed, for these technologies, digital 
images are often equated with memories. It is also necessary to touch on this ‘visual’ aspect of 
contemporary memory practices. How, then, can these different notions – algorithms, mediated 
memories, and the visual – be understood? First, the issue of algorithms. 
 
1.2 Defining Algorithms 
What is an algorithm? The term can be understood in various ways. The concept has a long 
history, dating back to 9th-century Persia. Etymologically, the word ‘algorithm’ has strong 
affinities to mathematics and arithmos, that is, the realm of numbers and calculability (Striphas, 
2015). In recent history, however, algorithm has acquired a distinctive meaning within the 
domain of computer science. From a formal perspective, algorithms are essentially seen as 
calculative step-by-step procedures employed in computer software to process input data in 
order to generate a desired output (Kitchin, 2017). As Robert K. Hill (2015, p. 47) stated, 
algorithms are fundamentally mathematical constructs ‘accomplishing a given purpose under 
given provisions.’ In this vein, algorithms have also been understood as ‘the operations 
performed on data’, highlighting the interdependence of algorithms, data, and broader digital 
infrastructures (Bucher, 2018, p. 22). Algorithms, from this perspective, are processes aimed 
at computational problem-solving. 
 The reference to ‘algorithms’ in the thesis title is not meant to suggest a reified, 
essentialised, nor homogeneous object. Rather, it is meant to suggest the widespread prolife-
ration of the ‘logic of algorithms’ in today’s society (Totaro and Ninno, 2014), which for some 
has signalled an increasingly ‘algorithmic culture’ (Hallinan and Striphas, 2016). As such, it is 
crucial to also acknowledge the social power of algorithms and the impact they have on most 
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aspects of society. Broadly speaking, algorithms are often used to perform tasks such as 
prioritization, classification, association, and filtering (Diakopoulos, 2014). They produce 
outputs which can be made actionable in certain societal contexts, whether that is enabling 
high-frequency trading (Mackenzie, 2018) or identifying suspicious individuals at a border 
control (Amoore and Hall, 2009). Algorithmic operations can also be seen at work in instances 
such as: Google Search predictions, YouTube algorithms classifying video material, recom-
mendation systems such as Amazon (‘customers like you’), and memory features like 
Facebook’s Year in Review (Jacobsen, 2020b). As Louise Amoore (2020) put it, we 
increasingly find ourselves living life in and through the algorithm.  
Yet, it is important to bear in mind that there is a plethora of different algorithms, aimed 
at solving a multiplicity of problems in equally many contexts. This is important to point out 
as algorithms are developed to perform different tasks for different purposes. As such, there 
have been various attempts at grouping algorithms in order to make sense of them. For instance, 
one overarching way has been to distinguish between so-called ‘rule-based’ algorithms and 
‘machine-learning algorithms’ (e.g. Bueno, 2019; Fry, 2018). That is, algorithms that either 
correspond to ‘a set of finite instructions’ or algorithms understood as ‘evolving data able to 
adapt’ to external inputs (Parisi, 2013, p. 10). In the case of the former, the necessary steps and 
instructions are already pre-written by the programmer, and the algorithm ‘simply’ follows the 
procedure in a step-by-step fashion. Machine learning algorithms, on the other hand, are feed 
vast amounts of training data with the aim that they might generate a set of rules themselves. 
In a sense, they are algorithms that develop other algorithms. Machine learning can also be 
further differentiated into supervised, unsupervised, and reinforcement algorithms (for more 
detail, see Amoore, 2020; Domingos, 2015; Mackenzie, 2017). These attempts to distinguish 
between algorithms, although it can be reductive, they do help us understand the complexity 
of algorithms and the vast array of functions they may perform based on the contexts in which 
they operate. It also sensitises us to the fact that algorithms are never singular things (Zietwitz, 
2016); rather, they are always-already embedded within other algorithms, data structures, and 
larger data assemblages. As Rob Kitchin (2017, p. 20) points out, algorithms often exist within 
complex, multi-layered systems, ‘embedded within hundreds of other algorithms’. In fact, 
outside of these data assemblages, outside of code and stacks of data, algorithms lose their 
efficacy and meaning.  
 Given their complexities and their entanglements within various contexts, it is often 
stated that algorithms and the way inputs are processed are black-boxed, inscrutable, and 
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opaque. This idea of the opacity and inscrutability of the algorithm and the challenges this 
poses is well established in the academic literature (e.g. Ananny, 2016; Annany and Crawford, 
2018; Dourish, 2016; Zarsky, 2016). Wendy Chun (2008), for instance, argued that we cannot 
fully know software because it is but a gathering of heterogeneous relations, both human and 
nonhuman: ‘its effectiveness depends on a whole imagined network of machines and humans’ 
(p. 299). This idea of the black boxing of algorithms has found traction especially as a result 
of Frank Pasquale’s (2015) influential book The Black Box Society. Pasquale argued that we 
increasingly find ourselves living in a ‘black box society’, where people remain visible to 
institutions and companies, but where society’s inner mechanisms remain unknown, secret, 
inscrutable, or opaque to people. As in an interrogation room, transparency only goes one way. 
For Pasquale, this is a society whose authority is ‘increasingly expressed algorithmically’ and 
where certain algorithms remain proprietary information and trade secrets for large corpo-
rations (p. 8). 
Although this claim can sometimes be seen as problematic (Bucher, 2018), this project 
does not seek to open the black box, so to speak. Rather, it seeks to explore what happens when 
the black box spills out into the social world. The project investigates the social implications 
of particular implementations or instantiations of algorithmic procedures in everyday life: on 
various social media platforms, mobile apps, and phone software features. In other words, I 
seek to examine how algorithms are executed in the world, shaping and limiting its various 
socio-cultural parameters, and ultimately affecting people and their everyday lives (Kitchin, 
2017; Willson, 2017). In short, how algorithms come to figure as powerful social actors in the 
world (Beer, 2017). Yet, what is meant by this notion of algorithms as powerful? Scott Lash 
(2007), for instance, argued that part of the power of algorithms emanates from their capacity 
to generate realities. More precisely, they constitute ‘virtuals that generate a whole variety of 
actuals’ (Lash, 2007, pp. 70-71). In other words, the social power becomes visible as they 
recursively sort, classify, and shape everything from what people see on social media (Bucher, 
2012b) to notions of identity (Cheney-Lippold, 2011, 2017; de Vries, 2010). Conceptually 
speaking, algorithms help to ‘reontologise the world’ (Mittelstadt et al., 2016, p. 5).  
The ‘kinds’ of algorithmic systems discussed in this project are not the ones used to 
regulate stock market prices or automatically pinpoint and predict terrorist suspects. Instead, 
they are embedded within what I will ‘algorithmic remembrance technologies’. These are 
features, apps, databases, and platforms that perform a particular set of functions: they store, 
analyse, classify and resurface people’s past data as ‘memories’ in the present (more on this in 
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chapter 3). Some of these technologies follow a more ‘rule-based’ algorithmic framework (e.g. 
Timehop), whereas others make use of machine learning algorithms and neural networks (e.g. 
Facebook Memories, Apple Memories). More specifically, this project examines instantiations 
of algorithmic procedures that ‘make generally reliable (but subjective and not necessarily 
correct) decisions based upon complex rules that challenge or confound human capacities for 
action and comprehension’ (Mittelstadt et al., 2016, p. 3). Algorithmic remembrance techno-
logies are avenues for storing, re-visiting and being visited by one’s data past, by aspects of the 
data past that come to matter to users. They are undergirded by complex rules and seek to make 
reliable decisions in the form of resurfacing data memories. Algorithmic systems can therefore 
be seen as ‘apparatuses of mattering’ (Amoore, 2020), that is, both in terms of how the data 
past is made matter as well as how it is made to matter to people in the present. This project 
specifically investigates how algorithms mediate and make the data past present as well as the 
repercussions of this. But as algorithms make powerful yet ‘subjective decisions’ about the 
world and about people’s data past, the outcome of algorithmic processes are never fully deter-
mined. As a result, they leave room for contingency, resistance, and mutual moulding.4 As Kate 
Crawford (2016) argues, the production and implementation of algorithms should be seen as 
variegated ‘contested spaces’: spaces where humans and algorithms meet, interact, and are 
interwoven in complex and sometimes contested ways.  
Through mediating, facilitating, and shaping people’s memory practices, algorithms 
can be seen to do active work in the world. Not just in terms of processing input data in order 
to generate certain desirable outputs, but also in terms of carving out novel ways of remem-
bering the past and working on the present. This project therefore draws on an STS-inflected 
understanding of algorithmic systems (e.g. Latour, 1988, 1992), seeing them as actors in the 
world, limiting and shaping the boundaries of knowledge, agency, and, in this case, memory. 
As such, algorithms should be understood not simply as mathematical formulae, but also as 
social actors embedded within various assemblages. In chapters five and six, for instance, 
algorithms can be seen as embedded within broader platforms and applications whilst simul-
taneously forming an integral part of people’s everyday memory practices. Here, they are 
understood and examined in terms of their social efficacy, in relation to the work they perform 
in the social world. As this project seeks to show, examining how algorithms operate in the 
 
4 Taina Bucher (2017), in her article ‘The algorithmic imaginary’, investigates how algorithms are shaped by 
people’s perceptions on social media. In other words, how people conceived of ‘the algorithm’ had a performative 
impact on how they related to the social media platform, which in turn shaped what content the Facebook 
algorithm made visible to them and how often.   
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world also helps us rethink how we understand memory and how we remember the past in 
everyday life. As David Beer (2017, p. 3) points out, algorithms help us ‘rethink some 
entrenched assumptions about agency, transparency, and normativity.’ Before exploring the 
question – what does it mean to remember with algorithms –  it is also crucial to clarify what 
is meant by memory and, more specifically, the notion of ‘mediated memories’ that will be 
used in the thesis in relation to the emphasis on the visual in contemporary society.  
 
1.3 The Visual Turn and Mediated Memories  
The digital environment, in which memory and contemporary memory practices are embedded, 
are heavily underpinned by the visual. In recent years, there has been an acceleration in the 
production, circulation, and consumption of digital images on social media platforms. This had 
led some to argue that the emergence of popular image-sharing platforms such as Instagram 
and Snapchat, as well as the increased image circulation on other platforms such as Facebook 
and Twitter, constitutes social media’s so-called ‘visual turn’ (Gibbs et al., 2015, p. 258). This 
turn towards the visual is also echoed in David Beer’s (2019a) work on the data analytics 
industry. For Beer (2019a, p. 8), the notion of ‘data gaze’ showcases how ‘the visual, the optic 
and the material are privileged in the knowledge that forms around data analytics’. Moreover, 
in the context of mediated memories, these developments are also suggested by Andrew 
Hoskins’s (2009, p. 34) claim that ‘we inhabit a more vivid image-driven environment’ than 
previously before.5 The link between memories and digital images is seemingly unavoidable. 
 Although Hoskins wrote this in relation to the emergence and proliferation of Web 2.0 
and mobile phones, the sociotechnical gravitation towards the visual has greatly intensified in 
the recent decade. Technologies such as Timehop, Facebook Memories, Apple Memories, 
Snapchat Memories, Amazon Photos, and Google Photos demonstrate this development, as 
they are characterised by a drive towards mining, operationalising, and animating digital 
images. As the project will discuss in more detail later, these features showcase a heavy 
emphasis on resurfacing and circulating digital images as ‘memories’ to users in the present. 
For instance, past images of family and pets are considered by Facebook’s in-house researchers 
as being ‘memory gold’, supposedly bound to elicit a positive response from users if they were 
resurfaced in the present (Konrad, 2017).  
 
5 For more on the changing implications of the image in an age of algorithms, see Uricchio (2011).  
 
17 
That being said, before examining what the effects are of algorithms mediating people’s 
personal memories, it is necessary to first unpack what is meant by ‘mediation’ and how it 
relates to memory and remembering. In her book Mediated Memories in the Digital Age (2007), 
which this thesis title is a nod to, media scholar José van Dijck explores the role of digital 
technologies in facilitating and shaping the documentation and re-visiting of the past. 
Proposing the notion of ‘mediated memories’, van Dijck defines them as ‘the activities and 
objects we produce and appropriate by means of media technologies, for creating and re-
creating a sense of past, present, and future of ourselves in relation to others’ (p. 21). The term 
denotes how the material (and symbolic) conditions of memory and remembering the past are 
made possible and shaped by various technologies, forms of digital media, and by larger digital 
infrastructures.  
The notion also highlights the entanglement of the personal, social, technological, and 
the cognitive. As van Dijck (2007, p. 28) claims: 
Mediated memories… can be located neither strictly in the brain nor wholly 
outside in (material) culture but exist in both concurrently, for they are manifes-
tations of a complex interaction between brain, material objects, and the cultural 
matrix from which they arise. 
Within this framework, making clear distinctions between brain, body, sociality, and material 
objects is, at best, problematic. These various biological, social, and technological factors 
interact and feed into each in complex ways, shaping the parameters and conditions of what 
memory is, through what objects memories are instantiated, as well as what it means to 
remember the past. For this reason, van Dijck (2009) calls mediated memories ‘amalgamations’ 
of technology, culture, and embodiment. In other words, they highlight the entanglement of 
technologies, users, people’s sense of self, as well as the objects created through the 
technologies. Conceptualising mediated memories as amalgamations problematises the (often-
neat) distinctions that emerge from different disciplinary approaches to the study of memory, 
such as psychology, neuroscience, and philosophy. Instead, van Dijck’s notion of mediated 
memories suggest a dialectical co-constitution between cognition, embodiment, sociality, 
technology, and culture. What constitutes memory and what it means to remember the past are 
therefore not stable nor fixed categories. Rather, the questions of what memory is and what it 
means to meaningfully remember the past are in constant development, a constant state of 
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becoming (something else) as a result of the technological changes permeating contemporary 
society.  
In this thesis, I want to transpose or take this notion of mediated memories further by 
bringing in the issues concerning the widespread proliferation of algorithmic systems. As Coul-
dry and Hepp (2017, p. 34) remind us, contemporary society is marked by ‘a much more intense 
embedding of media in social processes than ever before.’ Given the fact that algorithms are 
becoming ever-more intensely embedded in social processes, it is getting increasingly difficult 
to understand memory practices apart from the social media platforms, apps, software features, 
and algorithmic systems in which they are embedded. Mediated memories must be understood 
as ‘deeply mediatised’ (Couldry and Hepp, 2017), as simultaneously and inextricably personal, 
social, cognitive, material, and algorithmic. These interact and shape each other in ways I want 
to examine. How we talk about memory, how we imagine and conceptualise it, how we 
meaningfully engage with the past, are shaped by the technologies and algorithmic systems we 
use. In short, the concept of mediated memories is used throughout this project as a way to 
investigate what it means to remember with, and as a result of, algorithms in everyday life. As 
such, this investigation will shed new light on both the pervasive role played by algorithms and 
the ever-changing nature of memory.  
 
1.4 Chapter Overview 
Chapter two provides an overview of the literature that is explored in relation to this project. It 
discusses the fields of algorithms, memory, and digital memory studies, and highlights the 
various conceptual contours that have emerged within these fields. In chapter three, I outline 
the project’s methodological approach. In order to answer the research questions listed earlier 
I employ documentary analysis as well as qualitative interviews, conducting both in-depth 
online interviews as well as focus groups. Chapter four turns to an analysis of the algorithmic 
remembrance technologies themselves. When exploring the intersections between algorithms 
and memory, it is necessary to examine the sites and spaces through which everyday memory 
practices are instantiated. The data is drawn from an analysis of a range of case materials: 
documents such as Terms of Agreement, Terms of Service, Privacy and Cookie Policies as 
well as promotional material such as video presentations, instructional videos, blog entries, and 
advertisements. The chapter explores several features, software functionalities, platforms, and 
apps that currently exist to mediate people’s mediated memories. Looking at features such as 
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Amazon Photos, Facebook Memories, and Snapchat Memories, this chapter seeks to examine 
their salient characteristics and the ways in which they have been constructed and with what 
aims. As such, the chapter seeks to outline and investigate the various contours that characterise 
the variegated landscape of algorithmic remembrance technologies. The chapter argues that, 
through their salient affordances, these technologies have the capacity and the potential to 
shape the conditions of possibility for users and their everyday memory practices. Tapping into 
the affordances of data-driven and data-led modes of engaging with the past, algorithmic 
remembrance technologies represent an attempt to make the conditions for human memory-
making increasingly machine-readable and thus knowable to the algorithm. Yet, it is important 
that these features are also seen as integral to existing networks within what has been called 
‘surveillance capitalism’ (Zuboff, 2015; 2019). As such, the chapter also explores the economic 
underpinnings of these technologies and how that might shape how users engage with both the 
technologies themselves and their own data past.  
 In chapter five, the focus shifts to the ways in which users appropriate and use these 
technologies in everyday life. The encounters between algorithms and users are never fully 
pre-determined, but instead always exist in relation to various modes of engagement and 
resistance. Focusing on the practices of users, this chapter argues that people use algorithmic 
remembrance technologies as a means of ‘emplotment’, drawing on past memories in order to 
weave coherent narratives of self in the present. The chapter starts by discussing Lawler’s 
(2008) use of ‘emplotment’ in more detail, but also seeks to move towards a more socio-
technical understanding of it. Drawing on qualitative and focus group data, the chapter 
investigates three ways in which emplotment can be understood in terms of socio-technical 
practices: management, sharing, and anticipatory positioning. These practices or themes came 
to the forefront when participants discussed the various dimensions of using algorithmic 
memory features as well as their experiences encountering their digital past. Through practices 
of management, sharing, and anticipatory positioning, this chapter also argues that both humans 
and algorithms actively participate in the shaping, constructing, and maintaining of identities, 
drawing on mediated memories that resurface via memory features. 
Chapter six, titled ‘The Importance of Timing’, looks at a very particular way in which 
these algorithmic remembrance technologies can be seen to affect users in everyday life. It 
examines the algorithmic mediation of memories ‘from the bottom up’, so to speak (Couldry 
and Powell, 2014). Viewing algorithms as ‘apparatuses of mattering’ (Amoore, 2020), this 
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chapter examines particular instances when algorithms come to matter. It suggests that by 
analysing specific temporal instantiations, in this case ‘timing’ and the idea of the ‘right 
moment’ as well as the dynamics of algorithmic media, we may gain a better understanding of 
the social power of algorithms. Drawing on qualitative interview and focus group data, this 
chapter proposes the notion of ‘anniversification’ as a way to explore when algorithms come 
to matter and the impact their timing may have on memory. In short, the importance of timing 
for how users remember their data past. Algorithmic remembrance technologies resurface and 
remind users of their past data in the form of ‘memories.’ Anniversification sensitises us to the 
importance of examining how their timings are programmed and algorithmically instantiated, 
and how users are affected as a result. As the chapter details, when a person is reminded can 
be as significant as what they are reminded of. The notion of anniversification therefore 
functions as a way to investigate how algorithms temporally frame remembering in order to 
produce affective states, behaviours, habits, and routines. It is an avenue for exploring the 
politics of temporality on algorithmic media (Bucher, 2020b), that is, how temporality and 
timing are used and practiced by these media to shape how people remember the past and work 
on the present. 
 In the thesis conclusion, I return to the question: what does it mean to remember with 
algorithms? Here, I seek to develop a conceptual framework to better make sense of these 
increasingly intimate interconnections between algorithms and memory practices. Drawing on 
the findings from chapters four, five, and six, I argue that there is an overarching shift in our 
current media landscape from remembering to resurfacing. By this I mean that with algorithmic 
systems the focus shifts from merely affording users to store and draw data from the past to 
instead algorithmically pulling certain data points from the past and presenting these as 
‘memories’ in the present. Throughout the research project, it became clear that algorithmic 
systems are inhabiting an increasingly active role in memory making in terms of mining, 
classifying, ranking, timing, and resurfacing mediated memories. Drawing on these research 
findings, I argue that there are two underlying processes that facilitate and propel this shift: the 
‘eventfulness of algorithms’ and ‘the positioning of users’. As the analysis chapters will show, 
algorithms come to matter as part of broader socio-technical situations, where infrastructures, 
technologies, memory practices, and everyday negotiations intersect and cross. This shift from 
remembering to resurfacing should therefore not be seen as passive or deterministic. Rather, it 
signals the production of a plethora of affects, behaviours, and realities. Secondly, the shift 
from remembering to resurfacing is facilitated and propelled by the positioning of users. As is 
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discussed in more detail in chapter five, the everyday ‘use’ of memory technologies was often 
characterised by a certain posture, a certain mode of positioning, a way in which interviewees 
placed themselves in the way of algorithmic systems resurfacing memories from the past. In 
the conclusion, I also seek to make sense of the underlying politics and economics of this shift, 
linking it back to the idea of surveillance capitalism as well as what Nick Seaver (2018) calls 
‘captivating algorithms.’ But first, it is important to explore the fields of algorithms and 
memory in more detail. The following chapter will discuss some of the key concepts and ideas 



















2.0 Literature Review 
In order to answer the research questions posed in the introduction, I have chosen to engage 
with three particular fields of research: algorithm studies, memory studies, and digital memory 
studies. This is because the idea of remembering with algorithms necessitates a closer investi-
gation of these three areas and the particular concepts and ideas that have emerged within them. 
Firstly, the literature review explores in more depth the notion of algorithms as well as the role 
of algorithmic systems in society. Here I focus on three specific issues: visibility, order, and 
agency. Secondly, there is a need to investigate the field of memory studies and how past 
research has conceptualised remembering, memory, and memory practices. Here I explore 
issues such as self and identity, photograph and images, ideas of social memory, and archives. 
Lastly, the literature review engages with some of the main concepts and research strands that 
have emerged in what has been called digital memory studies. This section will explore the 
ideas of ‘digital’ and ‘mediated’ memories in more depth as well as the metaphor of dormancy, 
the interplay between social media platforms and social memory, and the nascent research on 
algorithms and memory. Reviewing literature from these three areas will provide both a deeper 
understanding of the issues at hand as well as a conceptual vocabulary when investigating the 
various intersections of algorithms and memory in chapters four, five, and six. Crucially, 
through an engagement with these fields of research, I identify relevant gaps in the literatures 
and how this project aims to explore these. 
 
2.1 Algorithm Studies 
This section will give a general overview of some key aspects or characteristics of algorithms. 
The field of ‘critical algorithm studies’, as it is sometimes called (Seaver and Gillespie, 2016), 
encapsulates a wide variety of aspects as well as scholarly directions. This section will touch 
on three key aspects of algorithms – visibility, order, and agency – as a way to better understand 
both the diverse implications of algorithmic systems enacted in the social world as well as the 
specific implications for mediated memories and everyday memory practices.  
Before discussing each of these aspects in more detail it is important to reiterate the 
scope and widespread proliferation of algorithms in society. As a result of the emergence of 
large datasets, often referred to as the era of Big Data (Boyd and Crawford, 2012; Kitchin, 
2014a) has led to a ‘data revolution’ (Kitchin, 2014b) in which data infrastructures and 
algorithmic systems have pervaded society. Algorithms have been implemented for various 
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purposes in contexts as diverse as schools (Andrejevic and Selwyn, 2019), border security 
systems (Amoore and Raley, 2017), academic work (Introna, 2016a), social media (Bucher, 
2012b), and even gymnastics tournaments (Keh, 2019). In tandem with the widespread 
applications of algorithms there has been a call to adopt a more critical stance towards them, 
as they have the potential to be systems of oppression (Noble, 2017) that dehumanise (Cheney-
Lippold, 2017) and perpetuate digital inequalities (Eubanks, 2018). But viewing algorithms 
solely in terms of oppression and discrimination fails to recognise that they are fundamentally 
productive processes, generating realities or, more specifically, the conditions for which certain 
realities are possible and desirable (Amoore, 2020). As such, algorithmic functions such as 
making-visible, classifying, and ordering need to be understood as a performative power to 
generate novel actual realities from virtual ones (Lash, 2007). In other words, they contain the 
potential to process data about the world and roll-out new modes of thoughts, behaviours, and 
habits, carving out new or modified spaces of human experience in a world they often claim to 
only represent.  
Algorithms are therefore socially powerful, both in the sense that power is exercised 
through them (e.g. government agencies, corporate companies) and more broadly that they 
have the potential to generate new realities. Yet, the social power of algorithms should not be 
understood in essentialist terms. As Taina Bucher (2018) reminds us, algorithms are 
ontologically processual, coming to matter in specific situations, at specific times, and within 
particular human-nonhuman assemblages. For instance, algorithms lose all meaning and 
efficacy apart from written code, apart from data and large training sets, apart from software 
and computational frameworks, apart from larger digital infrastructures, or apart from their 
everyday interactions within the world (both in terms of their effects on people and institutions, 
but also their interactions with other algorithms, as seen in high-frequency trading). Algorithms 
are therefore processual, relational, and affective. In short, the main thrust of this section is that 
algorithms are generative. They not only represent the world, but participate in shaping it. More 
specifically, this section will show how algorithms may do so in terms of broader issues such 






Even though algorithms may constitute opaque procedures (Burrell, 2016), they are powerful 
agents in the shaping of the visible realm, both online and offline. As I will show here, 
algorithms can structure and modulate the realm of the visible, and this has social implications. 
Much scholarly work has already been conducted into the ontology and sociality of visibility 
(Brighenti 2007; 2010) as well as how algorithms can modify the visible (Pasquinelli, 2009; 
Introna and Nissenbaum, 2000).6 In her article ‘Want to be on top?’ (2012b), Taina Bucher 
looks at new ‘modalities of visibility’ that algorithmic media, i.e. social media platforms, 
afford. She argues that through a particular architectural structuring, using the machine learning 
algorithm EdgeRank, Facebook constructs a regime of visibility that imbues in the user that 
participates on the platform a perceived ‘threat of invisibility’ (p. 1164). The algorithm behind 
the NewsFeed calculates people’s posts, pictures, and shares and filters them in a way that 
creates a hierarchy of visibility with some posts being more likely to be visible and others more 
likely to disappear from view. Unlike studies that examine mediated visibilities in terms of the 
ways in which people make themselves appear online, Bucher shifts the focus toward the 
software architectures that make possible such mediated visibilities in the first place, seeing 
software as ‘a sociotechnical actor capable of influencing users’ practices and experiences on 
the Web’ (p. 1167). Focusing on software and algorithms brings to the forefront how visibility 
is never just there; it is always made, arranged, and designed, never neutral.  
For Bucher, visibility is a matter of architecture or, more specifically, Facebook’s 
technical structuring of visibility on through the EdgeRank algorithm. What posts become 
visible and what posts disappear does not necessarily depend on what is written, even though 
the content is a factor that determines its relevance and impact to some extent. Rather, it 
fundamentally depends on ‘the (im)material conditions of the software’ that makes things 
‘visible, and thus knowable, in a specific way’ (p. 1171). As such, the way in which visibility 
on Facebook is organised entails that the condition of being visible to others becomes, Bucher 
states, a ‘highly contested game of power’ (p. 1165). This architectural structuring of visibility, 
the digital space of contestation on the NewsFeed, has affective repercussions on how subjects 
perceive themselves and participate on the platform. As Bucher states:  
 
6 Pasquinelli (2009) and Introna and Nissenbaum (2000) specifically examined the PageRank algorithm that 
calculates and determines the relevancy Google searches.  
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In Facebook there is not so much a 'threat of visibility' as there is a threat of invisi-
bility' that seems to govern the actions of its subjects. The problem as it appears is 
not the possibility of constantly being observed, but the possibility of constantly 
disappearing, of not being considered important enough. In order to appear, to 
become visible, one needs to follow a certain platform logic embedded in the archi-
tecture of Facebook (p. 1171). 
Through this struggle for contested visibility, the user is instilled with the logic of Facebook’s 
regime of visibility that works to discipline its users into a framework of ‘online participation 
= reward’. As Bucher writes, ‘In the Facebook assemblage, a useful individual is the one who 
participates, communicates and interacts’ (p. 1175). Thus, Bucher turns Foucault’s model of 
panoptic power on its head: ubiquitous visibility is not surveillance to be dreaded but a form 
of currency and a sign of participation to be pursued. But by participating, by wanting to 
become visible, one surrenders to, legitimates, and further perpetuates this ‘platform logic’ that 
is embedded in the way Facebook operates. Moreover, this reward scheme means that if one 
does not participate on Facebook, or participates in the ‘wrong’ way, the ‘punishment’ so to 
speak is invisibility. That is, if one does not continually participate there is a potential that one’s 
posts, pictures, and general uploads will not reach a wide audience of friends.7 Drawing on 
Foucault’s notion of discipline, Bucher states that this architectural structuring of visibility 
leads to a ‘participatory subjectivity’ (p. 1164), the reconfiguration and disciplining of users 
into participating subjects, subjects encouraged to be active or else they fall into obscurity.  
Bucher’s analysis helpfully reminds us that what is visible on social media platforms 
cannot simply be reduced to what is written or stated, whether it deserves to be visible or not, 
as it depends on the technical structuring of visibility underlying these platforms. As Andrea 
M. Brighenti (2010, p. 34) suggests, the visual has to ‘visibilised’, that is, it is has to be outlined, 
actively made, and programmed. Algorithmic procedures are not only there to make visibility 
easier but to better structure its conditions and facilitate its ‘game rules,’ however contested 
the game of power may be. But ultimately, Bucher (2012b, p. 1169) argues, the Facebook 
EdgeRank algorithm is ‘not merely modelled on a set of pre-existing cultural assumptions, but 
also on anticipated or future-oriented assumptions about valuable and profitable interactions 
 
7 This is exactly the opposite issue in areas such as surveillance and border security control (Amoore, 2009; 
Cheney-Lippold, 2016). Louise Amoore (2009, p. 25), for instance, argues that in border security practices 
algorithmic systems are ‘not primarily a way of seeing or surveilling the world, but rather a means of dividing, 
isolating, annexing subjects in order to visualize what is 'unknown'. As such, people can be ‘pixelated’ and then 
‘constructed’ as potential threats or terrorists.  
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that are ultimately geared towards commercial and monetary purposes’ (p. 1169). That is, 
social media platforms have a financial incentive to make sure that certain things remain visible 
to users, such as third-party ads. This financial incentive, which Astrid Mager (2012) argues is 
emblematic of an ‘algorithmic ideology,’ can not only be seen on certain social media sites but 
can also be seen as underpinning search engines such as Google and Bing as well as the 
continual development of search technology. Algorithmic mediations are attempts to ensure 
that the ‘right kind of’ visibility reaches the ‘right kind’ of audience (Mager, 2012). As such, 
visibility is algorithmically personalised, users are recommended or shown content that has 
been predicted will matter to them specifically. Visibility loses its potency if it is visible for 
the wrong reasons or, more importantly, to the wrong kind of crowd. Such instances could 
include getting ads that are vastly different to what users might normally connect with. This 
shows that the visibility created by algorithmic systems is not deterministic, but rather 
constitutes ‘spaces of contestation’ (Crawford, 2016), where users may engage with, negotiate 
and/or resist the outcomes of algorithms.    
For Lucas Introna (2016b), this financial incentive of making things visible on social 
media undergirds a move toward increasingly ‘choreographed’ forms of algorithmically 
mediated visibility. By this he means that algorithmic processing of data allows for the coming 
together of subject, product, and producer in an efficient and dynamic way. That is, a 
choreography that positions the user as a particular type of consumer (i.e. one who likes sports, 
books, listens to certain types of music) and couples them up with ads deemed ‘relevant’ to 
them in that particular time. More specifically, Introna proposes the notion of ‘impressionable 
subjects’ in explicating the importance of the ‘right kind of visibility’ to the ‘right kind of 
person’ in advertising. ‘Impressionable subjects’ refer to, Introna (2016b, p. 26) states:  
Subjects that are so impressed – pressed into or imprinted on – that they are 
highly likely to convert. That is, do something of value for the company whose 
advertisement it is – such as click on the advertisement, register on the site, buy 
a product/service, and so forth (original emphasis).  
Visibility on social media platforms such as Facebook is algorithmically manufactured around 
financial incentives to profit from users’ online activity. For Introna, algorithms have the 
capacity to both aggregate and individuate users, coupling them with product ads they are likely 
to buy based on the attributes of others. These notions of ‘choreographed visibility’ and 
‘impressionable subjects’ also bring attention to the way algorithmic systems not only find 
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already-existing users and compare them with other similar users; instead, as the next section 
will demonstrate, algorithmic systems classify, order and, ultimately create users and their 
points of comparisons.  
 
2.1.2 Order 
Another broad set of tasks performed by algorithms revolves around what I have here called 
the ‘order’ of algorithms: their affordances to cluster, classify, group, and categorise content 
and people. The ordering power of algorithms is seen to underpin the logic of social media 
platforms (Andersen, 2018; van Dijck and Poell, 2013) as well as various other real-world 
contexts.8 In short, algorithms is a pattern-seeking operations. They are often implemented to 
spot patterns in data in order to find how data points connect and diverge.9 Before we examine 
the social implications of such algorithmic ordering, it is worth mentioning that on an 
ontological level algorithmic outputs are predicated on boundaries and problems being clearly 
defined and demarcated. As Luciana Parisi (2016, p. 473) states, ‘the tendency of computation 
is to determine its incomputable horizon. What this activity implies is a continuous 
compression of incomputables into countable data and systems of equations.’ The algorithmic 
choreography of visibility, as we saw with Introna (2016b), relies on parameters (e.g. data or 
users) that have already been generated, made computable, countable, and thus been made 
actionable. In a sense, algorithms reduce, compress, and render the ‘incomputable’ into data 
that is intelligible. A crucial way this is done is through classification. As Adrian Mackenzie 
(2015, p. 433) states in ‘The production of prediction’: 
In all cases, prediction depends on classification, and classification itself 
presumes the existence of classes, and attributes that define membership of 
classes. This mode of apprehending differences through classification assumes 
that all relevant differences can be understood as deriving from combinations of 
attributes or ‘features.’  
 
8 Jack Andersen (2018) argues that search engines, algorithms, and databases increasingly shape and order 
everyday communicative actions, that is, ‘they make us think, internalize, and act along the lines of their particular 
modes of communication action’ (p. 1). 
9 For more on issues such as classification, classifiers, bayes probabilities, clustering, etc., see Adrian Mackenzie’s 
(2017) comprehensive Machine Learners. 
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In order for predictions to be efficacious, data must be classified and ordered, put into 
hierarchies.10 Algorithms process data to spot ways in which data points may be similar or 
different, how they may connect or diverge, classifying attributes accordingly. The algorithm, 
then, is a pattern-seeking and pattern-recognising procedure, implemented in wider systems, 
often in relation to other functions. They participate in the ordering of the social by classifying 
or grouping it into observable patterns and categories. Although such categories may not 
always be helpful, and though they may be discriminatory, they are rarely transparent. The 
ordering power of algorithms therefore does not simply reflect the way in which world is 
already divided and classified, but often participates in the production of such divisions and 
classifications. 
It is important to then ask what the social implications of the ordering power of 
algorithms are. One area the ordering power of algorithms becomes visible is in the field of 
identity and personalisation (e.g. de Vries, 2010; Lury and Day, 2019). John Cheney-Lippold’s 
(2011, 2016, 2017) work, for instance, has repeatedly emphasised how notions of identity, 
gender, and citizenship are being re-conceptualised through algorithmic categorisations. In the 
article ‘A New Algorithmic Identity’ (2011), Cheney-Lippold argued that the implementation 
of machine learning algorithms in sectors such as marketing and data analytics gave companies 
the capacity to infer categories of identity based not on survey or census statistics but rather on 
people’s online behavioural patterns. These algorithmic inferences or categorisations, 
according to Cheney-Lippold (2011, p. 172), constitute the emergence of a novel way of 
conceptualising and understanding identity as a ‘new analytical axis of power: the digital 
construction of categories of identity.’ This form of algorithmic categorisation calculates and 
determines people’s gender, class, or race based on tracking users movements across different 
websites and servers - in short, it is based on ‘statistical commonality models’ (p. 165). This 
means that as people’s online behavioural patterns change, even incrementally, notions of 
identity attributed to users are recalculated, remaining in a state of perpetual flux and recali-
bration. As such, the ordering power of algorithms do not simply construct online identities 
but, simultaneously, ‘defines the actual meaning of gender, class, or race themselves’ (p. 165). 
Attempts at algorithmically classifying individuals therefore helps to modify the very para-
meters of how identity is conceptualised and understood. As a result, Cheney-Lippold (2017, 
 
10 For more on the social implications of classification practices, see Bowker and Star (2000). 
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pp.4-5) has argued elsewhere that ‘we are data,’ that is, ‘we are temporary members of different 
emergent categories… according to our data.’  
 Cheney-Lippold’s work has also focused specifically on the implications of such 
algorithmic categorisations for emerging notions of gender. He argues that: 
Algorithms allow a shift to a more flexible and functional definition of the 
category, one that de-essentializes gender from its corporeal and societal forms 
and determinations while it also re-essentializes gender as a statistically-related, 
largely market research-driven category (Cheney-Lippold, 2011, p. 170). 
Drawing on Deleuze’s famous ‘control societies’, Cheney-Lippold (2011, p. 171) argues that 
such algorithmic categorisations constitute a novel form of biopower which he calls ‘soft 
biopower’. Soft biopower, in his view, comprises endlessly updatable categories of identity 
based on algorithmic calculations. Gender, in this framework, similarly becomes an endlessly 
updatable category, where a user’s gender is reduced to and equated with statistical correlations 
with other users.  Gender is detached from its embodied and societal forms and instead becomes 
an ever-modified correlative pattern. In short, a ‘man’ is someone behaving similar to other 
‘men’ online, leading to novel modes of generalisations and stereotyping.  The danger of such 
algorithmic categorisations, Cheney-Lippold (2011, p. 177) concludes, resides in the way they 
provide ‘an elastic relationship to power’, that is, ‘one that uses the capacity of suggestion to 
softly persuade users towards models of normalized behaviour and identity through the 
constant redefinition of categories of identity.’ The danger, in other words, lies in the way that 
these algorithmic categorisations are not simply tools for marketing, but also have the capacity 
to modify people’s perceptions and behaviours in the real world. Algorithmic calculations tend 
to ignore people’s embodied, subjective, social, and psychological realities. Instead, as he states 
in his book, We Are Data, ‘who we are in the face of algorithmic interpretation is how we are 
computationally calculated to be’ (Cheney-Lippold, 2017, p. 5). 
Another area where the ordering power of algorithms is salient is in relation to sociality 
and the ways in which it is variously configured on social media platforms. Critical media 
scholars have pointed out how social media platforms do not simply mediate or facilitate 
already-existing social groups; instead, they actively participate in shaping and constructing 
the formation of various audiences on social media platforms. Tarleton Gillespie (2014), in his 
influential article ‘The Relevance of Algorithms’, argued that algorithms can be seen to partici-
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pate in the production of what he calls ‘calculated publics.’ The way publics can be seen as 
‘calculated’ is, according to Gillespie (2014, p. 188): 
When Amazon recommends a book that ‘customers like’ bought, it is invoking and 
claiming to know a public with which we are invited to feel an affinity – though the 
population on which it bases these recommendations is not transparent, and is 
certainly not coterminous with its entire customer base. 
He further suggests that these algorithmically generated groups may be ‘inexact approxi-
mations’ and that they have nothing to do with the users they have sought to represent (p. 189). 
As such, algorithmic systems can often seem to reflect and mediate pre-existing audiences, 
with commonalities and mutual interests and affinities, whereas in actual fact these publics 
have been ‘calculated’ and programmed based on the criteria and aims posed by the social 
media platform in question. Gillespie’s (2016) exploration of Twitter trends is an apt example 
of how the algorithmic production of calculated publics can be seen at work in everyday life. 
On Twitter, things trend when multiple users concurrently tweet about the same event/news or 
engage with the same topic through hashtags. Yet, as Gillespie (2016, p. 3) points out, Twitter’s 
trending algorithm identifies what is popular for ‘us’ by using ‘a combination of metrics to 
identify particular content or topics generating the most activity, at a particular moment, and 
among a particular group of users.’ According to Gillespie, trending algorithms on Twitter 
calculate whether something should trend based broadly on three different components: a very 
broad who, a very narrow when, and a little what. For something to trend, in other words, the 
algorithm calculates how many users (who) tweet about a certain topic (what) within short 
increments of time (when). Trending algorithms, as such, purport to help link content with 
users who are likely to find it newsworthy or interesting. For Gillespie, trends are algorithmic 
calculations that invite us ‘to both attend to and join these trends’ (p. 7). The trend, in a sense, 
is created by users being shown the ‘trend.’   
A third area where the ordering power of the algorithm can be seen is with regards to 
culture and cultural production. For instance, much critical work has already examined how 
algorithms shape music taste on various digital platforms (Prey, 2017; Karakayali et al., 2018). 
Culture is an elusive concept and has been conceptualised in various different ways. For 
Raymond Williams (1976), in his book Keywords, ‘culture’ refers to the values, views, and 
meanings embedded in certain practices and forms of life. Williams argues that culture is often 
implicit because it is ordinary, ubiquitous, and taken for granted. It seems evident that many of 
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the practices commonly understood as ‘cultural’ have been reshaped, or are in the process of 
being reshaped, by algorithms. In Popular Culture and New Media, David Beer (2013) argues 
that our everyday lives are increasingly being shaped and ordered by the merging of new media 
and popular culture. He points out that taste is often understood in relation to people’s 
economic background and their level of social or cultural capital. With the emergence of new 
media, Beer argues, this view fails to capture the fact that algorithms are shaping people’s 
cultural tastes to a larger extent than ever before (pp. 3-4). Central to this intersection of new 
media and popular culture are circulations of data that are produced on a granular level by 
people who engage with culture in various ways (be it through the movies they watch or the 
music they listen to) (p. 4). The data is generated when people engage with various new media 
architectures such as digital archives and social media platforms and this data then flows back 
into these architectures, reshaping them based on the new data that was produced. Culture, 
becoming mediatised, increasingly consists of a multiplicity of flows, of data circulations that 
recursively fold back into the very culture that facilitates these flows in the first place. 
Therefore, it is not unlikely that there exists, as Beer (2013, p. 165) states, ‘an underlying 
recursivity in contemporary culture.’ That is, a recursivity that is arguably key to understanding 
not only how popular culture works but modern rationality as well (Hui, 2019; Totaro and 
Ninno, 2014; 2016). 
 The social power of algorithms, embedded in software and new media architectures, 
can be said to ‘flow’ out from these circulations of data into everyday life. They classify and 
order what movies or music people watch or listen to depending on what they have previously 
watched or listened to. But the power of these automatic processes resides not only in their 
power to predict cultural behaviour by continually honing the accuracy of recommendation 
systems, but in their performativity: ‘algorithms have the capacity and potential to make 
taste by shaping cultural encounters and crafting our cultural landscape’ (Beer, 2013, p. 99; 
original emphasis). As algorithms order our cultural consumption and recommend what new 
music to listen to, what books to buy, and what films to watch the ordering power of algorithms 
is revealed and continually fine-tuned.  As culture is reconfigured through increasingly intimate 
circulations of data, the role of algorithms to process and to make sense of these data sets 
becomes ever more important.  
 There are others, however, who have argued that the ubiquity of algorithmic processes 
in society has led to the emergence of ‘algorithmic culture’ (Galloway, 2006; Striphas, 2015). 
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What is meant by this notion? Defining algorithmic culture, Ted Striphas (2015, p. 396) states 
that: 
What one sees in Amazon, and in its kin Google, Facebook, Twitter, Netflix and 
many others, is the enfolding of human thought, conduct, organization and expres-
sion into the logic of big data and large-scale computation, a move that alters how 
the category culture has long been practiced, experienced and understood. This is 
the phenomenon I am calling… ‘algorithmic culture.’ 
Hallinan and Striphas (2016) take this notion further in order to elucidate the extent to which 
algorithms feature prominently in the construction, curation, consumption, and circulation of 
(digital) cultural objects such as films and music. Culture, according to Hallinan and Striphas, 
is increasingly entangled with algorithmic practices, and these practices participate in the 
shaping and determining of what culture looks like. For example, they state that Netflix offered 
1 million US dollars to the first person or team who could improve their recommendation 
system by 10% (2016, p. 117). The competition, which was known as The Netflix Prize (2006-
2009), revealed that long-established marketing categories such as gender, ethnicity, and age 
were insufficient factors when determining the accuracy and appropriateness of a movie or 
series recommendation. These classifications failed to capture the more nuanced reasons why 
people watched the movies they did and they were therefore not precise enough when trying to 
draw connections between users, that is, when trying to determine what ‘kind’ of viewer would 
view ‘what’ kind of movie (p. 123). Instead, the outcome of the competition led to a shift in 
how movies and series were being recommended on the platform, ‘from more traditionally 
collaborative filtering to a blend of latent predictive elements’ (p. 127). The Netflix algorithms 
started recommending based on individual user ratings, that is, what movies the user likes, and 
would modify its recommendations based on the user’s continual engagements with the 
services on Netflix and the movies or series their algorithms recommended, echoing Cheney-
Lippold’s (2011) notion of ‘soft biopower.’  
 Hallinan and Striphas (2016, pp. 129-130) also point out how Netflix used a factor-
based algorithmic approach to the production of their popular political drama series, House of 
Cards. Based on the analytical tracking and classification of their users, Netflix found strong 
correlations between factors such as ‘David Fincher’, ‘Kevin Spacey’, and ‘Political Drama’ 
and thereafter sought to assess whether there would be a potential audience for the combination. 
In other words, both the production and recommendation of movies and television series are 
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informed by ‘data-driven hunches’ (Hallinan and Striphas, 2016, p. 129). It signals the 
importance of data in determining cultural production and consumption rather than using more 
traditionally fixed marketing categories such as age, gender, and race. The example suggests a 
way in which algorithmic processing of user data operates in an everyday context, shaping and 
reinforcing the taste of their subscribers.  
It is important to note, however, even though algorithms may be said to constitute a 
powerful ordering force in the world, this ordering force must not be equated with a wholistic, 
overarching logic or grand narrative. As has been already suggested, algorithms produce 
multiple outputs from multiple inputs (Roberge and Seyfert, 2016, p. 3), resulting in a multi-
directionality that problematises the orderliness of algorithmic order. As such, given this 
multiplicity and contingency, Roberge and Seyfert (2016) prefer the plural notion ‘algorithmic 
cultures.’ Multiple outcomes engender and cascade into multiple readings, interpretations, 
conceptions, and lived practices. This is, for instance, well demonstrated by Taina Bucher’s 
(2017) notion of ‘algorithmic imaginary’, where users and algorithms are seen as intertwined 
on social media platforms, iteratively shaping each other. Bucher shows how people’s 
perceptions of the algorithm shapes the way they interact with it, which in turn shapes how the 
algorithm interacts with them as well as the kind of content it reveals. Still, the algorithm 
participates in the reconfiguration of culture and its underlying principles of automation, 
calculation, classification, and hierarchisation can be seen in how culture is being produced, 
mediated, and consumed. That is why it is crucial to also examine the idea of agency in this 
context, both in terms of human and algorithmic agencies.  
 
2.1.3 Agency 
As the previous sections have shown, algorithms are now widely diffused in society, perfor-
ming real-world tasks but also affecting and shaping people’s perceptions, behaviours, and 
grids of intelligibility. Does this mean that algorithms have agency in the sense that human 
beings have agency? In order to answer this question, it is important ask what counts as an 
agential ‘act’. This section will look at this notion of agency in more depth, both in terms of 
algorithms and humans. This project draws on notions of agency from STS scholarships, 
especially Bruno Latour’s (1988, 1992) conceptualisation of ‘actor.’ Latour’s actors constitute 
a broad category, where nonhuman objects are considered agents similar to human beings. 
Latour abandons the dichotomy between agency-possessing humans (subject) and the agency-
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lacking nonhuman (object), proposing the notion of ‘actors’ instead, which envisages a 
complex intermingling between humans and non-humans alike. He similarly abandons the 
subject-object dichotomy in favour of action, defined as ‘a property of associated entities’ 
(Latour, 1994, p. 35). For Latour, ‘essence is existence and existence is action’ (p. 35). Actions 
are therefore fundamentally distributed across a wide range of actors. In other words, actions 
are that which does, enables, facilitates, authorises, enhances, accelerates, modifies.   
From such a viewpoint, algorithms must be thought of as performative, exercising 
affective power in the social world. Yet, it is also important to account for the interdependence 
and interconnections of various actors. Following Deleuze and Guattari, Donald Mackenzie 
(2009) has called the assemblage of humans, non-human objects, and technical systems 
‘agencement’ in order to capture the associative and entangled nature of agency. It is a reminder 
that agency does not strictly nor exclusively reside in the human subject. It also encapsulates 
nonhuman objects such as algorithmic systems that make ‘subjects’ possible. Moreover, the 
notion of agencement or assemblages indicates what Lucas Introna (2011) calls the ‘enframing’ 
of agencies within systems and wider structures. In his essay ‘The Encoding of Human 
Agency’, Introna (2011) argues that all forms of human agency are always predicated on pre-
existing conditions, norms, and rules. That is, human agency does not exist in a vacuum but is 
made possible by ‘material enactments’ such as language, writing, or software code that are 
often taken for granted (p. 116). Introna, echoing Marshall McLuhan’s (2001) media theory, 
states that all cultures and all epochs have their own modes of encoding, enactments without 
which reality remains unintelligible, where people remain ‘trapped in the immediacy of the 
present and the encoded materiality of the body’ (p. 122). Material enactments, according to 
Introna, frame or translate our social existence so that it becomes possible for us to act meaning-
fully, extending our agency in the world.  
However, Introna argues, that is impossible to separate human agency from these 
encoding systems. Echoing posthumanist scholars such as Ihde, Haraway, and Hayles, Introna 
argues that ‘there is no agency – and therefore no actor – which is prior to encoding/extension’ 
(p. 119) and that ‘all agency is always borrowed (or ‘plagiarized’) – i.e. it is never originally 
human’ (pp. 133-134). In other words, one should not start with human essence and view 
technologies and encoding material enactments as merely emanating from it. Rather, the tools 
we have used to create the world have always been embedded in who we are and how we act. 
Human agency is encoded by them, framed, enabled, shaped, and borrowed from them. In this 
view, agency can therefore be understood as a ‘nested’ concept. That is, ‘as our sociomaterial 
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world becomes more complex, agency becomes increasingly encapsulated – nested as codes 
within codes within codes’ (Introna, 2011, p. 134). They help us make sense of ourselves as 
well as extend our agencies to act meaningfully in our environments. Most importantly, 
however, encoding enactments ‘performatively produce’ our agency. Enactments such as 
algorithms never merely represent the world to ourselves and to others; they help produce the 
reality they purport to represent. 
This notion of agency as nested and as distributed also echoes N. Katherine Hayles’s 
(1999, 2006, 2012, 2017) extensive work on agency and cognition. In How We Think (2012), 
for instance, Hayles investigates how humans and machines perform different cognitive 
functions such as making inferences. Attempting to capture the entanglement of human and 
machine, she proposes the notion of ‘technogenesis’, which refers to the ‘reciprocal causality 
between human bodies and technics’ (Hayles, 2012, p. 123). Agency, in this framework, 
consists of both human and nonhuman actors that are mutually constitutive. Humans are 
dependent on these technical systems as much as they are on humans. Hayles’s work also 
challenges the assumption that agency must be equated with ideas of intentionality, rationality, 
and consciousness. Hayles’s notion of ‘cognisphere’ (2006), as well as her work on non-
conscious forms of cognition in Unthought (2017), problematises such claims by suggesting 
that cognitive processes do not reside merely in human subjects, but are rather distributed 
across biological and nonbiological lifeforms such as media and technical systems. Human 
agency is always-already part of broader assemblages of interwoven and interconnected modes 
of cognition.  
Moreover, in her book Unthought (2017), Hayles proposes the distinction replaces the 
dichotomy between human and nonhuman in favour of ‘cognizers’ and ‘noncognizers’. 
Emphasising ideas of cognition enables Hayles to conceptually capture the vast extent to which 
human agency comprises the enactment of nonconscious cognition. For humans, for instance, 
agency is most often not conscious. Most of human or bodily behaviour is performed uncon-
sciously, which in turn means that agency should not be reduced to simply conscious choice or 
intentionality. Hayes argues that algorithmic systems similarly perform non-conscious forms 




 It would be easy to fall into the trap of thinking that such arguments propose a 
deterministic view of human agency as totally engulfed in and nullified by algorithmic systems. 
However, this is not the case. As Louise Amoore (2019a, p. 6) reminds us: 
A Haylesian reading would urge caution with the idea that forms of machine 
reading are subsuming the human forms of deep reading of these authors. The 
human and the algorithm are co-evolving, yielding new modes of reading and 
cognition that do not readily map onto conventional notions of the human and 
the machine. 
Notions such as actors, agencement, cognisphere, and cognizers emphasise a ‘co-evolution’, a 
‘technogenesis’, of human and nonhuman agencies, that is, a process by multiple kinds of 
agency are mutually produced.11 Elsewhere, Introna and Hayes (2011, p. 108) have called this 
co-evolution a ‘constitutive entanglement’, suggesting the dialectical production of human 
subjects and the technical (or algorithmic) systems which they come into contact with. But this 
dialectical process is not smooth or straightforward, which means that the relations or 
interconnectedness of human and algorithmic agencies cannot be conceptualised as simply a 
form of ‘being alongside’ (Latimer, 2013). As Lucas Introna (2011, p. 118) points out, ‘in the 
multiplicity of encoded events there are always multiple points or possibilities for the otherness 
of the events to assert itself.’ The conditions underlying human agency are not fixed but may 
at any time, for any given reason, modulate and fluctuate. Algorithmic systems do not simply 
actualise certain realities in the social world unproblematically, because they exist in complex 
wider assemblages as well as in relation to various human practices, resistances, and surprising 
intentions.  
Therefore, with every algorithmic implementation, there always exists a vast array of 
potential outcomes, possibilities that the algorithm may change, and that accidents, break-
downs, misuses, subversions, and re-appropriations may occur. As Bucher (2017) shows, 
algorithmic systems can be shaped by human responding to them, gaming them, or resisting 
them. As such, algorithmic outcomes or implementations are not entirely determined but rather 
 
11 Other ways to conceptualise the relationship between humans and algorithmic systems is in terms of a ‘dance 
of agency’ (Pickering, 2005) or ‘flows of agency’ (Introna, 2016b). Lucas Introna (2016b) develops this notion 
of flow of agency in relation to algorithmic choreography and impressionable subjects, stating that:  
In the algorithmic choreography of the impressionable subject there are many different agencies 
circulating – which overlap, coincide, correspond, etc. In these circulations intentions, identities, 
positions become translated and displaced in ways that do not allow any definite choreographer 
to emerge (not the algorithms, nor the subjects, nor the advertisers, nor the advertising agencies, 
and so forth) (p. 47).  
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carry traces of contingency.12 Moreover, Kate Crawford (2016) argues that algorithmic encoun-
ters should be perceived as ‘spaces of contestation.’ Although algorithms contain the power 
and potential to transform reality and may enact what their designers intended them to do, they 
do not necessarily always reflect the intentionality of their designers.13 They do not determine, 
and are sometimes unable to even predict, how people will act and react to those algorithmic 
processes. Reality is messier and more unpredictable than often assumed. 
Roberge and Seyfert (2016, p. 3), in order to capture this uncertainty in algorithmic 
operations, propose the idea that algorithms possess a sort of ‘fractal agency’, suggesting that 
they may or may not result in (un)wanted and (un)expected outcomes. They argue that, even if 
algorithms can be said to ‘do’ things or to possess agency, their actions cannot be said to always 
be intentional or straightforward. Rather, they state, ‘the type of agency involved here can be 
best described as ‘fractal,’ that is, producing numerous outputs from multiple inputs’ (Roberge 
and Seyfert, 2016, p. 3). As the mathematical term suggests, the fractal agency of algorithms 
is multidirectional, pushing in multiple directions simultaneously. They seldomly operate in a 
linear fashion (that is, translating one input to one output) but rather work with finding patterns, 
sorting, and categorising units from large datasets to which data is constantly added, retracted, 
and evolving. As Roberge and Seyfert suggest, the outcome of multiple inputs is, corres-
pondingly, multiple results.  
In addition to the complexity of algorithmic multi-directionality, the idea of fractal 
algorithmic agency invokes fragility and the potential for brokenness, as the words ‘fractal’ 
and ‘fracture’ both etymologically derive from the Latin word frangere, which means to break. 
Roberge and Seyfer (2016, p. 3) state that ‘one algorithm is intertwined with many others in 
extremely intricate networks. Nonhuman as much as human contributions are thus key here, 
and could rather easily result in mismatches, unpredictable results, or even dramatic failures.’ 
This potential for unpredictable failures and mismatches, creates an algorithmic indeterminacy 
by which the outputs produced by algorithms may be numerous but do not always necessarily 
achieve what they were initially designed to achieve. Shintaro Miyazaki (2016), for example, 
has outlined how the AT&T Crash of 1990 was a result of a malfunction in the algorithmic 
 
12 M. Beatrice Fazi (2018) even argues that contingency is at the heart of all forms of computations.  
13 Green and Viljoen (2020) have proposed the notion of ‘algorithmic realism’ as a new mode of algorithmic 
thinking for computer scientists. Algorithmic realism sensitises computer scientists and programmers to the gaps 
that exist between the intended (good) uses of algorithms and the actual socio-economic realities they often help 
create or perpetuate in the real world.  
 
38 
feedback loops.14 Of course, looking for the initial purpose of an algorithm procedure is not 
always straightforward. It assumes that a particular human intentionality can always be located 
as underlying originator of the algorithm in question. On the contrary, the reality is most often 
that the production of algorithms involves large teams of developers simultaneously working 
on different parts of it. But the idea of a fractal agency is a helpful reminder of how an algorithm 
operates: through a multi-directional production of several outputs that carries the potential for 
failure and mismatch.   
Given their proneness to failure and the unexpected consequences that can emerge from 
algorithmic outputs, Louise Amoore (2019b) has proposed a ‘posthuman mode of doubt.’ 
Amoore points out that the allure of (machine learning) algorithms for the financial and 
political sectors resides in their promise of ‘securing against all possible future events 
(terrorism, irregular migration, financial crisis, climate change), via the analysis of data’ (p. 
148). With machine learning algorithms, future possibilities and unknowabilities are reduced 
to ‘a malleable arrangement of weighted probabilities’ (pp. 148-149) whereby any doubt is thus 
eradicated and instead rendered as a singular decision that is made actionable by the algorithm. 
This is also echoed by Luciana Parisi (2016, p. 473), who suggests that for computation to 
actually be efficacious it must be predicated on ‘a continuous compression of incomputables 
into countable data and systems of equations.’ Yet, according to Amoore (2019b), the 
fundamental issue is not that algorithms produce ‘partial accounts’ of the world or the future; 
rather, they reveal ‘the already present problem of locating a clear-sighted account in a 
knowable human subject’ (p. 150). The issue, in other words, is not that the algorithm provides 
partial accounts and humans are somehow able to provide full accounts. Instead, doubt inheres 
in both human and algorithmic agency. Certainty is never fully achievable. The presence of 
doubt in algorithmic systems, according to Amoore, opens onto a future ‘that is never fully 
reduced to the single output signal, to the optimised target’ (p. 147). In other words, algorithms 
can be considered agents, performing tasks in the real world, shaping, and affecting how life is 
lived and perceived. Yet, just like humans, they are unable to fully capture the complexity of 
reality in single actionable outputs. At the same time, this does not stun human agency, but 
their interactions with algorithms are characterised by a variety of outcomes, possibilities, and 
reactions – by doubt. Algorithms and humans, therefore, are intertwined in assemblages of 
 
14 For more on the momentary break-down of algorithmic systems and its repercussions, see chapter five 
‘Temporality and Cognitive Assemblages’ (pp. 142-178) in Katherine N. Hayles’s Unthought (2017). 
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interconnected agencies, but this does not pre-determine what the outcomes will be, but rather 
opens onto a future that is never fully reduced to a single output signal.   
 
The algorithm, in short, is affective and performative. It structures and modulates the realm of 
the visible, enframes and reframes human agency, and constitutes an ordering force that 
reconfigures culture in relation to its rationality of automation, calculation, classification, and 
hierarchisation. But to ascribe power to the algorithm is not to pose a deterministic view of 
computational agency, limiting all human practices and perceptions, nor is it to essentialise a 
particular software property. Rather, it is acknowledging that algorithms form part of a much 
larger and complex ‘assemblage of strategies’ (Bucher, 2018, p. 3) from which power flows. It 
is an acknowledgment of the scope to which algorithms have been implemented in society, and 
some of the important functions we have delegated to these automated processes. It is 
acknowledging that algorithms make matter and only come to matter in particular situations 
and at particular times. As this thesis also explores, it is crucial to understand the way in which 
algorithms interact with and shape people’s everyday memory practices. I will now outline 
some important aspects and themes that have emerged in the memory studies literature.  
 
2.2 Memory Studies 
What is memory? How can we understand and conceptualise memories and remembering? 
Research into the nature, qualities, functions, and implications of memory have been conducted 
across diverse fields: neuroscience, cognitive psychology, cultural studies, social studies and 
sociology, literary studies, history, and philosophy. Ideas of memory can vary greatly as well. 
At best, memory is ‘travelling concept’ (Bal, 2002), one which traverses disciplinary, 
linguistic, historical, and cultural boundaries, picking up a heterogeneity of meanings whilst 
simultaneously shedding others. The study of memory is a diversified and interdisciplinary 
endeavour, comprising various epistemological, ontological methodological assumptions and 
approaches. The meaning of memory also varies from culture to culture, whilst there exists a 
multiplicity of memory practices, which converge and diverge across various societal contexts. 
 It is important, then, that memory be understood ‘within a kind of multidimensional 
space’ (Sutton et al., 2010, p. 221), where both personal, cultural, and social forms of remem-
bering are considered, as well as tools, objects, databases, archives, algorithms, and infra-
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structures. In this part of the literature review, I have narrowed the multiple approaches to 
memory studies down to four key areas: self and identity, photography, the social forms of 
memory, and archives. The reason for choosing these areas is because they can provide a deeper 
understand the various ideas and concepts that underlie my examination into the intersections 
of algorithms and people’s memory practices. These focal points also provide a language and 
framework in which to make sense of the ways memories are facilitated, ordered, and 
resurfaced on algorithmic remembrance technologies as well as how these technologies figure 
in people’s everyday memory practices. Although the literature review differentiates between 
four key areas of memory studies, it is important to acknowledge that these are not holistic nor 
independent categories. Rather, they coexist, blend, and often overlap. The following section 
will discuss how memory has been conceptualised in relation to notions of self and identity. 
 
2.2.1 Self and Identity 
In many areas of memory studies, memory remains intimately interconnected with ideas of self 
and identity. Memory has been suggested to be key to how a sense of self is maintained over 
time. English philosopher John Locke, for instance, emphasised this link between memory and 
a sense of self, arguing that memory was not just a means of storage, a storehouse and 
extraction point for lived experiences, but rather constituted an essential part of a person’s 
selfhood, a sense of their diachronicity, as well as their identity-making process (Ferguson, 
1996). Locke suggested that it is because of memory that individuals have the ability to act in 
accordance (or in opposition) with their past sense of self. They are able to reflect back and 
evaluate present behaviours in view of the past and to reinterpret past behaviours in view of 
the present. This frame of reference for action anchors people in ‘the now’ and gives them a 
sense of continuity over time. As such, this anchoring aspect of memory is considered vital for 
a sense of selfhood that is relatively consistent through time.  
Since Locke, the study of the connection between memory and self has been developed 
in diverse directions but, as Frances Ferguson (1996) has noted, the emphasis on the inter-
dependence of memory and a continual sense of self has remained a focal point of memory 
studies. Its continual importance is also evident when looking at how this link has been 
explored in popular culture, with movies such as Blade Runner and Eternal Sunshine of the 
Spotless Mind as well as more recently with the HBO series Westworld. However, Ferguson 
(1996) adds that this interconnection between memory and self was to a large extent born out 
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of the Romantic period, a period in which the idea of the self was foregrounded and where 
memory predominantly revolved around and was anchored in ‘the individual.’ As Ferguson 
observes, memory following the Romantic period has come to stand for not only the ability to 
recall certain parts of the past, but also ‘the possibility of reflexiveness itself’ (p. 514).  
 This idea of memory as condition for self and reflexiveness has permeated Western 
societies, even becoming inextricably embedded at the level of language itself. For example, 
Paul Ricoeur (2004, p. 96) has pointed out that French uses the reflexive pronoun ‘soi’ (self) 
as prefix to the verbs ‘souvenir’ and ‘rappeler’, meaning to remember. At the level of everyday 
speech, Ricoeur (2004, p. 96) suggests, remembering figures as an act of the self: ‘in remember-
ing something, one remembers oneself.’ Moreover, the idea of reflexiveness also highlights 
how memories are not static representations of the past. Rather, as the process of producing 
and maintaining a sense of self through time is not stable, so memories are constantly being 
revised and modified in the present. This is also echoed by the psychoanalytic literature where 
memory traces are constantly revised and rearranged to fit new experiences and new 
circumstances, incorporated into and perpetuating a sense of continuous self (e.g. Kennedy, 
2010). This view is further echoed in psychology and neuroscience where remembering 
denotes an imaginative reconstruction of the past in the present (e.g. Bartlett, 1932; Rose, 
2003). As Fredric Bartlett (1932, p. 213) put it: 
Remembering is not the re-excitation of innumerable fixed, lifeless and fragmen-
tary traces. It is an imaginative reconstruction, or construction, built out of the 
relation of our attitude towards a whole active mass of organised past reactions 
or experience. 
Remembering, in this view, entails an interactive process of interpretation and reinterpretation, 
of ‘imaginative reconstruction’ of the past and our relationship to the past. As Annette Kuhn 
(1995) argues, memory can therefore be considered as an always-already ‘secondary-revision’, 
that is, an ongoing and dynamic process of negotiating the past, present and future. In Family 
Secrets (1995), Kuhn proposes the notion of ‘memory work’ in order to better capture these 
dynamics of remembering. ‘This in effect is my understanding of memory work,’ Kuhn (1995, 
p. 157) states, ‘an active practice of remembering which takes an inquiring attitude towards the 
past and the activity of its (re)construction through memory.’ Kuhn’s notion of memory work 
highlights the affinity between remembering as an act of interpretation as well as an active 
‘investigation’ into past experiences and the objects which mediate them, such as photographs. 
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Memory work conceptualises remembering as a set of active, intentional, performative, and yet 
contested acts, turning a critical eye to the ways in which the past is construed. The reason 
remembering may be seen as performative is because personal memories are constantly being 
interpreted and re-interpreted, be it to fit the current situation of the person remembering or to 
give a sense of personal and historical continuity.15 In other words, memories are less like 
storehouse objects waiting to be accessed and more like the by-products of ongoing investi-
gative memory work. 
 Given this intimate link between memory and self, there has been much emphasis on 
the role of narrative in relation to both memory and identity (e.g. Bruner, 1991; Cavarero, 
2000). In her book Relating Narrative, Adriana Cavarero (2000, p. 33) argues that ‘every 
human being, without even wanting to know it, is aware of being a narratable self – immersed 
in the spontaneous auto-narration of memory’ (original emphasis). Drawing attention to both 
the link between memory and identity and the notion of memories as constantly in a state of 
flux, Steph Lawler (2014) explores the role of memories particularly in relation to how 
identities are formed in everyday life. In her book Identity (2014), Lawler seeks to examine 
how people engage in ‘processes of producing an identity through assembling various 
memories, experiences, episodes, etc., within narratives’ (p. 24; emphasis original). Drawing 
on Paul Ricoeur’s notion of ‘emplotment’, Lawler explores how the narratives people employ 
in the production of their identities and how stories and memories from the past figure in this 
narrative production. Emplotment delineates the minimally necessary elements that a narrative 
needs to have in order to be a narrative, these being characters, action, and plot. Every narrative, 
in other words, needs to have someone in it, something that happens, and a plot which, as 
Lawler points out, is what actually ‘makes’ the narrative: ‘it brings together events and episodes 
into a meaningful whole: events or episodes are not thrown together at random but are linked 
together’ (p. 24). Emplotment is the making of a plot and the linking or ‘synthesising’ together 
of events.16  
This process of bringing events and episodes together in a meaningful fashion, is 
essential to a narrative. More importantly, emplotment is essential to how a sense of continuous 
self is produced and maintained through time. In making sense of themselves, people draw on 
memories of various incidents and episodes that happened at various points in their lives. These 
 
15 This notion that memories are in a constant state of flux, since they are products of iterative processes of 
interpretation and reinterpretation, also brings attention to the way memories can be forgotten, repressed, or 
plainly false. For more on this notion of ‘false memories’, see Loftus (1997).  
16 Ricoeur defines emplotment as ‘a synthesis of heterogeneous elements’ (Ricoeur quoted in Lawler, 2014, p. 27) 
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incidents are not necessarily connected (and some not at all) but are linked together through a 
process of emplotment – a linking of events in a narrative structure – and these memories 
therefore form part of a (logically) continuous narrative of interconnected episodes that give 
the impression that these incidents have ‘inevitably’ led individuals to where they are now (p. 
29). ‘Emplotment,’ Lawler suggests, ‘configures a self which appears as the inevitable outcome 
and actualization of the episodes which constitute a life’ (pp. 29-30). A sense of continuous 
self is therefore produced in the process of recursively engaging with, interpreting, 
reinterpreting, and organising one's memories in relation to the narrative of one’s life. 
Moreover, Lawler suggests that memories, being themselves interpretations, are highly 
selective and are ultimately dependent on the impact they have on whomever remembers. They 
feature heavily in the narratives we produce, and it is ‘through the narratives themselves that 
we produce our identities in this way’ (p. 26; emphasis original). As such, memories are part 
and parcel of the recursive production of people’s identities, and this in turn highlights the 
extent to which memories are performative. In short, memories are performed, enacted and re-
enacted through the continual telling of stories.   
Lawler’s work on the utility of memories for the production of identity narratives 
highlights how these narratives can be created both intentionally and unconsciously by 
individuals. Emplotment highlights how identities are actively produced by stories and people 
drawing on their past experiences and memories. As such, the notion highlights the purposeful 
processes by which people draw on memories to make sense of themselves. This sense of 
purposefulness and conscious retrieval of memories for present interpretations is also echoed 
in Annette Kuhn’s (1995) notion of memory work as investigative attitude to the ways in which 
the past is perceived, construed, and constructed in the present.  
Yet, the dynamic and multi-faceted nature of remembering encompasses not only con-
scious processes but nonconscious as well. These unconscious dynamics of memory become 
visible when turning to the idea of forgetting. Even though forgetting harbours notions of 
ambiguity and suspicion in Western history of thought (Weinrich, 1997), its centrality to 
remembering, reflexivity, and action cannot be denied. For instance, Siegfried Kracauer 
([1927]1993, p. 425) stated that memory encompasses ‘neither the entire spatial appearance 
nor the entire temporal course of an event,’ but was rather full of gaps and voids that have been 
forgotten. ‘Autobiographical memory,’ Jens Brockmeier (2002, p. 20) observes, ‘is essentially 
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about forgetting: forgetting about most of what happened in one’s life-time.’17 Autobio-
graphical memory is not only what we forget but what we thought we had forgotten and are 
then reminded of later on. The centrality of forgetting to our memory suggests that even if 
people (deliberately) draw on memories in order to produce and re-produce a sense of identity, 
most of people’s past experiences are inaccessible or at least not accessible to intentional re-
collection even if they may be important part of someone’s personal history. As such, memories 
are not only an active set of practices, something we use to form our identities; memory is also 
something that happens to us – unpredictably, spontaneously, organically, and uncontrollably.  
 This idea of memory as unpredictable and spontaneous is well captured in the work of 
novelist Marcel Proust, especially in relation to his idea of ‘involuntary memory.’ For Proust, 
voluntary memory, or actively remembering certain events or experiences that happened to 
oneself, was not considered ‘true’ memory since it only provided an imprecise copy of the past 
(Wood, 2010, p. 111). Proust claims that true memory, on the other hand, is a spontaneous 
recovery of the past through an unexpected provocation of the senses: the scent of a particular 
brand of tea, the sound of a piano, the sensation of holding a particular book in your hands. 
There is a famous example in Proust’s Way by Swann’s where the narrator dips a madeleine 
biscuit in tea and feels a warm sensation rushing over him and is immediately transported back 
to his childhood days in Combray where his aunt would give him biscuits on Sunday mornings. 
Even though Proust’s memory distinction is questionable, the examples of involuntary memory 
in Proust’s fiction sensitises us to the elusive, nonconscious elements of memory, and also 
highlights the role of the body in remembering (Whitehead, 2009). 
These unexpected sensations also highlight the role of reminding. As Edward S. Casey 
(1987) states, reminding is a fundamental modulation of remembering. It is a way of revisiting 
or being revisited by past memories, or being prompted to revisit, through objects such as old 
photographs and videos. Just as with Proust’s notion of involuntary memory, people can be 
prompted to remember certain past experiences in unexpected ways and at unexpected times. 
Sensations may remind us of the past, remind us of memories we had forgotten we had. In a 
 
17 The critical role of forgetting for identity is also echoed in Pierre Bourdieu’s (1990) work, especially with 
regards to his notion of ‘habitus’. Habitus, being the inculcated dispositions, can be understood as ‘embodied 
history, internalised as second nature and so forgotten as history’ (Bourdieu, 1990, p. 56). Inculcated habits and 
embodied dispositions are historically conditioned and internalised to such an extent that people forget where they 
originated (e.g. class relations). Instead, these qualities and habits come to seem as innate and intrinsic to someone 
is. This kind of forgetting, history ‘forgotten as history’, is constitutive of people’s identities. 
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sense, these external factors afford remembering to take place. Michael Wood (2010, p. 113), 
in his analysis of Marcel Proust, states that the role of reminding is a crucial one:  
It's not that we don't remember, it's that we can't recall. Significant memories 
don't come when they are called, and we couldn't call them anyway, because we 
don't know of their existence until they suddenly arrive. We happen on them; 
they happen to us. 
Involuntary memory, as understood by Marcel Proust, can produce both sensations of joy, as 
we are reminded of happy childhood days, or sadness, as we are reminded of someone’s death. 
These memories happen externally, they are cued and provoked by things around us. They are 
involuntary, and as such problematize our notions of agency and intentionality in relation to 
memory. This form of memory is equally powerful to the more active, performative 
understanding of memory that is outlined in Lawler, but is much more elusive since it is 
spontaneous, organic, external, and indisputably affective.  
As such, memory is both a re-presenting of the past and a negotiation of its meaning. It 
comprises traces of lived experiences and performative engagements with those memory 
traces. However, drawing on Proust, it is also important to consider the unexpected and 
involuntary qualities of memory, conceptualising it as something internal and external to us 
simultaneously. As Sally Alexander (2010, p. 237) put it, ‘memory works on the cusp of inner 
and outer reality.’ Remembering can therefore be conceived as an intentional, conscious, and 
performative act as well as an involuntary one, where memories cued externally. People draw 
on memories to construct narratives of self, but memories can also be, in a sense, ‘pulled out’ 
of people: it can engender affective states, creating reactions and involuntary moments of recall 
in the present. Both these dimensions of memory – as intentional and non-intentional - 
emphasise an intimate connection between remembering our past experiences and our sense of 
identity progressing through time. 
 
2.2.2 Photography 
Given the idea that memory is intimately linked to notions of selfhood and identity and the fact 
that things are easily forgotten, people have long been dependent on various material objects 
and structures to store and facilitate their remembering of the past. As Annette Kuhn (1995, p. 
13) noted, memory relies on ‘the materiality of the trace, the immediacy of the recording, the 
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visibility of the image.’ Given their integrated part of our everyday life, objects can become 
fused with affect and meaning. They can become what Sherry Turkle (2007) calls ‘evocative 
objects’, capturing and triggering affective states, stories, and memories. Given the increasing 
emphasis on the visual for algorithmic remembrance technologies, this section will look closer 
at the idea of photography, the image or visual object, and how these variously relate to memory 
and remembering.  
Photography has become a central and ubiquitous device for retaining people’s personal 
memories in contemporary society. This dominance of photography as medium for personal 
memories is an understandable development: photographs seem to give us access to a reality 
that once was; they act as evidence that some event in history really did happen; they help us 
remember lives once lived. Yet, they are also snapshots of stories we will never know in their 
entirety. Although photographs have become a dominant way to store personal memories, the 
extent to which one can or should distinguish between memories themselves and memory 
objects has been subject to debate. For instance, Siegfried Kracauer ([1927]1993) states that a 
distinction must be established between the two, given that they comprise and provide different 
visual representations of time. He argues that ‘memory-images’ – the mental, visual impres-
sions that are personal memories – ‘retain what is given only insofar as it has significance’ (p. 
425). For Kracauer, what constitutes personal memories, or memory-images, is primarily a 
question of the meaning or significance they have for the person doing the remembering.  
Photographic images, on the other hand, are able to capture the appearance of the time 
and place of an event and freeze or fix them. As John Berger (2009, p. 54) notes, ‘the camera, 
unlike the human eye, is able to fix the appearance of the event. It removes its appearance from 
the flow of appearances and preserves it’ (original emphasis). Kracauer argues that since the 
camera is able to isolate or fix events that are necessarily interlinked with other events in a 
temporally continuous flow, photographic images do not encompass ‘the meaning to which 
they refer’, and as such, ‘a person’s history is buried as if under a layer of snow’ (p. 426). Thus, 
whilst memories are highly selective, retained because of what they mean to the person remem-
bering, photographs manage to isolate moments and events from their continuous flow, but are 
unable to retain the meanings that these moments might have had for the people living them or 
witnessing them.  
In Camera Lucida, Roland Barthes (1980) similarly argues that a more rigorous 
distinction must be made between photographs and personal memories. In fact, he argues that 
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a photograph is ‘never, in essence, a memory’ (p. 91) and these must therefore not be conflated. 
For Barthes, photographs are even so-called ‘counter-memories’, objects that may block the 
remembering of things. Yet, as I will discuss in more detail in the next section (‘digital memory 
studies’), the capacity of technologies and media such as digital images to mediate memories 
from the past problematises any clear-cut distinctions made between memories and memory 
objects.  
Given this tension between the different ‘organising principles’ (Kracauer, 1993) of 
memories and photographs, it is not surprising that those researching memory are critical of 
the ways photographs make the world appear.18 Annette Kuhn (1995, 2000, 2007, 2010) has 
explored extensively the relationship between photographs and memories in a critical manner. 
In Family Secrets, for instance, Kuhn (1995) looks at photos from her past to investigate the 
gender politics of her family, seeking to reconcile her childhood with her adult life. In the book, 
Kuhn argues that the memories available to women through photographs may limit the 
construction of possible narratives for women in the present. As such, she investigates what 
bell hooks (1995) called ‘the visual politics’ of photographs and memories. Kuhn (2010) 
conceptualises these photographs as ‘memory objects’, objects that set the stage for various 
acts of remembering, material traces that might evoke or act as vehicles for remembering.  
Echoing her notion of ‘memory work’, Kuhn’s (1995) methodological approach con-
stitutes casting a critical, reflexive eye on photographs and their evocative ability. Memory 
work sees memory not as something given or something inevitably arising from photographs, 
but rather as a dynamic act of coming to terms with one’s past through scrutiny, negotiation, 
and reconstruction. Memories are always in flux and must therefore always be questioned, and 
negotiated. And when these memories are mediated through photographs, through ‘memory 
objects’, they take on added layers of complexity. Photographs, in this view, do not evoke a 
‘pure’ memory of the event as much as they produce a variety of meanings in the present. Being 
interested in how photographs help make such meanings, Kuhn (2000, p. 183) suggests that: 
Every photograph contains a range of possible meanings, from those relating to 
cultural conventions of image production to those that have to do with the social 
 
18 Some scholarship has examined the role of photographs in the transmission of knowledge concerning traumatic 
events (Hirsch, 2008; Pickering and Keightley, 2012). Others have explored, for instance, how photographs may 
act as memorials or as modes to further political agendas (Sturken, 1999). 
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and cultural contexts in which the image has been produced and is being used. I 
find that these meanings seldom yield themselves fully to a surface reading. 
Critical memory work entails being aware of the multiplicity of meanings a photograph may 
produce. As such, photographs can be understood as ‘restless images’ that are always ‘changing 
meaning and moving forward (Sturken, 1999, p. 194). Images help produce realities and are 
not just neutral conveyors of a person’s memory of past events. Photographic images may give 
the impression that they are able to fix certain events, but they do not provide a ‘pure’ access 
to these events, and are instead able to shape memories of a certain person or event. Photo-
graphic images may be used as a means to repress the memory of someone (as in the Soviet 
censorship of political and military figures) and it can also be used to perpetuate and reify 
societal structures.  
 Echoing Turkle’s (2007) point about the interconnection between objects and affect, it 
is important to note that photographs may not only produce a multiplicity of meanings, but can 
also be highly affective as vehicles for remembering. In his book Camera Lucida, Roland 
Barthes (1980) seeks to arrive at a definition of photography as a particular type of knowledge 
and perception. When discussing the more phenomenological approach to photographs, 
Barthes distinguishes between two ways photographs may affect people: ‘studium’ and 
‘punctum’. A person’s general interest in photography, or their interest in the subject matter of 
a certain photograph, Barthes calls studium (p. 26). Studium is a somewhat disinterested, 
distanced, and familiar interest in the subject matter of the photographs. It is the ‘very wide 
field of unconcerned desire, of various interest, of inconsequential taste’ (Barthes, 1980, p. 27). 
According to Pickering and Keightley (2007, p. 277), Barthes’ idea of studium operates on the 
level of ‘regulated desire, anticipated pleasures, and relatively superficial modes of relating to 
an image.’ 
On the other hand, Barthes argues, photographs can pierce through the studium, 
people’s general interest, and induce a highly subjective and affective response in the viewer. 
This affective response to certain photographs he calls the punctum: ‘this element which rises 
from the scene, shoots out of if like an arrow, and pierces me’ (p. 26). According to Hirsch 
(1997, p. 4), the punctum is an affective response which ‘disturbs the flat and immobile surface 
of the image’ and ‘arrests and interrupts the contextual and therefore narrative reading of the 
photograph.’ As such, pictures may involuntarily connect people to their past in affective ways, 
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engendering various emotional responses and attachments.19 It is also worth adding that 
Barthes’ (1980) notion of punctum accentuates the involuntary aspects of memory and the 
affective responses memory objects can have. According to David Bate (2010), Barthes’ notion 
carries a certain resemblance to Proust’s idea of ‘involuntary memory.’ That is, photographic 
images can involuntarily remind us or jog our memory of certain things in the past. As Bate 
argues, the affective potential of certain photographic images, as memory objects or as vehicles 
for remembering, can reside in their unpredictability, their involuntariness, their seeming 
randomness. Both Barthes’ notion of punctum and Proust’s idea of involuntary memory 
suggest that memory can be something profoundly external to us yet affectively powerful. 
 As Pickering and Keightley (2007, 2012) have explored in detail, photographs do not 
simply engender affective states, but also form part of people’s practices in everyday life. In 
their article ‘Technologies of memory’, Keightley and Pickering (2014) examine the shift from 
analogue to digital photography, focusing on four key categories of photographic practices: 
photo-taking, photo-storing, photo-viewing, and photo-sharing. They argue that the shift from 
analogue to digital photography has implications for how photographs figure as ‘mnemonic 
resource’ (p. 576), as vehicles for remembering. However, the shift from analogue to digital, 
they argue, does not constitute a clear rupture, nor did it engender the emergence of entirely 
novel forms of photographic and memory practices. Instead, their data shows that photographic 
and memory practices ‘manifest a fluid and ambivalent mix of change and continuity with 
various adaptations from analogue practice being made alongside accommodations to digital 
technology’ (p. 581). As they also state earlier in the article:  
When we turn aside from thinking exclusively in terms of the technology, and 
look instead at how digital cameras and digital imagery are being adapted to 
existing patterns of remembering in everyday life, we see that, alongside changes 
that are being made to these patterns, there are clear signs of continuity in the 
ways people are adapting them to older modes of storage and retrieval, and older 
idioms of drawing on and relating to photographs in thinking and talking about 
the pasts that they share (p. 579). 
 
19 For how the dual notions of studium and punctum have been used as conceptual framework in qualitative 
research, see Pickering and Keightley (2007). In their work, Pickering and Keightley have also called for a reas-
sessment of the relationship between studium and punctum, arguing instead for greater emphasis on the inter-
dependence of both concepts (2007, p. 276-279) As they state, ‘these twinned concepts should be reformulated in 
a constitutive relation of mutuality, for they can only exist alongside each other’ (p. 277). 
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In the digital age, photography has taken on new meanings as well as providing new affor-
dances. Yet, the role of digital images, especially in relation to algorithmic remembrance 
technologies such as Timehop, Facebook Memories, or Snapchat Memories, should not be 
considered to constitute entirely novel forms of memory practices. Rather, they draw on and 
have been adapted from already existing ‘patterns of remembering in everyday life.’ They form 
part of larger trajectories of usage. Developments within photography – for instance, images 
as ‘memories’ on Facebook Memories or Snapchat’s Snap images (see Jurgenson, 2019) – 
should be seen as constituting ‘an ambivalent mix of change and continuity’, as both old and 
new, as both continuity and rupture.  
That being said, photographs are also highly transferrable. They cannot be viewed as 
merely being the ‘memory objects’ of remembering individuals. Their meanings are produced 
intersubjectively and they are therefore necessarily replete with social meanings, comprising, 
reflecting, and reproducing social relations. As memory objects, photographic (or digital) 
images should be seen as having the potential to produce and reproduce what Pickering and 
Keightley (2012) called ‘communities of memory’. Mediated through memory objects such as 
photographs, memories can become socio-cultural artifacts and its meanings transmitted across 
generations and social formations. It is these social dimensions of memory that will be discus-
sed in the next section.  
 
2.2.3 The Social Forms of Memory 
In the previous sections, memory has been considered in relation to material objects such as 
photographic images but it has also been considered in relation to notions of identity and 
selfhood. Although memory can be conceptualised as intimate and personal, it is crucial to 
acknowledge the social and intersubjective aspects of memory. Within social studies and 
cultural studies, much has been written on memory as a fundamentally social or socio-cultural 
phenomena. Prefixes such as ‘collective’, ‘public’, ‘cultural’, and ‘social’ have been variously 
used to conceptualise the social dynamics of memory in society.20 In On Collective Memory 
 
20 Marianne Hirsch (2008), for instance, has proposed the term ‘postmemory’ to examine a generation’s 
relationship to a particular incident they have not directly lived through it (e.g. the descendants of Holocaust 
survivors). Aleida Assmann (2006) differentiated between four types of memory: 1) individual memory, 2) social 
memory, 3) political memory, and 4) cultural memory. Even though memory is differentiated (and has been further 





([1952]1992) and the unfinished The Collective Memory ([1950]1980), Maurice Halbwachs 
sought to move the study of memory away from the philosophical, cognitive, and psychological 
approaches existing in the nineteenth and early twentieth century. These approaches saw the 
individual, both in terms of their embodiment and cognition, as the locus of memory. For 
Halbwachs, memory was rather a fundamentally relational and intersubjective phenomena. 
About the nature of memories, Halbwachs (1992, p. 38) states:  
There is no point in seeking where they are preserved in my brain or in some nook 
of my mind to which I alone have access: for they are recalled to me externally, and 
the groups of which I am a part at any time give me the means to reconstruct them, 
upon condition, to be sure, that I turn toward them and adopt, at least for the 
moment, their way of thinking. 
Proposing a socially distributed notion of memory, what he called ‘collective memory’, 
Halbwachs emphasised the role of the ‘group’ for the production and maintenance of memo-
ries. These groups – family, friendships, interest groups, corporations, religious organisations 
– function as ‘the instruments used by the collective memory to reconstruct an image of the 
past which is in accord, in each epoch, with the predominant thoughts of the society’ (1992, p. 
40). These groups, in other words, function as social frameworks in which memory can be 
instantiated and reproduced over time. In fact, Halbwachs (1992, p. 43) even argued that 
outside these frameworks no memory was possible. In this view, there is no memory without 
the social. 
 However, the notion of collective memory produced a tension for Halbwachs: who is 
then doing the actual remembering? In the book The Collective Memory, Halbwachs (1980, p. 
48) suggested that ‘while the collective memory endures and draws strength from its base in a 
coherent body of people, it is individuals as group members who remember.’ For Halbwachs, 
then, one could argue that although the actual remembering is located in the individual, neither 
the individual nor the collective are ontologically preeminent. Instead, both form part of a 
remembering assemblage, where memory is spread out amongst individuals who are always 
already inhabiting social frameworks, groups, and interconnected networks. Halbwachs also 
stated that the concept of ‘collective memory’ should not be read as a denial or negation of 
‘individual’ memory (if that distinction can be made), but rather it constituted an attempt to 
extend existing conceptions of memory beyond the limits of the individual human brain. In 
short, to emphasise the social conditions of memory and to think remembering as an always-
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already, socially ‘enframed’ set of practices. This also highlights the importance of repetition 
for the production and maintenance of the social forms of memory, an idea which I will revisit 
in chapter five. For such memories to persist over time, they have to be continually enacted or 
engaged with (Brightenti, 2015). As other scholars have also pointed out, the repeated re-
enactment of memories also helps to internalise them to such an extent that they become 
habitually encoded actions (Bourdieu, 1990; Connerton, 1989). Through such habitual actions, 
people remind themselves, consciously or unconsciously, of the shared histories of the 
communities in which they are embedded, which are in turn perpetuated in the present. 
Although Halbwachs’ notion of ‘collective memory’ sought to conceptualise memory 
as made possible and instantiated within social frameworks, renewed and perpetuated ‘during 
the dull routines of everyday life’ (Halbwachs, 1992, p. 25), his framework has been critiqued 
on a number of areas. For instance, Some scholars have noted that Halbwachs does not account 
for how memories can persist across multiple generations (e.g. Connerton, 1989; Assmann, 
1995), whereas others have questioned whether or not Halbwachs’ social ‘frameworks’ are to 
stable and well-delineated, proposing a more messy and dynamic understanding of social 
frameworks (e.g. Huyssen, 2003). With the rise of digital technologies, the very notion of 
‘collective memory’ has also been critiqued: Hoskins (2016b) prefers the term ‘memory 
ecologies’ whilst Garde-Hansen and Schwartz (2018) propose the notion ‘iconomies of 
memory’.  
Drawing on the work of Halbwachs, Jan Assmann (1995) seeks to examine the role of 
culture in relation to memory as well as how memory comes to be maintained and transmitted 
over long periods of time. Assmann (1995) makes the overarching distinction between ‘com-
municative memory’ and ‘cultural memory’. ‘Communicative memory’ refers primarily to 
everyday actions, interactions, and communications between members of a group (1995, p. 
126). The memories that form on the basis of these everyday (inter)actions are characterized 
predominantly by ‘formlessness, wilfulness, and disorganization’ (p. 127). ‘Cultural memory’, 
on the other hand, is more formalized and organised. It is the moment when ‘a collective 
experience crystallizes, whose meaning, when touched upon, may suddenly become accessible 
again across millennia’ (p. 126). Rather than being rooted in everyday lived experiences, such 
as collective memory would, cultural memory relates more to memories of events and persons 
from a past that exceeds living memory, but instead is ‘characterized by its distance from the 
everyday, or its transcendence’ (Whitehead, 2009, p. 132). In the age of digital technologies 
and algorithmic media, as chapters five and six explore in more depth, this well-defined 
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contrast between memories based on lived experience and material representations is 
problematised, as is the understanding of memory being necessarily instantiated within social 
frameworks, collectives, and groups. One reason for this is the increasing deep mediatisation 
of smart technologies in the fabric of everyday life, and another is that phenomena such as 
social media platforms problematise the whole notion of the ‘social’. 
Moreover, the mediation of memory through socio-cultural objects such as monuments 
or institutions such as museums plays a crucial role in Assmann’s (2008) framework of 
‘cultural memory’. Assmann (2008, p. 110) argues that cultural memory is ‘a kind of insti-
tution’, meaning that it is ‘exteriorized, objectified, and stored away in symbolic forms’ and 
thus attains a sort of fixity which allows the memories to persist through time. As he suggests, 
‘in cultural formation, a collective experience crystallizes, whose meaning, when touched 
upon, may suddenly become accessible again across millennia’ (Assmann, 1995, p. 126). As 
such, cultural memory can be crystallised and maintained through objects such as images and 
texts, institutions such as monuments and libraries, and practices such as rites and rituals. This 
is not to say that the meanings embedded in objects such as monuments remained fixed. Rather, 
Assmann (2008) suggests that cultural memory is a conduit for a multiplicity of readings and 
interpretations. Cultural memory, even though objects such as monuments may imply a 
semblance of fixity, is always in a state of flux; its meaning remains in a state of transition, a 
state of tension. It is always being interpreted and reinterpreted, appropriated and transformed 
according to the context in which it exists. 
The importance of institutions and societal structures in mediating cultural memory 
further suggests that acts of remembering should not be viewed as neutral processes but rather 
as being politically underpinned. Memory can be instrumentalised in order to legitimate and 
perpetuate a certain socio-cultural or national identity over time. In How Societies Remember, 
Paul Connerton (1989) argues that ‘it is surely the case that control of a society's memory 
largely conditions the hierarchy of power,’ adding that the issues surrounding the storage of 
data in contemporary society, for example, has a direct bearing on ‘legitimation, the question 
of control and ownership of information’ (p. 1). This link between memory and power can also 
be seen in the ways forgetting has been variously employed in the forging of nation states and 
as well as shaping socio-cultural communities (Anderson, 1983; Brockmeier, 2002; Connerton, 
2008, 2009; Kundera, 1996).21 Collective memory (and collective forgetting), therefore, has 
 
21 See also Ian Hacking’s (1995) work on the ways in which the psychological study of memory in the 19th century 
was used as a means to justify certain discriminatory beliefs, such as racism.  
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crucial implications for the legitimation and perpetuation of socio-cultural identities over time. 
This means that although we have the impression of remembering the past as individuals, we 
are simultaneously ‘recalling the memories of a social community’ (Brockmeier, 2002, p. 24). 
As such, the social forms of memory can be seen to be political in the sense that they may 
frame social interactions, create, and shape societal cohesion, and legitimate certain expres-
sions of identity.  
 
2.2.4 Archives 
A particularly important institution for the preservation and transmission of both personal and 
cultural memory was the archive. The emergence of digital databases, social media platforms, 
smartphone galleries, and cloud-based services corroborate this need to think memory in 
relation to the archive (Beer and Burrows, 2013). Before the written language, memories were 
mostly transmitted orally but as people started retaining their stories in writing, the archive 
became an important socio-cultural institution. It allowed for the retention of the history and 
collective memory of different groups of people. The intimate link between archives and 
memory has led some to proclaim that ‘without archives, memory falters’ (Schwartz and Cook, 
2002, p. 18).  
The importance of archives for memory is also emphasised in Jacques Derrida’s (1995) 
work. In Archive Fever, Derrida (1995) discusses the conceptual history of the archive, 
reflecting on its structures and implications for society. Drawing on the etymology of archive 
(‘arkhe’), Derrida argues that the archive traditionally was grounded in two primary functions 
or principles: namely, the archive was the place of ‘commencement’ (the ontological principle) 
and the place of ‘commandment’ (the nomological principle) (p. 1). As a place of ‘com-
mencement’, the archive is a place of origin, a place in which the history and knowledge of a 
society begins. The archiving of a people’s history gave a sense of their continuity, laid the 
ground for a collective identity, and allowed for the public commemoration of events of 
individuals. It afforded the possibility of ‘memorialization, of repetition, of reproduction, or of 
reimpression’ (p. 14) and therefore the continual remembering and inculcation of certain 
memories along with the (systematic) exclusion of others. At the same time, the archive was a 
place of ‘commandment’, the place from which the law, authority, and social order were upheld 
and exercised. As such, the archive is that which both conserves and initiates.  
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Derrida states that the effectiveness and efficiency of archives depended upon the role 
of the archons, that is, the custodians that resided in the archives and were the so-called 
‘documents’ guardians’ (p. 10). They were responsible for not only the physical safety of the 
archive but also of acquiring, interpreting, classifying, and ordering that which was archived. 
The archons, Derrida suggests, were accorded ‘hermeneutic right’ to both ‘state the law’ as 
well as ‘recall the law and call on or impose the law’ (p. 10). These responsibilities were not 
only founded on certain intellectual or technical expertise, but also constituted political power. 
As Derrida argues: 
There is no political power without control of the archive, if not of memory. 
Effective democratization can always be measured by this essential criterion: the 
participation in and the access to the archive, its constitution, and its inter-
pretation (p. 11n). 
Political power, according to Derrida, was inextricably linked to who controlled the archive. 
Control of the archive meant control over the means by which things were captured, ordered, 
and regulated. With the archive, then, memory became more than a personal or socio-cultural 
quality; it was entangled with the archive’s nomological principle, becoming a tool for political 
authority, power, and order. Of course, it is questionable whether one has ever been able to 
sever memory from politics, but with the archive this link became more increasingly overt. 
Still, the issue of archives and archons reminds us of the political dimensions that are expressed 
in how things are archived, interpreted, classified, unified, and ultimately executed as law. As 
such, memory is not only enframed within certain social frameworks, embedded within certain 
material objects. It is also mediated through the archive and the power of the ‘archons’.  
Unlike Derrida, Michel Foucault (1972) understands the archive in less spatialised and 
more abstract, linguistic terms. Foucault defines the archive as ‘the general system of the 
formation and transformation of statements’ (p. 130). Defining the archive in terms of the 
statement, Foucault emphasises the power of the archive to determine what can and cannot be 
said, describing the archive as ‘the law of what can be said’ (p. 129). According to Foucault, 
the meaning of what is archived or uttered is determined by the structural framework in which 
they exist. In other words, it follows that some sentences do not lend themselves to the 
underlying logic and form of some archival structures and therefore are rendered unsayable, 
meaningless (p. 129). Foucault argues that a particular system of archive defines the 
‘enunciability’ (p. 129) of an archived object, which suggests that the archive is not only that 
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which archives, but also which determines what can or cannot be archive in the first place. The 
power of the archive, according to Foucault, resides in their ability to define and shape the 
parameters of the archivable or utterable.  
This idea of archives defining the archivable is also echoed in Derrida (1995). As he 
states, ‘the technical structure of the archiving archive also determines the structure of the 
archivable content in its very coming into existence’ (p. 17; emphasis original). The archive 
therefore has a performative effect on the events being recorded. Derrida even argues that ‘the 
archivization produces as much as it records the events’ (p. 17). As such, both Foucault and 
Derrida emphasise the idea that archivable content is malleable and is modulated according to 
the particular logic or structure of the archiving archive.22  
As archives moved into a digital context, their form and function have fundamentally 
shifted. The archive was decentralised and instead multiplied. The central role of the archive 
as centralised, institutional guardian of collective memory and history was rapidly replaced 
with widely disseminated digital devices such as mobile phones and computers that became 
personal, everyday archives of memory (Featherstone, 2006). As such, the archive in the digital 
age has ‘extended its wall’ (Featherstone, 2000), capturing everyday life in ways previously 
impossible. This has led scholars to conceptualise the archive as ‘banal’ (Parikka, 2012), 
‘affective’ (Long et al., 2017), and ‘everyday’ (Osborne, 1999).23 Even though the implications 
of archiving and memory in a digital context will be discussed further in the next section, it is 
worth reiterating, echoing both Derrida and Foucault, that the archive is not neutral but is 
wrapped up in questions of power. Moreover, both Derrida and Foucault argued that a shift in 
the archival structure necessitated a shift in the archivable content, since the archive defines 
and shapes the way the past is recorded, made retrievable, and thus legitimated.  
 
22 This idea is also echoed in Arlette Farge’s (2013) work on the connection between the archive and truth. 
Drawing on Foucault’s notion of the archive, Farge states: 
The archive is a vantage point from which the symbolic and intellectual constructions of the past 
can be rearranged. It is a matrix that does not articulate ‘the’ truth, but rather produces, through 
recognition as much as through disorientation, the elements necessary to ground a discourse of 
truth telling that refuses to lie (pp. 96-97).  
The archive becomes that which produces as much it facilitates the truth. The archive therefore should not be 
reduced to a political institution, but should be considered what Mike Featherstone (2006, p. 596) called ‘a 
paradigmatic entity’, a logic which constructs, arranges, rearranges, and legitimates conceptions of truth and 
representations of the past. 
23 Osborne (1999, p. 59) suggested that the archive in the digital age became a ‘memory of everyday detail’, 
capturing the mundane and insignificant as well as big milestones. This has had profound impact on how we 
understand the figure of ‘the archon’ and archontic power, especially in the context of social media platforms that 
curate people’s personal data.  
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 The question, then, becomes: What does this mean for memory and the remembering 
of the past? As David Beer (2020) points out, Derrida leaves it ambiguous whether he thinks 
memory changes in accordance with the restructuring of archival systems. Instead, he rather 
hints at the idea that this is likely to be the case. Derrida (1995, p. 16) suggest that although 
changes in archival systems do not necessarily denote a shift in the ‘representative value’ of 
memory, it does suggest the shift of ‘an entirely different logic’ of memory. It is therefore 
possible, according to Derrida, that a shift in how the past is documented, stored, and ordered, 
could mean a shift in how the past is remembered and understood. Mike Featherstone (2006, 
p. 594) argued that with the proliferation and decentralisation of the archive in the digital age, 
the archive constituted an ‘active aspiration’, that is, a place and ‘a tool for reworking desires 
and memories.’ Although he does not specifically examine whether or not memory is 
reconfigured by new archival systems, Derrida’s ambiguity at least demonstrates his interest in 
how archival technologies may or may not shape individual and social memory (Beer, 2020). 
One could therefore ask: with the proliferation of algorithmic systems on social media 
platforms, are we seeing a new logic of memory? A new way memory is represented, mediated, 
conceptualised, and even produced? The question of the changing nature of memory in the age 
of the algorithm will be further detailed and explored in the next section where I provide an 
overview of the digital memory studies literature, showcasing different ways in which the 
relationship between digital media and memory have been developed.  
 
These focal points – self and identity, photography, the social forms of memory, and archives 
- have functioned as a reminder that memory is not merely an abstract concept but is always 
variously framed. Whether it be spatially, biographically, cognitively, or socio-culturally, 
memory is always embedded in various institutions and groups, upheld by archives or evoked 
through a performative engagement with ‘memory objects’ such as photographs. As these 
sections have also shown, remembering can be a conscious act and a result of involuntary 
reminders, it is an investigative approach, an ongoing, dynamic, and performative process – 
which produces the past as much as it recalls it. In the last section of this literature review, the 
attention turns to the ways memory and memory practices have been conceptualised within the 




2.3 Digital Memory Studies 
The previous section looked at different ways in which memory has been and continues to be 
conceptualised, mediated, and facilitated. It discussed media such as archives and photographic 
images that capture, order, and facilitate people’s re-engagement with their mediated pasts. 
Similarly, the field often termed ‘digital memory studies’ (e.g. Hoskins, 2018) examines the 
ways in which memory and new media intersect in our contemporary media landscapes. This 
field of study, Andrew Hoskins (2018, p. i) states in the preface to the edited collection Digital 
Memory Studies, seeks to ‘interrogate concepts, theories and histories of media and memory 
studies, to map a holistic vision for the study of the digital remaking of memory.’ As such, the 
intersectional study of media and memory seeks to examine how memory practices are shaped 
in a digital context, how conceptions of the past may be changing, and that ‘the act of recall, 
of recollection and of remembering is changing in itself’ (Garde-Hansen et al., 2009, p. 1). In 
short, how memory and remembering are being shaped by emerging technological and digital 
systems.  
 As this section of the literature review will demonstrate, there has been much scholar-
ship examining the relationship between memory and digital media in the past couple of 
decades. Yet, the intersections between memory and algorithms have remained a largely un-
explored topic of research.24 Given the proliferation of algorithmic systems in everyday life, 
this project seeks to examine the various ways in which algorithms can be seen to affect 
people’s remembrance of the past as well as their memory practices in everyday life. This 
section of the literature review seeks to give a general overview of the studies that have been 
conducted in the area of media and memory. It also discusses some notable concepts that have 
emerged from it (e.g. mediated memories, dormant memories, dynamic archives, algorithmic 
memory) in order to better highlight how an in-depth study of the intersections of algorithms 
and memory can prove a fruitful addition. The following section looks closer at different con-
ceptualisations of memories in a digital context. 
 
2.3.1 From Digital Memories to Mediated Memories 
Throughout the years, the field of digital memory studies has focused on various aspects of 
media and memory. Some of the early work in the field focused specifically on the emergence 
 
24 As I mentioned in the thesis introduction, notable exceptions are Prey and Smit (2019) and Pereira (2019). This 
will be discussed in greater detail in the last section of this chapter. 
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of Web 2.0 and how it enabled novel ways of documenting, engaging with, and sharing the 
past with others (Garde-Hansen et al., 2009). Other scholarship has also examined the ways in 
which digital media could shape people’s relationship to forgetting (Blanchette and Johnson, 
2002; Dodge and Kitchen, 2007; Mayer-Schönberger, 2009; ), as well as how social memory 
can be seen, in a digital age, as fundamentally connective (van Dijck, 2010), globally 
distributed (Garde-Hansen, 2011)25, and existing within the ‘architectures of temporality’ of 
network culture and social media platforms (Parikka, 2018). 
 One crucial issue, however, has been how to conceptualise the nature of people’s 
memories in a digital context. In the early edited collection Save as… Digital Memories, Garde-
Hansen et al. (2009, p. 4) proposed the notion of ‘digital memories’ as a way to conceptualise 
digital memory objects. Such digital memories could include: 
Online mementos, photographs taken with digital cameras or camera phones, 
memorial web pages, digital shrines, text messages, digital archives (institutional 
and personal), online museums, online condolence message boards, virtual 
candles, souvenirs and memorabilia traded on eBay, social networking an alumni 
websites of archival material, blogs, digital storytelling, passwords, computer 
games based on past wars, fan sites and digital scrapbooks. 
This list was not meant to be exhaustive, the authors suggested, but was rather meant as a sort 
of umbrella term, emphasising the potential for heterogeneous digital objects to function as 
vehicles for people’s remembrance of the past. Digital memories, in other words, ‘deal with 
the past’s relationship to the present through digital media technology’ (p. 4). Digital 
memories, as we shall see with mediated memories as well below, not only referred to digital 
objects, but to embodied practices in everyday life as well. As Garde-Hansen et al. (2009, p. 7) 
state:  
Digital memory is, then, an enactment and engagement with difference and the 
use of digital media to remember is not about taking a passive approach to the 
passage of time, however fast it appears to be. Rather, it is the active, subjective, 
organic, emotional, virtual and uncertain production of the past and present at 
the same time. 
 
25 Garde-Hansen (2011, p. 46) argues that ‘memories are now distributed globally and networked digitally even 
though they are personally and locally produced.’  
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The digitalisation of memory, then, denotes an active engagement with both the past (i.e. how 
the present is captured and the past remembered) as well as digital technologies (i.e. the tools 
used to document and engage with the digital past). Digital memory suggests active practices 
in everyday life, rather than ‘a passive approach’ to the digital past. Digital memory as a 
practice, or ‘digital memory work’ (echoing Kuhn’s notion), is also well captured in more 
recent work dealing with how people actively engage with the past through smartphones (Hand, 
2017; Özkul and Humphreys, 2015) and social media platforms such as Facebook (Humphreys, 
2018).  
The notion of digital memory is helpful in order to understand both the active memory 
practices it suggests as well as the sheer heterogeneity of digital objects that can act as vehicles 
for remembering. However, Garde-Hansen et al.’s (2009) view of mediation establishes a too 
clear-cut distinction between the analogue and the digital, the embodied and the techno-
logical.26 Given the proliferation of algorithms in society, there is a need for a notion that better 
captures the ways in which algorithms, platforms, data, memories, and memory practices are 
inextricably interwoven in contemporary society. As a result, I will now turn to José van 
Dijck’s (2007) notion of ‘mediated memories’. 
One of the important earlier nodes in the field of digital memory studies was José van 
Dijck’s (2007) book Mediated Memories in the Digital Age. Similar to Garde-Hansen et al.’s 
(2009) understanding of ‘digital memories’, van Dijck (2009, p. 21) defined ‘mediated memo-
ries’ as ‘the activities and objects we produce and appropriate by means of media technologies, 
for creating and re-creating a sense of past, present, and future of ourselves in relation to 
others’.27 As such, the notion is understood in terms of, firstly, the affordances of media techno-
logies to store, facilitate and ultimately shape people’s memory objects; secondly, people’s 
active practices and engagements with those memory objects; and thirdly, how mediated 
memories also mediate socio-cultural relationships. In other words, mediated memories 
 
26 Garde-Hansen et al. (2009, p. 11) argue that media function as ‘an externalisation of inner processes, sensations, 
thoughts and memories’, focusing in particular on the ways in which these memories can be digitally shared. 
However, viewing media simply in terms of the externalisation of inner processes creates a too pronounced 
dichotomy between what they call ‘the organic and the inorganic’ (p. 13), the inner and the outer, the embodied 
and the technological. As they argue, ‘making memories remotely accessible, producing empathy at a distance… 
means that they are not only shared but are prosthetic. They become memories that are not built on first-hand 
experiences but still have powerful emotional effects’ (p. 11). In my view, this notion of media technologies as 
producing ‘prosthetic memories’, not built from first-hand experiences, does not capture the extent to which 
current algorithmic systems, platforms, and smartphone features are intensely embedded in people’s everyday 
lives.  
27 Andrew Hoskins (2009: 27) suggests that ‘memory (individual and collective and their varying intersections) 
is ‘mediated’ in that how the past is and is not recorded, achieved, accessed, retrieved and represented is entangled 
with the nature, forms and control of the technologies, media and institutions of the day’. 
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suggests how the socio-material conditions of memory practices and how the past is conceived 
is facilitated and shaped by technologies and larger digital infrastructures. Van Dijck also uses 
the notion as a conceptual tool through which ‘we can understand larger transformation 
currently at work in our culture’ (p. xiii). Indeed, van Dijck (2007, p. 21) argues that ‘mediated 
memory objects and acts are crucial sites for negotiating the relationship between self and 
culture at large, between what counts as private and what as public, and how individuality 
relates to collectivity.’ This research project also seeks to use ‘mediated memories’ as con-
ceptual tool in order to examine in more detail the larger algorithmic transformation of society.  
 As was mentioned in the thesis introduction, van Dijck’s notion problematises the 
dichotomy between organic and inorganic, analogue and digital, embodied and technological, 
in favour of a more entangled conceptualisation. Given the importance of this sentiment, it is 
worth quoting again at length: 
Mediated memories… can be located neither strictly in the brain nor wholly 
outside in (material) culture but exist in both concurrently, for they are mani-
festations of a complex interaction between brain, material objects, and the 
cultural matrix from which they arise (van Dijck, 2007, p. 28). 
Mediated memories, then, are not simply prothesis of the mind, technological copies of a more 
original embodied thing. As van Dijck (2009, p. 158) argues in the paper ‘Mediated Memories 
as Amalgamations’: ‘It is at the nexus of mind, technology, and perceptual and semiotic habits 
that mediated memories are shaped.’28 These factors are in a constant state of interaction and 
constitutive mutuality. In my view, this conceptualisation of mediated memories as 
amalgamations better captures the ways in which current algorithmic systems are ‘intensely 
embedded’ (Couldry and Hepp, 2017) in people’s everyday lives. The notion highlights the 
entanglement of technologies, users, people’s sense of self, as well as the objects created 
through the technologies. Moreover, it problematises any clear distinctions between techno-
logy, data, embodiment, cognition, and sociality since these are inextricably interdependent 
and in constant interaction. The notion of mediated memories, within this framework of 
entanglement and amalgamations, also signals that the parameters and conditions of what 
 
28 This same idea is echoed in van Dijck’s (2010) paper ‘Flickr and the culture of connectivity’, where she dis-
cusses the idea of connectivity in particular, 
The dynamic of connection constitutes memory’s very condition. Therefore, any memorizing 
activity takes place in the current flow of contacts between people and machines and cannot be 
the result of either an individual or collective reminiscence (2010, p. 404). 
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constitutes ‘memory,’ ‘memory practices,’ and ‘remembering’ do not remain fixed. Rather, 
these can be shaped and re-ontologised by algorithmic technologies.29 
 
2.3.2 The Metaphor of Dormancy 
Another conceptual node which that emerged in the field digital memory studies, especially in 
its early days, was the metaphor of dormancy in relation to mediated memories and data. 
Writing at the time when social networking sites started to emerge, Kathleen Richardson and 
Sue Hessey (2009, p. 25) argued that platforms such as Facebook functioned as ‘a dormant 
archive of relationships that would have dissipated without these technologies.’ In their view, 
Facebook affords users to accumulate ‘friends’ over time, giving them the option to connect or 
reconnect with them at any future point. However, Richardson and Hessey observe, their 
participants did not interact with most of these ‘friends’ most of the time. Most friendships 
remain simply a numerical addition to the accumulated friendships list, and although they were 
called ‘friendships’ they were not actualised as such. These friendships, Richardson and Hessey 
argue, can therefore be seen to be ‘dormant’, that is, inactive and passive nodes of social 
connectivity. As such, in their view, Facebook figured as a ‘dormant archive’. It makes possible 
social connections that would not have been possible otherwise through the material conditions 
of the platform itself, which is comprised mostly of ‘friendships’ and potential social relations 
that are not actualised as such.    
 This idea of dormancy is also echoed in Joanne Garde-Hansen’s (2011) book Media 
and Memory in relation to the idea of ‘dormant memories’. In it, Garde-Hansen points out that:  
My Facebook page is awash with unremarkable images of conventionality: new 
babies, weddings, beloved pets, children on the beach, families skiing, gather-
ings, nights out, concerts, gardens, home improvements and hobbies. The vast 
majority I am not in... They are 'dormant memories' (p. 136). 
Social media platforms afford the continuous accumulation of so-called ‘unremarkable images 
of conventionality,’ data traces that lie dormant in the storehouse of the platform. These digital 
 
29 Further on this idea, Andrew Hoskins (2016b, p. 18) states that one of the advantages of seeing mediated 
memories as fundamentally entangled is that this view resists ‘the traditional way of seeing memory as discrete 
entities or phenomena’, especially with regards to discrete and contained entities such as ‘the body’, ‘the brain’, 
‘the social’, and so on. The understanding of mediated memories as entangled is premised on memory as 
constituted through ‘emergence, enfoldings, and interactions’ (p. 18), as well as through ‘an ongoing dynamic 
trajectory of hyperconnections rather than being merely residual (in brains, bodies, media)’ (p. 18). 
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artifacts represent not much more than a bundle of disjointed and unrelated memories, mediated 
memories that lie dormant. That is, they lie inactive until they are revived by the user re-
engaging with their digital traces. Social media platforms, in other words, afford what Geoffrey 
Bowker (2008) called ‘potential memory,’ the potential status of some data as memories 
‘should the need ever arise’ for them to become such (p. 30). As such, dormant memories do 
not only suggest the social relations underpinning these but also the digital objects themselves 
and their dormant mnemonic potential that lie hidden, dormant.  
 A third understanding of this notion of ‘dormant memories’ can be seen in Andrew 
Hoskins’s (2010) blog entry titled ‘The Diffusion of Media/Memory.’ Discussing the nature of 
social media platforms, which were in their infancy, Hoskins argued that ‘Social networking 
sites facilitate a continuous, accumulating, dormant memory, with ongoing potential to trans-
form past relations through the re-activation of latent and semi-latent connections.’ Hoskins 
similarly comments on the accumulative effect of social media platforms, continuously mining 
and storing people’s data. He writes about the continuous accumulation of digital traces as well 
as the social relations underpinning these. Yet, Hoskins also acknowledges the ‘ongoing 
potential’ of these past relations being ‘re-activated’ in the present. Social networking sites, 
accumulating people’s data, afford users the potential to reactivate latent and semi-latent 
connections in the present and not just the mediated memory objects themselves. This means 
that although dormant memories suggests a passive approach to memory, their persistence 
through time, their continuous accumulation, and their always-being-there on the platform, 
gives users the potential to revive and reactive both past (and not so past) social relations as 
well as the digital memory objects themselves.  
 As such, dormancy highlighted the archival potentialities of social media platforms, 
especially around the time of their inception and proliferation. It highlighted the ways in which 
users were able to upload, post, and share on these platforms, which stored and accumulated 
these data traces for an indefinite amount of time. Yet, as social media platforms have 
developed and their data tracking techniques and algorithmic underpinnings have become 
increasingly sophisticated, the conception of them as storehouses for people’s dormant 
memories has also shifted. Naturally, the idea of ‘dormant memories’ may seem a little 
outdated now.30 In fact, as I will discuss in the next section, the nature and function of the 
 
30 Another issue with this notion of ‘dormant memories’ is that it is not an adequate metaphor for understanding 
potential differences between storing mediated memories digitally or on analogue devices such as photo albums. 
If dormant memories are understood as essentially stored and accumulated memories that lie dormant until users 
re-engage with them, then this would also apply to devices such as diaries, shoeboxes, and photo albums as well. 
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digital archive has shifted in the last few years, after becoming increasingly algorithmic. Yet, 
the reason this concept figures in this literature review is because, I argue, the exact opposite 
trend can be seen emerging on newer algorithmic remembrance technologies such as Facebook 
Memories, Google Photos, or Apple Memories. Applying various algorithmic processes such 
as machine learning and pattern recognition, these features do not only store people’s digital 
memory traces on their database, but they actively pull out these digital memory traces, 
resurfacing and reminding users of them in the present. Instead of simply lying dormant within 
the database of the social media platform, mediated memories have become lively, being 
variously resurfaced and vitalised by algorithmic processes. The digital archive, in other words, 
has become more dynamic.  
 
2.3.3 Dynamic Archives 
As the last section pointed out, the notion of social media platforms as dormant archives may 
have been an apt description when they were in their infancy, but it does not account for the 
ways social media platforms have developed and how contemporary digital archives have 
become increasingly dynamic. Throughout the years, there have been several studies into the 
effects of digital archiving on memory, and how the changing nature of the digital archive 
shapes how memory is perceived and instantiated (Blom et al., 2015; Ernst, 2013; Garde-
Hansen, 2009). David Beer (2018, p. 20), for instance, states that we need to focus on the ways 
in which different archival structures such as social media platforms fashion and shape our 
memory-making practices as well as how they shape ‘our memories and the information we 
have available and retrievable to us.’ Considerations of how the digital archive is shaping 
memory, according to Beer, must emphasise issues such as classification, categorisation, 
retrievability and the powers of inference and prediction. Akin to Derrida’s ‘archive fever’, 
Andrew Hoskins (2016a), for instance, states that the ubiquity of memory devices in 
contemporary society has engendered an ‘archive me!’, where everything in the present can be 
digitally archived, where archiving is seen as desirable. It refers to a sort of envisioned total 
memory, and the self’s curatorial control is promised. Such issues and such notions indicate a 
move away from considering platforms as dormant digital archives, merely hosting or storing 
people’s digital memory traces, which await re-engagement and re-activation.  
 
As such, the concept does not effectively describe the ways in which the digital archiving of memories is different 
from other means of storing and accumulation.  
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 In an article discussing the inherent time properties within technological media and how 
these might affect human perception and memory making, Wolfgang Ernst (2018) argues that 
the nature of the archive fundamentally changed when it went digital. In one sense, ‘digital 
communication is a system that is permanently archiving presence’ (p. 144; emphasis original), 
that is, there is no longer any delay between memory and the present, as digital archives afford 
the immediate archiving of the present. More importantly, however, Ernst stated that the digital 
archive is increasingly characterised by what he calls ‘algorithmic dynamics’:  
While the traditional function of the archive is to document an event that took place 
at one time and one place, the emphasis in the digital archive shifts to re-generation, 
(co-)produced by the online users for their own needs. There is still an archive, in 
Immanuel Kant's and Michel Foucault's sense: the condition for the possibility of 
the memory performance to take place at all. The real multi-media archive is the 
arche of its source codes, but in a different form of existence: algorithmic dynamics 
instead of documentary stills (p. 148; emphasis added). 
What does Ernst mean by this notion of ‘algorithmic dynamics’? what are its implications for 
our understanding of the archive and its functionality? He continues: 
The contemporary digital archive is indeed marked by algorithmic dynamics, but 
not in the sense of online user co-production: Instead of a creative process of 
'pulling' memories out of the archive, the digital archive is 'pushing' digital 
memories, afforded by algorithmic dynamics (p. 148). 
As Ernst points out, the digital archive is being reconfigured, characterised by an algorithmic 
dynamics, which affects how people interact with the archive and the content that has been 
archived. On one level, the digital archive has made it possible for users to creatively engage 
with archived data, providing the condition of possibilities for engaging with one’s mediated 
memories. Users are able to easily pull data from the digital archive, to enjoy them, to reflect 
on them, to engage with their personal and symbolic texture, and to share these with others. 
Yet, with the emergence of algorithmically dynamic archives, digital archives are able to ‘push’ 
mediated memories (p. 148). In other words, it therefore becomes important to examine 
remembering as an act of non-human actors as well as human. 
Ernst’s suggestion regarding contemporary digital or computational archives can be 
seen to, again, problematise the notion that social networking sites simply facilitate ’dormant’ 
 
66 
memories. Ernst proposes a notion that sees archives as inherently dynamic, its affordances 
going beyond the capacity to just store and make data retrievable for human consumption. As 
a result of their underlying algorithmic dynamics, social media platforms have started 
increasingly pushing the data that previously was predominantly ‘pulled’ by users. Although 
Ernst’s notion of algorithmically dynamic archives implies a connection between mediated 
memories and algorithms, it focused mainly on shifts in the ways in which things are digitally 
stored. He proposes the notion not so much to demonstrate how algorithms may mediate and 
affect people’s personal memories as to highlight the nuanced developments in contemporary 
storage technologies. This project draws on and transposes Ernst’s observation that archives 
are capable of ‘pushing’ data instead of merely allowing data to be ‘pulled’. It seeks to examine 
empirically how the algorithmic dynamics of contemporary memory features are enacted and 
instantiated in people’s everyday lives. As David Beer (2020) stated, conceptualising social 
media platforms as a form of archival media: 
The form that these archival social media take, produces and shapes the events 
that they capture and the way that people understand, respond and memorialise 
those events. Knowledge and memory are changed as the archival structures 
within which we live change. 
Digital archives are not simply a matter of storing, ordering, and managing digital data. They 
do not merely afford the pull out of data and information. They have become dynamic in their 
interaction with their outside world, with those that use them. And as the digital archive and 
their underlying algorithmic makeup change, they constitute changes in the way memory is 
stored and perceived as well as how remembering is instantiated in everyday life. The dynamic 
archives described by Wolfgang Ernst, indicate a turn towards pushing information outwards 
as well as the affordance of information to be extracted.  
 
2.3.4 Social (Media) Memory 
Another salient issue has been how to conceptualise social or collective memory in a changing 
media landscape. Some have focused on the way digital media are dynamic rather than static 
sites of social remembering in contemporary society, paying specific attention to the ‘media 
frameworks’ through which memory becomes collective (Erll and Rigney, 2009). Others have 
focused on issues such as the effects of the increasing convergence of museum and online 
spaces for social memory (Worcman and Garde-Hansen, 2016), whereas others have focused 
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on the ways social memory figures in the contemporary network economy (Terranova, 2017) 
and how in the digital age it is increasingly reduced to the production and mining of data.31 The 
majority of these studies contend with Maurice Halbwachs’ notion that memory exists 
inescapably within social frameworks, yet we also need to attend to the digital conditions in 
which contemporary social memory exists. Some have argued that we need to re-conceptualise 
our notions of ‘social’ and ‘collective’ memory, given the prevalence of digital media and 
social media platforms. José van Dijck (2010, p. 403), for instance, critiqued Halbwachs’ idea 
of ‘collective memory’, stating that the notion of the collective was conceptualised solely in 
anthropomorphic terms. Moreover, Andrew Hoskins argues that Halbwachs’ notion of 
‘collective memory’ does not account for, unsurprisingly, the digital environments in which 
memory takes place. As such, he argues that we need to examine ‘memory ecologies’ instead, 
i.e. external factors that facilitate individual and collective memory (Hoskins, 2016). 
Elsewhere, Hoskins (2018) applies Paulo Virno’s notion of ‘the multitude’ in order to argue 
for the end of collective memory and move beyond Halbwachs. These studies also indicate that 
we need to approach mediated memories in terms of both the changing conceptions of the 
social and the platform logics and algorithmic processes on which they are predicated.  
In If…Then: Algorithmic Power and Politics, Taina Bucher (2018) touches on some of 
the ways social media platforms and algorithms may affect people’s personal and collective 
memories. Bucher states that Facebook provides several tools and techniques dedicated to 
supporting memory in order to simulate and augment the notion of a shared history, (p. 5). 
Some of these techniques include being encouraged to celebrate when one became friends with 
someone else, more ‘intimate’ friendversaries, celebrating x number of likes or pictures shared 
with someone else, and celebrating or remembering some historical event. As seen here, social 
memory emerges not simply as the shared communicative practices of groups of people. In 
other words, it does not merely indicate a coming-together, routinised acts of commemoration 
and collective celebration. Rather, social (media) memory emerges as constructed, as 
fundamentally programmed. As José van Dijck (2010, p. 401) argued, collective memory on 
social media platforms is ‘largely the result of data linked up by means of computer code and 
institutional protocols.’  
 Although Bucher touches on the idea of social memory being facilitated and shaped by 
various social media tools and techniques, she does not go further in her analysis of how social 
 
31 See also Neiger et al.’s (2011) edited collection On Media Memory: Collective Memory in a New Media Age 
for a more comprehensive, if somewhat dated, overview how digital media facilitate and shape collective memory.  
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memory is being shaped. She does, however, argue for a reconceptualisation of the ‘social’ 
given the increasing use of algorithms of social media platforms. Bucher proposes the notion 
of ‘programmed sociality’ as a way to highlight the ways in which users and relations are highly 
networked and connected, overlapped, and circulated. Whereas Halbwachs’ understanding of 
memory as collective was based on purely anthropomorphic terms, Bucher’s notion brings to 
the forefront the architectural structure on which any notion of digital sociality and social 
memory is based. As she states:  
To be concerned with programmed sociality is to be interested in how actors are 
articulated in and through computational means of assembling and organizing, 
which always already embody certain norms and values about the social world 
(2018, p. 4). 
When defining the notion of ‘programmed’, Bucher draws on the language of computer 
science, in which programming refers to that which ‘organises’ and ‘assembles’ (p. 4). To 
program is to organise and assemble data into a manageable and functional structure, to impose 
a structure onto the data which makes it intelligible and useful. Programming is, in short, that 
which ‘frames software and algorithms as dynamic and performative rather than as fixed and 
static entities’ (p. 4). Bucher’s notion sensitises us to the processes through which sociality and 
online participation are algorithmically conditioned, showcasing how social formations are 
shaped to fit the specific logics of social media platforms (p. 7). For example, she shows how 
friendships are embedded and shaped by the structural makeup of Facebook: ‘friendships’ on 
Facebook are algorithmically measured according to criteria such as affinity and activity which 
in turn determines how visible someone’s post will be in relation to someone else. This means 
that what can be seen and who one comes into contact with is not a matter of fate or random 
selection. These relationships are no longer dormant or passive (as we saw in the previous 
section). Rather, Facebook ‘friendships’ constitute a highly calculated and algorithmically-
measured social space. As such, programmed sociality is also a politically infused term: 
‘political in the sense that it is ordered, governed, and shaped in and through software and 
algorithms’ (p. 8).  
In other words, social relations on social media platforms emerge as algorithmically 
conditioned and programmed. It is not unfeasible, then, to apply the same logic to the ways 
people engage with their own mediated memories and those of others. The tools and techniques 
that each social media platform uses to facilitate people’s remembrance of things operate 
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according to the logic of that particular platform. Each social media platform, in turn, operates 
according to its own logic of what participation should look like, and possesses therefore 
criteria to enforce or, more accurately, nudge this vision onto its users. We therefore need a 
thorough investigation of how the logics of platforms, and contemporary memory technologies 
in general, affect memory and memory-making practices in everyday life. In the next section, 
I will give an overview of the narrow yet emerging field of studies, examining how algorithms 
may affect memory.  
 
2.3.5 Towards Intersections of Algorithms and Memory 
Having outlined some of the conceptual nodes that examine the digitisation of memory, we 
now move towards the under-researched field of algorithms and memory. As of yet, there have 
been but a few studies in this area and these have varied greatly in both scope and aims. This 
fact also speaks to ways in which the relationship between algorithms and memory have been 
variously conceptualised and understood. A study into the intersections of algorithms and 
memory, therefore, is also simultaneously a window into different sculpting exercises. That is, 
given the fact the area is under-researched, it is marked by a need to conceptualise and justify 
what indeed counts as an intersection of algorithms and memory. As I will show in this section, 
the few studies that have already been conducted in this area construe and operationalise these 
intersections in heterogeneous ways. 
Lambert et al. (2016), for instance, investigated the effects of algorithmically curated 
memorial videos within the context of grief, mourning and commemoration. Specifically, they 
pay attention to controversial moments where the algorithmic curations of depictions of the 
deceased can be seen to have a negative impact on audiences. The paper concludes by asking, 
amongst others, ‘how can death-sensitive algorithms be designed and offered on large scales?’ 
(p. 13). On one level, this question beckons a deeper question: can algorithms ever be death-
sensitive? On another level, the question posed by Lambert et al. (2016) is a helpful reminder 
that algorithmic mediations of people’s memories are permeated by affect and meaning. 
Applied to other intersections of algorithms and memory, the question invites other questions 
such as: how do algorithms ‘know’ what mediated memories people want to encounter? How 
do they ‘know’ what counts as a mediated memory? These questions are indeed in need of 
further exploring.  
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 Other studies have gone further and proposed notions such as ‘algorithmic memory’ 
and ‘algorithmic memory making’. Elana Esposito’s (2017) work is exemplary of this. Esposito 
explores the different ways humans and algorithms process information, stating that algorithms 
cannot ‘remember’ or ‘forget’ in the same way humans can, because they simply work with 
and work on data, and in turn utilise and exploit the meanings bestowed on memory  and 
forgetting by human actors. As Esposito (2017, p. 6) suggests, ‘Abstracting is actually remem-
bering and forgetting. Algorithms do not abstract, they merely calculate. They do not properly 
remember and do not properly forget’ (original emphasis). The idea of algorithmic memory, as 
such, is not mainly a reference to the specific encounters between human memory practices 
and algorithms. Rather, it signals both the distinction between different forms of infor-
mation/data processing (human and nonhuman), but also the distinctiveness of algorithms in 
storing and processing people’s data or mediated memories. Algorithmic memory is therefore 
a reference to the sort of ‘memory work’ specifically performed by algorithms: calculated, 
classifying, and productive.  
However, Esposito argues that algorithms, because they work (semi)autonomously, 
provide the possibility of large-scale forgetting in humans. Drawing on Harald Weinrich’s 
work on forgetting, Esposito moves from the technical and conceptual specificities of 
algorithms to their potential impact on people’s remembering in everyday life. She suggests 
that ‘hindering remembering is not enough to produce forgetting’, but ’in order to reinforce 
forgetting you should rather multiply the range of available memories’ (Esposito, 2017, p. 6). 
The implication is that ‘if you increase memories, every piece of information is lost in the mass 
and becomes difficult to find,’ concluding that ‘in fact it is lost as if it were forgotten’ (p. 6). 
The argument put forward by Esposito centres around this notion of forgetting as induced by 
the deluge of data continually processed by algorithms, and the ways this development can be 
seen to have political implications. Esposito’s work seeks to develop a notion of ‘algorithmic 
memory’ through the lens of forgetting or digitally induced forgetting. This relationship 
between algorithms and forgetting can also be understood in terms of selectivity. For instance, 
elsewhere I have argued that Facebook’s throwback feature ‘Year in Review’ has incorporated 
algorithms which seek to identify and filter ‘unwanted memories’ from reappearing on people’s 
timeline, arguing that through these digitally ‘sculpted voids’ Facebook’s politics of forgetting 
becomes salient (see Jacobsen, 2020b). However, there is still a need to develop an 
understanding of what it means to actually remember with algorithms, how algorithms can be 
seen to affect people’s remembrance of the past in their everyday lives.  
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 Recently, there have been some studies into the sort of ‘memory work’ done by 
algorithmic features such as Facebook Memories and Apple Memories. In their work on 
Facebook’s throwback feature ‘Memories’, Prey and Smit (2019) argue that the focus needs to 
shift from mediated memories as personal digital objects to mediated memories as algorithm-
mically personalised by the feature. Drawing on Bernard Stiegler’s work, Prey and Smit 
conceptualise Facebook Memories as a ‘mnemotechnology’, that is, a system built ‘around and 
through the organizing of our memories’ (p. 210) or ‘a technology that systematically orders 
memories’ (p. 212). Very much like Derrida’s archons, Prey and Smit emphasise the ordering 
power of memory features such as Facebook Memories. They argue that through the 
organisation of people’s memories, new information is generated about them (p. 212), echoing 
Derrida’s contention that the archiving archive shapes that which is being archived. The 
archivable content, for Derrida, is ordered and shaped according to the internal logics of the 
archive. As Prey and Smit (2019) state, ‘Memories on Facebook are exteriorized within a 
particular technological system which organizes memory according to its own logic’ (p. 213). 
A crucial aspect of the logics of Facebook Memories, according to Prey and Smit, is the way 
the feature seeks to personalise memories ‘through the interlinked processes of user experience 
research, machine learning, and user input’ (p. 213).32 Prey and Smit’s work is useful for seeing 
how mediated memories are shaped according to the logics of the feature ordering and 
processing them. Similarly, this project will seek to investigate the specific logics of other 
memory features, that is, examining what are their functionalities, aims, and affordances.  
This project will not, however, utilise the conceptual framework of ‘mnemotechno-
logies’ as have Prey and Smit. Referring back to Stiegler’s definition, the concept is somewhat 
deterministic and its undertones are too oppressive. As Stiegler states, mnemotechnologies 
refer to ‘service industries which can network them [memories], control them, formalize, model 
them, and perhaps destroy them’ (Stiegler cited in Prey and Smit, 2019, p. 212). Instead, this 
project will seek to explore how algorithmic memory features cannot be considered solely 
through a lens of control, formalisation, and destruction. Instead, drawing on the algorithm 
studies literature, we need to acknowledge the affective and productive effects of algorithmic 
systems and of these memory features. This project will explore how memory features may 
produce a multiplicity of affective encounters with users, affects such as meaningful, nostalgic, 
odd, creepy, funny, and so on. There is therefore a need for a conceptual framework that is 
 
32 They also argue that the personalisation of memories is also an attempt by the platform to improve their 
‘stickiness’, to seem more ‘intimate’ to users and to become more desirable (p. 214). 
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more nuanced than ‘mnemotechnologies’, one which accounts for both the programmed logics 
of the memory feature and how these are utilised and experienced by people in everyday life.  
 Finally, there has also been work examining Apple’s in-built photos application 
‘Memories’ (Jacobsen, 2020a; Pereira, 2019). In a conference paper titled ‘Apple Memories 
and Automated Memory-Making’, Gabriel Pereira (2019) explores the role of Apple Memories 
in the way memories are algorithmically generated and circulated. Attending to both Apple’s 
marketing speak as well as their chip-engineering, Pereira argues that memory-making is 
increasingly mediatised and automated in the age of the algorithm, embedded within a logic of 
prediction. As he concludes:  
Our memory is not a computer, and memory-making is more than information 
processing. As applications promise to cut through the clutter of our big data, the 
politics of these systems need to be carefully analyzed in the imaginary they 
present and how they physically materialize them. 
Posing a fundamental distinction between how humans and algorithms remember, Pereira calls 
for an investigation into the politics of how memory applications are being made, how they are 
being rhetorically and commercially presented, and they are physically materialised. This 
project will seek to respond to this call, examining the politics and imaginaries of memory 
features and how algorithms can be seen to affect and shape people’s memory making practices 
in everyday life. Yet, there is still scope to examine how applications such as Apple Memories 
are actually utilised and experienced by people in everyday life. Such examinations into the 
everyday use of memory features will also highlight how people can be seen to remember with 
algorithms, potentially disrupting or problematising the fundamental distinction between 
human and algorithmic remembering.   
 
2.4 Conclusion: Research Questions and Identifying the Gaps in the Literature 
The intersections of digital media and memory attest to the dual fact that people have always 
used ‘media’ of various kinds to facilitate and make possible their remembrance of the past and 
that the presence of media has been greatly proliferated in contemporary society. As we have 
also seen in this chapter, remembering must be understood as an active and performative 
engagement with one’s digital memory traces, one’s mediated memories. Memory and 
remembering are not contained in the individual nor the ‘social’; neither is it contained in the 
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technologies themselves. Examining the intersections of algorithms and memory should not be 
restricted to people’s performative enactments and engagements with their data past nor should 
it be understood solely through the prism of the technologies themselves. In other words, it 
means that neither humans nor algorithms can be ontologically prioritised, but rather these must 
be conceptualised and studied in relation to each other, as coming to matter in particular 
situations at particular times.  
As this chapter has also shown, there is not much research dedicated to the ways 
algorithms mediate memory. This project is guided by two overarching research questions: 
firstly, to what extent and in what ways do algorithms affect people’s remembering of the past? 
And secondly, what are the various (social) implications of algorithms mediating people’s 
memories? The project also identifies two main gaps in the literature or two main areas which 
are in need of more research: 1) an investigation into and a scoping of the algorithmic 
technologies themselves, and 2) a study into how people use, experience, and negotiate these 
technologies and their resurfacing memories. As I highlight below, each of these questions 
contain a plethora of sub questions that need attending to and investigating. I will outline a few 
here.  
In the context of the algorithmic technologies which mediate people’s mediated memo-
ries, there is a need for: 
• A comprehensive overview or scoping, which outlines the emergence and presence of 
algorithmic systems mediating memory in our current mediascape33 
• An examination of the functionalities and affordances of these systems, i.e. the role of 
techniques such as classification, computer vision, pattern recognition, neural net-
works, feedback loops, and so on.  
• An examination of how these algorithmic systems are rhetorically and program-
matically ‘imagined’ by tech companies, i.e. how they are described, what they promise 
users, what are some their underlying assumptions about the world, users, memory, and 
so on.34 
 
33 As the following chapters will show, these technologies comprise a heterogeneity in the form of social media 
platform features, smartphone features, standalone apps, cloud-based photo storage and sharing services, and so 
on. 
34 For instance, Van House and Churchill (2008, p. 297) observe that ‘explicit and tacit models of social and 
personal memory are ‘baked into’ the design of these technologies’, arguing that ‘these design decisions then play 




The project will seek to answer these questions in the first analysis chapter titled ‘The 
Landscape of Algorithmic Remembrance Technologies’. The chapter both conceptualises what 
is meant by the notion of ‘algorithmic remembrance technologies’ as well as outlining some of 
their key characteristics. Seeking to answering these questions will also help to answer a more 
fundamental and abstract set of questions, that is: how, when, and why is past data repackaged 
as mediated memories and what are its effects? This will be further elucidated in the thesis 
conclusion.  
Secondly, it is crucial that they examine people’s affective encounters with their data 
past and algorithmic remembrance technologies. In this context, there is a need for:  
• A study into people’s lived experiences with algorithms in relation to these techno-
logies, i.e. we need to ask: 
o How do people experience these technologies? 
o How do people use these features in their everyday life? 
o How do people negotiate and make sense of the mediated memories they are 
encountered with through their resurfacing? 
o What sort of impact do these technologies have on users and their remembrance 
of the past? 
o What sort of impact do these technologies have on people’s ‘working on the 
present’ (Bowker, 2008)? In other words, how are these technologies affecting 
people’s memory practices in the present and their present behavioural patterns? 
Pursuing these questions will help move the analysis towards a more nuanced and detailed 
understanding of people’s lived experiences of algorithms and also how algorithms affect 
people’s remembrance of the past. These questions will be approached in further detail in 
chapters 5 and 6. Chapter 5 will discuss how people variously use algorithmic remembrance 
technologies in everyday life, whilst chapter 6 will discuss how these technologies can be seen 
to affect and shape people’s perception and approach to the past.  
These various questions warrant a mix of methods, a mixed-methods approach (archival 
research and interviews – both qualitative and focus groups). In the next chapter, titled 
‘Methodology’, I will first argue for the reasons for using a mix-methods approach, and then 





3.1 Introduction: A Mixed-Methods Approach 
This research project examines the ways in which algorithms can be seen to affect and shape 
people’s remembrance of the past and their everyday memory practices. Through engaging 
with the research questions proposed in the introduction, the aim is to better understand what 
it means to remember with algorithms in everyday life. In order to do this, I utilise a mixed-
methods approach. The methods comprise: 
• The scoping and analysis of 15 algorithmic remembrance technologies (listed below) 
and the discourses surrounding them 
• The analysis of 26 in-depth, semi-structured interviews  
• The analysis of four focus groups  
• The analysis of one in-depth, semi-structured interview with a tech expert  
The chapter discusses these methods in two sections, titled ‘Scoping Algorithmic Remem-
brance Technologies’ and ‘Doing Interviews’. 
In order to better understand how algorithms and memory can be seen to intersect in 
everyday life, it was crucial to gain a deeper understanding of, firstly, the systems, apps, and 
platforms that mediate memory practices. The scoping of what I will call ‘algorithmic 
remembrance technologies’ sought to establish what technologies exist in the contemporary 
media landscape as well as outlining their key characteristics. Interviews with tech experts 
similarly sought to add nuance to the understanding of these technologies as well as providing 
insights into the ways these technologies are imagined and programmed, how users are figured, 
and how memory is conceptualised. As interviews with tech experts were dependent on access, 
I therefore did not expect many of these interviews. Nonetheless, I managed to get an interview 
with the head developer and co-founder of the popular memory app, Timehop. The interview 
with the Timehop cofounder provided an additional and fruitful entry point into investigating 
the power and politics of algorithms and algorithmic systems on the way memory is mediated 
in everyday life. 
 Furthermore, the thesis seeks to investigate varying levels of engagement with plat-
forms and apps. This provides a more comprehensive and more holistic understanding of how 
algorithmic remembrance technologies are experienced, used, and negotiated. As a result, two 
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different qualitative methods – in-depth interviews and focus groups – were used for the project 
(Bryman, 2012; Seidman, 1991; Rubin and Rubin, 2005).35 This was decided in order to 
procure data that explored people’s lived encounters, affects, and experiences with using these 
memory technologies. As this chapter will show, algorithmic remembrance technologies 
comprise both standalone apps and features that have been integrated into platforms. This 
necessarily affects how people use and experience the algorithmic mediation of memory online. 
For instance, apps such as Timehop are specifically designed with the sole purpose to resurface 
past data as ‘memories’ in the present, which means that people must opt in and continually 
engage with it. In this case, the assumption was that the use of Timehop, for instance, would 
be more routine, more voluntary, more active. Facebook Memories, on the other hand, is an 
integral features of the social media platform and cannot be fully disabled by users. It was 
therefore assumed that encountering resurfaced data as memories on Facebook would 
constitute a more incidental yet crucial part of the platform experience. Given the disparate 
nature of algorithmic remembrance technologies, this project showcases how people experi-
ence the algorithmic mediation of their past data differently based on what features or apps 
they use or are exposed to. 
 Therefore, the methods I have employed sought to capture the different ways algo-
rithmic remembrance technologies are used and experienced in everyday life. That is, to 
provide insights into how people both intentionally use memory features as well as how they 
are exposed to resurfacing memories as a ‘by product’ of their social media usage. The rationale 
for using mixed methods was in order to try and capture the diverse ways in which people 
experience, negotiate, and engage with algorithmic remembrance technologies and the 
‘memories’ they routinely resurface. 
In-depth, semi-structured interviews have been widely used to examine people’s 
memory practices and remembering of the past (e.g. Lawler, 2008; Keightley and Pickering, 
2012, 2014). It is also worth mentioning that I used semi-structured interviews as a way gain a 
better understanding of why algorithmic remembrance technologies are used and how they are 
perceived by users. Moreover, interviews were used to examine how the use of algorithmic 
 
35 There have been various studies conducted into the ways algorithms can be seen to affect and shape various 
aspects of people’s everyday lives (see chapter two). These studies have utilised different qualitative research 
methods to examine the social power of algorithms. Taina Bucher (2017), for instance, conducted email interviews 
with participants in order to examine people’s everyday perceptions of algorithms. Moreover, Rob Kitchin (2017) 
has proposed ethnography as a valid way of researching algorithms and the ways people both engage with and are 
conditioned by algorithmic systems. 
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remembrance technologies can be seen to affect and/or shape people’s remembrance of the 
past, whilst simultaneously acknowledging my involvement as researcher in the production of 
what Donna Haraway (1988) called ‘situated knowledges’. Focus groups, on the other hand, 
were employed to broaden the understanding of how algorithmic remembrance technologies 
are used and how they are understood. Focus groups were considered, and indeed proved to be, 
an apt approach to better capture the views of people who may not be routine users of memory 
apps.  Given the way some technologies are embedded into already well-established social 
media platforms or smartphones, focus groups constituted a useful mechanism to facilitate 
participants’ ways of co-exploring and co-constructing their experiences of encountering 
algorithmically resurfaced memories on features such as Facebook Memories or Apple 
Memories. As such, focus groups were a useful space in which people’s meanings and 
perceptions could be negotiated and co-constructed in relation to the other participants present. 
 This mixed-methods approach highlights the dynamic nature of memory – as embodied, 
embedded, and constantly in flux. This approach is also based on a relational view of 
algorithms (Bucher, 2018). Seen in relational terms, algorithms exist as part and parcel of larger 
assemblages, comprising both human and nonhuman agencies. Algorithms are therefore under-
stood as enacted in the world, at particular times, in particular settings.36 Examining algo-
rithmic remembrance technologies and how people experience them is one such setting that 
will help further our understanding of the social power and politics of algorithms. In the next 
section, I will outline the scoping method in more detail, discussing how these technologies 
were conceptualised and operationalised as well as sampled and analysed. 
 
3.2 Scoping Algorithmic Remembrance Technologies 
3.2.1 Conceptualising 
As the next chapter will argue in more detail, algorithmic remembrance technologies facilitate 
and shape how memory practices are instantiated in everyday life and, more broadly, how 
memory is being configured and conceptualised. More specifically, they are mechanisms for 
mining, analysing, and resurfacing previous content (such as social media posts and images) to 
 
36 For a deeper discussion of the relational/variable ontology of algorithms, see Taina Bucher (2018, p. 50-54). 
The notion that algorithms have a variable ontology also means, as Introna and Wood (2004, p. 180) state, that 
‘we cannot with any degree of certainty separate the purely social from the purely technical, cause from effect, 
designer from user, winners from losers, and so on’. Moreover, Tarleton Gillespie (2014, p. 183) argued that when 
studying algorithms we need to bear in mind ‘a multidimensional ‘entanglement’ between algorithms put into 
practice and the social tactics of users who take them up’.  
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a user as ‘memories’ at particular times in the present. I also identify different kinds of features 
currently mediating people’s memories, delineating their scope and structural configurations 
as well as analysing their main characteristics. Through this method, I provide an overview of 
the technologies that algorithmically mediate memory in our current mediascape. 
Having established this, I ask what is meant by ‘algorithmic remembrance technology’? 
In terms of the former, I propose the notion in order to emphasise the various applications of 
algorithmic techniques and models in the mediation of people’s memories: machine learning, 
convolutional neural networks, AI, computer vision, object and pattern recognition systems. In 
other words, the concept accentuates how these technologies mine, analyse, classify, order, 
rank, and routinely resurface people’s past data as ‘memories’ in the present (algorithmic 
remembrance technologies will be explored in chapter 4). As such, this project looks at contem-
porary technologies that algorithmically mediate people’s past data in the present.  
Notable examples of these tech-
nologies include features such as Fac-
ebook Memories, Apple Memories, and 
Timehop. Facebook’s Memories feature, 
for instance, helps users revisit content 
from a given day in their Facebook 
history with notifications such as ‘you 
have a memory 5 years ago with so and 
so.’  It consists of past platform-specific 
content such as posts and images, which 
are resurfaced back to users according to 
what has been posted in the past and 
when. If one has an iPhone, one may also 
encounter notifications from the feature Apple Memories such as ‘you have a new memory’ or 
‘fluffy friends 2015.’ This feature is embedded within the phone’s Photos app and resurfaces 
photos and videos one has taken in the past that are stored on the phone. There are also 
standalone apps, specifically dedicated to the purpose of resurfacing users’ data past in the 
present. For instance, the app Timehop gathers all of one’s social media content (such as posts 
and images) from across a variety of social media platforms, resurfacing these in the present. 
As a result, if one were to open up the app on, say, June 15th one would get the photos and 
posts from that exact day 1 year ago, two years ago, or even 8 years ago (that is, if one posted 
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anything on that day in the past). Generally speaking, what these algorithmic systems have in 
common is that they are mechanisms for presenting/resurfacing previous content (such as 
social media posts and images) to users as ‘memories’ at particular times in the present. 
Moreover, I propose the notion to make sense of the various technologies in the 
everyday life that seek to explicitly intervene in and shape the definition of what a memory is 
and what it means to remember. Notifications such as ‘you have a new memory’ are not merely 
clever marketing, but also reveal a fundamental engagement with how memories are 
conceptualised in the contemporary media landscape. There is therefore also a need to explore 
how these technologies define ‘memory’ and ‘remembering’ (this is explored in chapter 4). For 
this reason I have also chosen not to examine ‘quantified self’ apps. The quantified self, occu-
pied with self-tracking and lifelogging in order to promote a particular objectivised view of the 
body and of health, is not mainly concerned with conceptualising data as memories nor to 
explicitly intervene in the definition of what a memory is. Although a study of the relationship 
between quantified self apps and memory could be an interesting future study, I have chosen 
to leave it out here.  
 Given the emphasis on and use of algorithmic techniques in mediating people’s 
memories, it is worth mentioning from the outset that I am not looking at one homogeneous 
group of technologies. Instead, the notion of algorithmic remembrance technologies is referring 
to a wide variety of systems comprising apps, platforms, platform features, cloud-based 
services, databases, smartphone features, and so on. Indeed, as the analysis in chapter four will 
demonstrate, these technologies reflect a heterogeneous grouping of features, functionalities, 
and platforms. It is therefore not meant as a totalising concept nor an exhaustive list. Rather, it 
is of a sensitising kind. I suggest that the technologies that have been sampled and analysed in 
this project are sufficiently emblematic of an emergent, highly variegated media landscape that 
seeks to algorithmically facilitate, frame, and shape people’s memory practices in the present. 
 Given the plethora of features that currently exist, and given their varied configurations, 
I have employed a three-pronged sampling strategy for identifying these technologies. Broadly 
speaking, this means that the sampling of the scoping method was purposive as well as 
explorative (this will be discussed in more detail below). This strategy helped me identify and 
distinguish between three general categories of algorithmic remembrance technologies,37  
 
37  It is important to reiterate that these categories do not reflect nor describe the exact nature of these technologies. 




2) Platform features 
3) Smartphone features 
My justification for producing such a sampling typology is well articulated by John B. 
Thompson (2020). He states that:  
A typology of forms of interaction is not intended to be a description of the actual 
flow of social life. But one of the merits of a typology is that it enables you to 
separate out the different forms of interaction which are often woven together in 
the complex flow of day-to- day life, to analyse their characteristics and to make 
explicit certain similarities and differences that might otherwise be difficult to 
see (p. 8). 
Thompson is not discussing algorithmic remembrance technologies but rather the creation and 
development of new forms of digital action and interaction. Still, I find his idea – the separation 
of technological forms of interaction as a means of providing clarity, depth of analysis and 
understanding – highly relevant to the context of this project. As such, the sampling strategy 
was aimed to better analyse the characteristics of algorithmic remembrance technologies and 
to ‘make explicit certain similarities and difference’ between different kinds of memory 
technologies. 
The first category – apps – refers to ‘mobile software applications’, or applications 
designed and programmed to be used on smartphones and tablets. Apps are ubiquitous and 
mundane, designed to be downloaded and used voluntarily. This project sees apps in terms of 
both ‘commodities’ (Morris & Elkins, 2015) and ‘sociocultural artefacts’ (Lupton, 2014). This 
means that apps are understood as ‘digital objects that are the products of human decision-
making, underpinned by tacit assumptions, norms and discourses already circulating in the 
social and cultural contexts in which they are generated, marketed and used’ (Lupton, 2014, p. 
 
loadable as a smartphone app. Similarly, Apple Memories is an integrated feature of the iPhone’s Photos feature, 
but also exists on the Photos feature on Apple Macs. Moreover, Google Photos and Gallery Go are both produced 
by Google, and they contain overlapping functionalities, but one I have categorised as a ‘platform feature’ and the 
other as an ‘app’. How these are categorised is necessarily contingent since their boundaries are fluid. As such, 
the categorisation of algorithmic remembrance technologies is a sampling strategy and should not be seen as a 
generalisable classification or taxonomy of these technologies. Although these features are interconnected and 




606).38 Apps are also embedded within ‘pre-established circuits of discourse and meaning’ 
(Lupton, 2015, p. 441), which means that they have the potential to impact and shape people’s 
everyday perceptions and practices. Algorithmic remembrance technologies also comprise 
mobile software applications. As a result, the scoping of these technologies is, in part, a critical 
analysis of particular apps which store people’s past data from various platforms and resurface 
these as ‘memories’ in the present. The scoping and analysis of memory technologies therefore 
includes apps as one methodological point of departure. 
 Secondly, algorithmic remembrance technologies also refer to platform features. Plat-
forms and their politics have received ample scholarly attention in recent years (Helmond, 
2015; Gillespie, 2010, 2018; van Dijck et al., 2018). For instance, social media platforms have 
been conceptualised as ‘algorithmic media’ as a way to explore ‘what it means to have 
algorithms interwoven in the social fabric of the contemporary media landscape’ (Bucher, 
2018, p. 38). Platforms, and especially social media platforms, have become ubiquitous aspects 
of work and everyday life, shaping the ways we shop, learn, and interact with others. As this 
project shows, they have also become central to how memory is conceptualised and how 
memory practices are instantiated in everyday life. Algorithmic remembrance technologies not 
only constitute standalone apps, but are also embedded or integral features of already-
established social media platforms. As I pointed out earlier, this means that these technologies 
can seem less visible than standalone apps. For instance, Google is primarily a search and 
online advertising company, yet they also host cloud-based photo storage and sharing services 
such as Google Photos. Google Photos can be considered, at least in part, an algorithmic 
remembrance technology as it stores, analyses, curates and resurfaces past content as ‘memo-
ries’ in the present. Through features such as Google Photos we are able to identify and investi-
gate more implicit iterations of algorithmic remembrance technologies. 
 Another similarly implicit kind of algorithmic remembrance technologies can be found 
on smartphone features. These features, it turned out, were often embedded in the default apps 
of smartphones and thus could not be entirely deleted (although it could be muted to some 
extent). For instance, features such as Apple’s Memories, which is an integral part of the default 
Photos app, seeks to algorithmically curate and resurface a user’s past content in the present. 
Other smartphones have similar embedded features: LG has a feature called ‘Memories’ whilst 
the newer versions of Samsung smartphone have similar memory-directed functionalities on 
 
38 Apps have been extensively researched in a variety of areas, for instance, in relation to self-tracking and sex 
(Lupton, 2015) education (Decuypere, 2019), and language learning (Godwin-Jones, 2015). 
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their inbuilt ‘Gallery’ app. Sampling categories such as ‘platform features’ and ‘smartphone 
features’ indicate that a certain preoccupation with people’s mediated memories could be seen 
to be deeply and inescapably embedded in the structural fabric of our current media landscape.  
 
3.2.2 Sampling 
Having conceptualised algorithmic remembrance technologies, I now turn to issues of samp-
ling. The sampling took place between October and December 2018 and was both purposive 
and explorative. In the years leading up to the project, I had had several encounters with my 
past data resurfacing as memories in the present. As a Facebook user, I occasionally came 
across notifications such as ‘Here’s a Memory from Two Years Ago’ on my Newsfeed, and as 
iPhone user, I routinely saw the notification ‘You have a New Memory’. These personal 
experiences became a starting point for exploring what other memory features there might 
exist. By purposive, I mean that I intentionally searched for similar functionalities such as 
Apple Memories or Facebook Memories. By explorative, I mean that I did not know before-
hand all the technologies that existed. Having established the different categories, I then 
explored each in more depth, finding relevant features as well as hitting dead ends along the 
way. Overall, the three-pronged sampling strategy provided a clear and manageable framework 
for identifying these algorithmic remembrance technologies. Still, how were each of these 
categories sampled more specifically? 
The aim, in terms of apps, was to identify and establish what kind of memory apps existed, 
paying specific attention to their similarities and differences. The aim was not to establish a 
sense of volume (that is, how many apps existed in terms of quantification) but rather to 
establish what kinds of apps existed in relation to memory, and what were their affordances as 
well as technical makeup and interface. Following Dieter et al.’s (2019) discussion on app 
stores as a methodological entry point to the study of apps, memory apps were sampled from 
both Google Play and Apple’s App Store. App stores are crucial since apps are embedded and 
situated within these infrastructural settings.39 In order to explore and identify algorithmic 
remembrance technologies as apps, I conducted a search on the two major app stores from 
 
39 As such, there is a political dimension to app stores. They function as gatekeepers, making some apps more 
visible than others. As Dieter et al. (2019, p. 2) argue, ‘App stores are the main site for accessing, downloading, 
and distributing apps’, continuing that ‘they allow researchers several opportunities to follow the perspectives of 
different stakeholder groups, including users and developers.’ 
In other words, they function as gatekeepers ‘by setting up the rules for app creation, sorting, and distribution, and 
they do so by drawing from the economic model of the multi-sided marketplace’ (Dieter et al., 2019, p. 2). 
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October to December 2018, using a wide variety of search terms such as: ‘memory’, ‘memory 
app’, ‘remember’,  ‘rediscover’, ‘review’ and so on. I felt these to be the most appropriate and 
relevant search terms in the context of this project, and they were felt to highlight the types of 
apps most relevant to the algorithmic mediation of people’s digital memories. Given that the 
scoping of apps was explorative, it felt appropriate to use a plethora of search terms for a 
comprehensive overview. In general, these search terms revealed a wide range of apps, with 
various aims and purposes, most of which were not considered relevant to the scope of this 
project. For instance, search terms like ‘memory’ and ‘memory app’ revealed mostly games 
and exercise applications meant for memory training, where one could improve cognitive recall 
through memorisation exercises.40  
 Apps were identified as being relevant to this study based on a variety of factors: firstly 
and mainly, I reviewed the app’s functionalities and its features. For instance, apps such as 
Amazon Photos use facial and object recognition software to afford users the ability to search 
for certain people and objects in their digital photo albums. The use of facial and object recog-
nition also figured in the way Amazon Photos afforded the specific resurfacing of ‘memories 
of person x’ or ‘memories from place y.’ As such, the feature was considered relevant to how 
memory is conceptualised and how memory practices are framed and instantiated. Moreover, 
I looked at users’ reviews as well as examining the app’s ‘version history’ to see how it has 
been updated and developed through time. Many apps also listed their developer website, 
license agreement, terms of service, and privacy policy on their App Store page. These were 
perused to examine how the app had been developed, their relationship to data and privacy, 
and to identify what other applications had been made by the same developer. These links 
provided rich data and documentation for the analysis. 
 It is also important to acknowledge the interrelatedness of apps and their inter-
connections on app stores. According to Dieter et al., (2019, p. 2), app stores can be used not 
only to identify certain apps, but also to address relations among multiple apps. In the project, 
these relations were addressed in two particular ways: 1) through the app’s categorisation on 
the app stores, and 2) the ‘You May Also Like’ option. In terms of the former, both Apple’s 
and Google’s app stores categorise their apps under rubrics such as ‘Productivity’, ‘Art & 
Design’, ‘Creativity’, and ‘Education’. These categories help navigate users through the app 
 
40 Search terms such as ‘remember’ revealed apps mostly related to to-do lists, schedules, checklists, notepads, 
plans, goals, reminders, and so on. Apps such as ‘Google Keep’ were branded as mainly practical tools, and were 
also categorised by Apple Store as ‘Productivity’ (categories are discussed above). 
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stores towards apps they deem relevant. Most apps relating to the algorithmic mediation of 
memories, it turned out, were categorised predominantly as ‘Photo & Video’, with some 
categorised as ‘Social Networking’ as well as ‘Travel’. Taking advantage of the navigational 
affordance of app categories, I perused through categories such as ‘Photo & Video’, which 
elicited some interesting apps that have been included in the project’s analysis (e.g. Amazon 
Photos and Microsoft Photos). Attending to their categorisation was also a good way to 
examine how apps were imagined and understood by app stores as well as by developers. In 
terms of the latter, the ‘You May Also Like’ function highlights correlated, or what is perceived 
by app stores to be related, apps. Again, the use of this function elicited relevant apps and data, 
as well as accentuating the interrelatedness of apps and app developers more generally.  
Although platforms can be conceptualised in different ways (Gillespie, 2010), I chose 
to focus on the major social media platforms currently in circulation: Facebook, Instagram, 
Youtube, Twitter, Snapchat, TikTok, Tumblr, Reddit, LinkedIn, and Quora. The aim with 
scoping platform features was not to assess the exact number of algorithmic remembrance 
technologies in existence; rather, it was to examine the extent to which these technologies are 
already deeply embedded in and integrated into popular social media platforms. From October 
to December 2018, I perused these platforms for ways in which they may mediate people’s 
past data as memories.  
As the sampling strategy suggested, algorithmic remembrance technologies could also 
be found as features embedded in smartphones and their default applications. As I mentioned 
earlier, the experience of using an iPhone, and coming across notifications such as ‘you have a 
new memory’, sensitised me to the idea that these technologies could be found not just as 
standalone apps or as platform features, but as an integrated part of owning and using smart-
phones. The aim of this part of the sampling strategy was therefore to examine whether similar 
technologies existed in other kinds of smartphones as well, which would help to outline the 
scope of these technologies. The sampling frame for smartphone features was established by 
consulting both statistics outlining the global shipment of smartphones as well as sources listing 
the top-10 best-selling smartphone brands in the world at the moment.  
As a result, I went through and examined smartphones such as: iPhone 6 (and onwards), 
Samsung Galaxy, Google Pixel, Sony Experia, LG G7, Lenovo, ZTE, Nokia, OnePlus, Huawei, 
Honor, and HTC. Again, it is important to reiterate that this was not meant as an exhaustive 
list, but was rather meant to provide an idea of the scope of these algorithmic remembrance 
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technologies, how their functionalities and affordances might differ or resemble others. The 
sampling and data collection was conducted through both convenience sampling, examining 
the kinds of smartphones I could get physical access to, and archival research, that is, 
examining the smartphone developers’ online sites, their terms of agreement, their privacy 




This scoping method created a total sample of 15 algorithmic remembrance technologies in the 
form of apps, platform features, and smartphone features. The sample of algorithmic remem-
brance technologies, broken down into sampling categories, is listed on the table below.  
Platform Features Smart Phone Features Apps 
Facebook Memories Google Pixel Amazon Photos 
Instagram Throwbacks Apple Memories (in Photos) Ever 
Snapchat Flashback Memories LG Memories (in Gallery) Fotofami 
 Samsung Stories (in Gallery) Google Photos 
  MemoryWeb 
  Microsoft Photos 
  Swarm (by Foursquare) 
  Timehop 
The data from the scoping was collected between early October and late December 2018. The 
scoping produced a varied dataset and different types of data. It produced a variety of 
documents such as Terms and Agreements, Terms and Conditions, Data Policies, Privacy Poli-
cies, Cookie Policies, User Manuals, update histories, and developer blogs. The scoping, 
particularly of the websites of the developers, also produced a range of marketing materials 
such as video presentations, promotional material, instructional videos, blog entries, user re-
views, and online adverts.  
These different types of data enabled me to focus on and examine how the algorithmic 
remembrance technologies are presented in the materials: that is, what is their commercial or 
marketing rhetoric, what are their functionalities, affordances, services, what algorithmic 
techniques do they utilise, and what do they promise users. When analysing the data, I initially 
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focused on key words and references such as ‘machine learning’, ‘AI’, ‘pattern recognition’, 
and ‘memories.’ In subsequent readings, I delved deeper into the specificities of their function-
alities and how they algorithmically mediate people’s memories more specifically. These 
materials also helped me examine the ways in which the technologies are imagined by develop-
ers and tech companies, their proposed aims and achievements, as well as how they relate to 
the wider ecosystem of connectivity (van Dijck, 2013) and surveillance capitalism (Zuboff, 
2015; 2019).  
 It is worth mentioning that the scoping and analysis of algorithmic remembrance 
technologies, in terms of apps, also comprised what has been referred to as the ‘walkthrough 
method’ (Light et al., 2018; Decuypere, 2019). This refers to a methodological approach that 
examines apps in terms of their interfaces. It constitutes a direct and in-depth engagement with 
the app. As Decuypere (2019, p. 418) states, the walkthrough method enables the researcher to 
‘analyze an app’s architecture and interface in a systematic way in order to disentangle the 
app’s environment of expected use and foreground the characteristics of the interface’ (original 
emphasis). Using this approach enabled me to become more intimately familiar with the 
algorithmic remembrance technologies in question. Moreover, I downloaded and visited the 
memory app Timehop every day for a year as well as checking Facebook Memories and Apple 
Memories 2-3 times a week for six months. The perspectives this engagement engendered also 
helped me connect with many of the interview participants, providing us a common frame of 
reference and often similar experiences. Overall, the walkthrough method provided further 
nuance to the dataset and a deeper understanding of the functionalities, architectures, and 
interfaces of several algorithmic remembrance technologies.  
 
3.3 Doing Interviews 
3.3.1 Sampling 
This section will outline the interview approaches (i.e. 26 interviews, four focus groups, one 
interview with a tech expert). In terms of sampling for the qualitative interviews, it was decided 
that the most appropriate way to proceed was to do purposive sampling and thus narrow the 
focus down to one app, feature, or platform. As a result, Timehop was chosen as the sampling 
frame for the in-depth, semi-structured interviews. The reasons for selecting Timehop were 
manifold: firstly, it is an app specifically designed and dedicated to resurface users’ past data 
as ‘memories’ in the present. As an app, it provides users with daily snippets or backward 
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glances of their digital past. It was therefore assumed that its user base constituted, on average, 
active and voluntary users who had intentionally opted in to use the app. Secondly, the app 
remains highly popular. As of 2018, the app had 21 million daily users (Lomas, 2018), which 
provided more than enough scope in terms of sampling. Thirdly, other algorithmic remem-
brance technologies have taken inspiration from Timehop. Created in 2011, the app has since 
provided the inspirational blueprints for features such as Facebook Memories in addition to 
remaining relevant to users as a standalone app through the years. Lastly, it was assumed that 
users engaging with Timehop were likely to also use or encounter other similar memory 
technologies. The interviews demonstrated that this was indeed the case. Many of the interview 
participants also discussed their use of other features such as Apple Memories, Facebook 
Memories, or Snapchat Memories, often drawing comparisons between their functionalities. 
As a result, the interviews not only provided data on how users use and negotiate features such 
as Timehop, but also provided insights into the variegated experiences of using other 
algorithmic remembrance technologies as well. That made this dataset particularly rich as well 
as providing points of comparison with the findings that emerged in the focus group interviews.  
 I took methodological inspiration from studies such as Bucher (2017) and Lee (2013), 
who used Twitter as a means to sample and recruit potential participants, conducting the inter-
views remotely via applications such as Skype.41 I searched Twitter daily for key words relating 
to ‘Timehop’ or ‘Timehop memories’ over a three-month period, from mid-January to late 
March 2019. Based on these searches, I regularly contacted people on Twitter and 26 agreed 
to take part in an interview. These are listed below:   
Pseudonym Age Occupation Country 
Anna 60 Teacher Canada 
Becky 36 Charity worker United States 
Charlotte 27 Unemployed England 
Diana 31 Software engineer United States 
Ethan 29  Tech worker United States 
Francis 20s University student United States 
Grace 37 Digital marketing United States 
 
41 Bucher (2017), for instance, searched for key words on Twitter in relation to what people wrote about algorithms 
over a nine-month period. Potential participants were then contacted on Twitter and asked whether they wanted 
to participate in an email interview about everyday perceptions of algorithms. Lee (2013) similarly used Twitter 
to establish their sampling frame when analysing the use of social media and smartphones amongst Korean youth.  
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Harvey 33 Teacher United States 
Imogen 37  Journalist United States 
Jack 26 Clergy United States 
Keith 26 Industry relations coordinator United States 
Lydia 50s Management consultant Northern Ireland 
Miriam  26 Banker United States 
Nicole  34 Operations manager United States 
Oliver  32 Digital marketing United States 
Paul 35 Diamond industry worker United States 
Quentin  22 Journalist United States 
Raymond 40s Customer support Canada 
Sarah 44 Chief marketing officer United States 
Taylor 23 Barista Puerto Rico 
Alice 30  Attorney United States 
Beth 34 Tech consultant United States 
Charlie  22 Digital marketing Australia 
Donna 22 Paralegal United States 
Emma 34 Medical education manager United States 
Demi 25 Health worker Puerto Rico 
 
The participants were consequently provided with an information sheet via email about the 
project as well as a consent form that they had to sign and send back before the start of the 
interview. Given the fact that 26 participants ultimately accepted to take part in the remote 
interviews, and given the total number of people contacted, the response rate was low. 
However, this was not seen as an issue for this project, as I was not attempting to determine a 
representative or generalisable sample of Timehop users, but rather to gain a multiplicity of 
insights and experiences of using memory features. 
Given the variegated nature of algorithmic remembrance technologies, it was also 
decided to conduct focus group interviews. Focus groups were considered well suited to 
explore the experiences of people with various degrees of exposure to memory features, who 
may have encountered resurfacing memories as a ‘by product’ of their social media usage. The 
aim was therefore to procure a diverse sample, ranging from those unfamiliar with these 
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technologies to those using them or encountering them regularly, which in turn produced a rich 
and varied dataset. As a result, I recruited focus group participants with diverse degrees of 
familiarity and exposure to the technologies in question as well as to social media platforms. It 
was also decided that potential participants did not necessarily need to be acquainted with the 
technologies beforehand. This was in order to add to the focus group dynamic and to the 
dataset. It is worth noting here that diversity was not mainly related to gender, class, or race, 
but the participants’ level of familiarity and exposure to or experiences using memory techno-
logies. The aim was not to produce the necessary conditions for comparable or generalisable 
statements about issues of gender, class, or race. Rather, it was to produce a dataset from which 
to develop a conceptual framework for thinking about the intersections of algorithms and 
memory in everyday life. 
I conducted four focus groups in total over two two-month periods in 2019: May to 
June and September to October. In order to procure a diverse and varied sample, I did purposive 
sampling and recruited participants from local community groups as well as students from the 
local university. It was decided that these two groups would provide sufficient range of 
familiarity and variety of encounters with the technologies in question. The focus group 
participants, who have been pseudonymised, are listed below: 
Focus group 1 (community group) Focus Group 2 (community group) 
Anna, 50s, housewife Emma, 70s, retired 
Brian, 50s, university lecturer Freddie, 70s, retired 
Catherine, 70s, retired Grace, 60s, retired 
Daniel, 70s, retired Helen, 70s, retired 
 
Focus Group 3 (student group) Focus Group 4 (student group) 
James, 18, student Esther, 18, student 
Lucas, 18, student Charlotte, 18, student 
Mia, 29, healthcare assistant Jane, 23, healthcare assistant 
Elijah, 20, student Theo, 30, civil servant 
Ava, 18, student Lily, 37, student 
Olivia, 18, student Eva, 20s, student 
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William, 19, student Sonya, 18 student 
 
One of the rationales for recruiting from these particular groups was the idea of sampling pre-
existing groups, which is a much-discussed topic in the methods literature (e.g. King and 
Horrock, 2010; Kitzinger, 1994). It was assumed that sampling pre-existing groups would 
amplify participants’ level of confidence and willingness to discuss the matter at hand, which 
in turn would engender a more dynamic group discussion.42 In fact, sampling pre-existing 
groups was particularly conducive to the focus group discussions in relation to local community 
group participants.  
 The recruitment of local community group members was done by directly emailing 
local community and interest groups, the contact information for which I found online. Two 
groups agreed to take part in the focus groups and were provided with further information about 
the project. These focus group interviews were both conducted in Late June 2019. The recruit-
ment of university students was done through departmental emailing lists. In late September, 
at the start of the Autumn term, I emailed different departments within the university and asked 
whether they would circulate my call for participants to the students in their department. 
Potential participants emailed me directly or were forwarded to me by their respective depart-
ment, and two student focus groups were conducted in early November 2019. 
 During the project, I also sought to interview tech experts and engineers working with 
algorithmic remembrance technologies. This would add nuance to my understanding of these 
technologies as well as providing insights into the different ways these technologies are 
imagined and programmed. The idea was that these would provide an additional entry point 
into investigating the power and politics of algorithmic systems on the mediations of memory 
in everyday life. Based on the scoping materials, I found information about the team of 
developers and programmers through their websites, the info sections on Apple Store or Google 
Play, and their ‘About’ section on the feature’s interface. It was also assumed that many of 
these developers, tech experts, UX researchers, and software engineers would have profiles on 
LinkedIn. I therefore decided to attempt to contact them through that platform. In March 2019, 
 
42 The challenge, on the other hand, is that it may limit the range of ideas and opinions being presented in the 
interview since participants are more likely to rely on taken-for-granted assumptions amongst the group members 
(Morgan, 1997). Another issue is that it may engender an implicit form of self-policing. That is, it may perpetuate 
the need for participants to appear consistent with former representations of self to avoid future awkwardness with 
other group members (Hollander, 2004).  
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I managed to get an interview with Benny Wong, software engineer and co-founder of the 
memory app, Timehop, who is now working at Instagram.  
 
3.3.2 Interviewing 
Overall, the interview samples were demographically and internationally varied and in terms 
of age. For the remote interviews, the sample range ranged from 22 to 60, and for the focus 
groups the sample ranged from 18 to participants in their 70s. As previously stated, the aim 
was not to produce a representative or generalisable sample, nor to provide a basis for compara-
tive analyses between different ages, nationalities, classes, or gender specifications. Instead, 
the aim was to produce a varied and nuanced data set relating to people’s experiences, affects, 
practices, habits, tensions, anxieties, and ultimately encounters with algorithmic remembrance 
technologies. 
In preparation for the remote interviews, focus groups, and the interview with Benny 
Wong, I created an interview guide, commonly recommended for qualitative interviewing (e.g. 
King and Horrocks, 2010; Kvale and Brinkmann, 2009). The interview guide allowed me to 
conceptualise and outline the main topics that I wanted to cover in the interviews and focus 
groups, but afforded flexibility in terms of phrasing and the sequence by which questions were 
asked. It is also worth mentioning that the interview guides were constantly tweaked, modified, 
added to, re-phrased, and re-ordered throughout the data collection process as a result of 
findings in the interviews and focus groups (see Appendix for interview guides). For instance, 
chapter six examines the importance of timing for the algorithmic mediation of memory. I did 
not think of this topic prior to the interviews, and any questions related to this topic were 
therefore initially not in the interview guide. However, this topic emerged through the interview 
process, and as I considered it a potentially fruitful avenue of research, questions related to it 
were therefore included in later interview guides. 
Drawing inspiration from Patton’s (1990) six types of interview questions, the research 
guide contained a mix between what Patton called background questions43, experience-
/behaviour questions44, opinion/value questions45, and feeling questions46 in order to elicit 
 
43 E.g. ‘how long have you been using Timehop’ or ‘How did you find out about Timehop’? 
44 E.g. ‘How do you normally use the app’ and sub-questions such as ‘does the Streak have any effect on how you 
use the app’? 
45 E.g. ‘What do you particularly like about using Timehop?’ or ‘Is there anything you particularly dislike?’ 
46 E.g. ‘How does it make you feel seeing or being reminded of memories on Timehop?’ 
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different kinds of data. Echoing Kvale and Brinkmann’s (2009) types of questions, the main 
questions in the interview guide contained potential follow-up questions (probes), prompting 
questions, specifying questions, and sub-questions, depending on which way the participant 
decided to go in the interview. Moreover, Merton et al.’s ([1956]1990) four criteria for effective 
interviews – range, specificity, depth, and personal context – also provided a helpful guide in 
thinking about and devising the interview guide. 
 The remote interviews lasted, on average, between 30 minutes and one hour. Generally, 
we discussed the participants’ use of Timehop as well other features such as Facebook 
Memories, Apple Memories, and Snapchat Memories. Moreover, we discussed the particular 
format of these technologies, in which users can visit these apps and encounter various 
increments of their data past. Participants explained how they found these technologies 
different and/or similar to more analogue modes of engaging with the past such as photo albums 
and diaries. The decision to use Timehop myself for a year before interviewing participants, as 
well as actively engaging with Facebook Memories and Apple Memories for an extensive 
period of time, proved fruitful for the discussions with the participants. It not only provided 
familiarity with the applications, but it also engendered a familiarity between me and the 
participants and common points of reference. It engendered a kind of user-to-user relation, as 
in many cases we were able to discuss how we both used the features and how we experienced 
it. I also decided not to take notes during the interviews, as I felt this would stifle the conver-
sation and make it more artificial. One of the aims from the outset was to facilitate as organic 
a conversation as possible (Rapley, 2012). I decided to conduct interviews until the point of 
theoretical saturation. Although I thought this point was reached after interview number 24, I 
decided to conduct two more interviews to bolster and confirm this sense of saturation.  
 The focus group interviews, on the other hand, lasted on average one hour. Before the 
focus groups started, I provided participants with an information sheet and a consent form to 
sign. At the start of the group discussion, I spent a few minutes explaining how the features we 
would be discussing worked, namely Facebook Memories and Apple Memories. I also used 
visual aids on my computer, showing the participants screenshots from these two features. In 
reality, the discussion started here, because I encouraged participants to ask about the features 
if there was something they did not understand, and other participants often contributed to these 
explanations as well. This collective activity, or these particular moments at the start of the 
focus groups, in my view, demonstrated the ways in which data is a ‘collaborative recon-
struction’ (Atkinson and Silverman, 1997, p. 314) by both interviewer and interviewee.  
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The discussions in the focus groups centred around the two features in question, 
Facebook Memories and Apple Memories; but many participants also drew interesting 
comparisons with Snapchat Memories, a feature they had often encountered or been exposed 
to. I had prepared a few general questions beforehand to help instigate and direct the topics of 
discussion, questions such as: what do you think of these features? Anything you particularly 
like or dislike about these features? Do you think you would remember something differently 
using these features as opposed to other ways of remembering the past? Given the flexibility 
and dynamics of a focus group setting, the discussion often went in many interesting directions, 
some emphasising the ways in which these features can change someone’s memory of the past, 
other’s discussing the ethics and privacy implications of these features, and others talking about 
issues such as temporality and sharing. As theoretical saturation had already been reached with 
the qualitative interviews, these focus groups were conducted to add nuance and depth to the 
already rich dataset. I therefore only conducted four focus groups in total.  
Following recommendations from the methodology literature (Bryman, 2012; Morgan, 
1997; King and Horrocks, 2010), size of the focus groups varied from to four to seven with an 
over-recruitment of 20% for each focus group. In terms of the focus group interview itself, I 
decided to utilise a semi-structured format. The ‘collective activity’ (Barbour & Kitzinger, 
1999) comprised a discussion of the theme of algorithms, social media platform, and memory 
as well as short visual introduction to the memory features we would discuss. Given the fact 
that focus groups constitute a socially constructed environment, the aim was to select con-
ditions most conducive to conversation. As a result, I ordered refreshments for the student focus 
groups (in the other two focus groups, refreshments were provided by the participants). The 
focus groups conducted with members from local community groups were also held in one of 
the participant’s home and in a meeting room in a local community centre. The focus groups 
conducted with students were conducted in easily accessible classrooms on campus. 
 The interview with Benny Wong posed different challenges. As I have already sug-
gested in this chapter, there is usually a certain unequal power balance in the interview setting. 
The interview dynamic was different in this case. Given Wong’s status as software engineer at 
Instagram and co-founder of a popular memory app, I asked Wong permission to mention him 
by name in the project. He accepted, but in return asked whether he could have a copy of the 
audio recording after the interview, which I forwarded to him afterwards.  
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 Although the interview was semi-structured, it was exploring different ideas than the 
other interviews. It focused on issues surrounding memory and algorithms from a more back-
end perspective. The interview lasted approximately one hour, and questions included: How 
did Timehop come about? What is the story? What is the importance of calling the resurfacing 
memories ‘anniversaries’? What did you find challenging about producing and running 
Timehop? We discussed issues around data mining, privacy, digital archives, temporality, the 
meanings imposed on data by users, as well as different ways Wong wished Timehop had 
developed. In turn, he asked me about the other interviews I had conducted with Timehop users 
and I mentioned some of the findings I had been thinking about and working on. More than the 
previous interviews, this interview was marked by reciprocity, a sharing of findings and 
information. Overall, the interview gave some additional insights into the ways in which Time-
hop had been programmed but also imagined from the start. It also provided insights into the 
ways the developers at Timehop conceptualised the relationship between data, memories, and 
the role of algorithms in mediating memories – which provided an interesting comparison to 
the construction of other features such as Facebook Memories.  
 At the end of the interviews and focus groups, I concluded by asking the interviewees 
if they had anything to add before finishing. In some of the interviews, for instance, this small 
window often engendered rich data, as users added thoughts, comments, or indeed questions 
they had had during the interview. Questions were often related to my experiences using the 
app or the project I was writing. I promised that all participants would be pseudonymised in 
the thesis and in future research outputs.  
 
3.4 Recording, Transcribing, Coding, Analysing 
The interviews and the focus groups were all audio recorded. After interviews, the audio files 
were transferred to my university office computer, which is equipped with the drive encryption 
program Bitlocker. Participants’ signed consent forms were kept in a locked cabinet. In 
chapters five and six, interviewees have been pseudonymised. I also created a list of all the 
pseudonyms and the actual names they replaced, in order to ensure data accuracy, which has 
also been safely stored.  
 Afterwards, the interviews and focus groups were transcribed using Microsoft Word. 
Usually, the interviews were transcribed a day or two after the interview. It is worth mentioning 
that the transcription phase constituted more than simply translating oral data into written text. 
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As Kvale and Brinkmann (2009, p. 177) remind us, transcribing constituted an ‘interpretative 
process,’ both in terms of how to translate data such as expressions, tone, and emphasis, but 
also in terms of thinking about overarching themes, analytical observations, and recurrences in 
the data. Echoing Rubin and Rubin’s (2005, p. 201) comment that the process of transcribing 
is ‘the first phase of analysis,’ I found that many of the thoughts and themes that ultimately 
emerged in this project emerged during the transcription phase. I also used many of the tran-
scription conventions outlined in academic texts (e.g. Kvale and Brinkmann, 2009),47 however 
I decided that it was unnecessary to transcribe cues such as ‘mm’s, pauses, and body language, 
since such linguistical and embodied features would be beyond the scope of the project aims. 
The transcriptions were therefore much more conversational in format. 
 In terms of coding, I found Johnny Saldaña’s (2009) book The Coding Manual for 
Qualitative Researchers especially useful. Many of the coding techniques listed by Saldaña - 
such as Descriptive Codes, Simultaneous Codes, In Vivo Codes - I used when coding and 
analysing the transcribed data. The codes I wrote down in the first cycle of coding would 
sometimes be modified in the second cycle of coding. As with all research, this process was 
highly iterative, codes often changing based on similar codes or further interviews and focus 
groups. Echoing Saldaña (2009), my approach was a mix of ‘deductive coding – driven by the 
existing literature and theories – and ‘inductive coding’ – coding driven by the data itself. As 
my overall research aimed to examine and develop a conceptual framework around the 
intersections of algorithms and memory in everyday life, inductive coding became particularly 
important, and I was looking to establish overarching patterns and themes in the coded data. 
One method I utilised in order to do this was to group similarly coded data into bigger cate-
gories, into increasingly higher levels of abstraction. For instance, this was especially useful in 
identifying the individual characteristics that became the overall memory practices discussed 
in chapter five. The process of increasing abstraction highlights the iterative process that is 
coding and the intimate connection between coding and analysis. Another method I utilised 
was thematic analysis (Braun and Clarke (2006). Through this, I could identify, analyse, and 
discuss overarching patterns in the data, using quotes and codes from the interview data as a 
means of illustration and corroboration. I also choose to use manual coding for both the inter-
 
47 For instance – (at the end or beginning of utterance) interrupted speech, 
    . . . material omitted by authors 
    [ ] material inserted by authors 
    _ material inaudible on tape 
    ? unidentifiable speaker 
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view and focus group data as I found it more manageable and convenient than, for instance, 
Nvivo coding.  
 
3.5 Conclusion: Towards Analysis 
Overall, these different methodological approaches – scoping, interviews, focus groups – 
facilitated an investigation into the algorithmic mediations of memory from various perspec-
tives. The analysis chapters echo this. Chapter four examines the algorithmic remembrance 
technologies themselves, their use of algorithmic techniques, their programmed and imagined 
nature and their economic underpinning. Chapters five and six draw on interview as well as 
focus group data to investigate users’ practices and the impact of timing (what I call ‘anniversi-
fication’) respectively. In short, the project analyses the technologies themselves, users’ experi-


















4.0 The Emergence of Algorithmic Remembrance Technologies: When the Conditions of 
Memory-Making Become Algorithmic 
 
4.1 Introduction: Media Landscapes of Remembering 
Memory is always enframed. Memory-making practices always take place within a context, 
within a particular framework. In other words, they happen somewhere. In his book Non-
Representational Theory, Nigel Thrift (2008) examines what he calls the ‘spatialities of 
feeling’, the intricate entanglements of affect and spatiality in contemporary urban life. Thrift 
argues that although affect has been part and parcel of the urban experience, ‘now affect is 
more and more likely to be actively engineered’ with the aim of providing ‘the basic mechanics 
and root textures of urban life’ (p. 172). In Thrift’s view, the increasing engineered reality of 
contemporary social life suggests that: 
Affective response can be designed into spaces, often out of what seems like 
very little at all. Though affective response can clearly never be guaranteed, the 
fact is that this is no longer a random process either. It is a form of landscape 
engineering that is gradually pulling itself into existence, producing new forms 
of power as it goes (Thrift, 2008, p. 187).  
This chapter similarly argues that the conditions of memory practices in contemporary society 
are increasingly predicated on and shaped by what Thrift calls ‘a form of landscape engine-
ering’, that is, a landscape densely populated with platforms, apps, algorithmic systems, and 
their infrastructural logics (Helmond, 2015; van Dijck and Poell, 2013). Drawing on the docu-
mentary analysis of 15 algorithmic remembrance technologies and the discourses surrounding 
them, this chapter contends that these technologies shape the conditions of possibility of 
encountering, negotiating, and remembering the past in contemporary life. In one sense, 
people’s memory-making practices are always in a state of flux; they always rely on and are 
framed by the technologies that are readily at hand. The ways people capture, store, curate, 
share, and engage with the past have always hinged on various technologies, like a knob on a 
door. They have always been socio-technical practices and processes. But recently, the ways 
in which memory is conceptualised and memory practices enacted is increasingly mediated, 
dependent on, and shaped by algorithmic media. The pressing question, then, becomes: what 
happens when the conditions for memory making become, at least in part, algorithmic? 
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In this chapter, I outline and investigate the various contours that characterise the 
contemporary media landscape of remembering. That is, I provide a documentary analysis of 
corporate materials and documents such as Terms and Agreements as well as Privacy and 
Cookie Policies. I also analyse the discourses surrounding technologies such as Facebook 
Memories and Amazon Photos, investigating their marketing materials, user manuals, and 
technical descriptions. I also interviewed Benny Wong, software developer and co-designer of 
the memory app Timehop, to gain a better understanding of the technical aspects of the memory 
tools people use in everyday life. The chapter focuses on what I call ‘algorithmic remembrance 
technologies’ as well as their role, their imagined nature, their functional characteristics and 
affordances. Algorithmic remembrance technologies afford and constrain memory-making. 
They generate and modulate the conditions by which memory-making practices are made pos-
sible and desirable. They are mechanisms for mining, analysing, and resurfacing previous data 
(such as social media posts and images) to users as ‘memories’ at particular times in the present. 
As this chapter demonstrates, these memory technologies are widely diffused and constitute a 
heterogeneous assemblage of features, platforms, apps, and functionalities. This landscape 
comprises both standalone apps, specifically dedicated to the mediation of people’s memories, 
as well as features that have melded into already-established platforms. 
Moreover, the chapter explores how these algorithmic remembrance technologies, 
these designed spaces of memory, are programmed or ‘engineered’ in particular ways and how 
they configure users, memory, and the role of algorithms. Ultimately, this chapter argues that 
memory technologies envision data-led and algorithmic processes as co-producers of human 
memory making. As such, it is argued that memory making is conceptualised mainly as being 
amenable to the algorithm, as being algorithmically shaped and instantiated. A particular 
conception of what a memory is, as well as what constitutes remembering, is being articulated 
by these platforms and app- and smart phone developers. The ‘data imaginary’ (Beer, 2018) of 
algorithmic remembrance technologies sees the melding of datafication, smart organisation, 
machine-learning predictions and remembering.  
More specifically, I argue that algorithmic remembrance technologies are reconfiguring 
memory-making practices in particular ways whilst undercutting prior understandings of what 
it means to remember and engage with the past. Below I outline six different themes that 
encapsulate how these technologies are designed and represented/marketed, what they do or 
how they are ‘meant’ to be used by consumers. These themes are unlimited, smart, organised, 
searchable, connective, and reminding. Through these themes, it becomes clear that the con-
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ditions of memory making are being shaped by algorithmic media, ultimately generating new 
modalities of remembering in a digital context. This chapter’s overarching framework high-
lights ways in which the conditions for mediated remembering is being variously reconfigured. 
In other words, mediated memories are conceptualised as increasingly datafied, ordered, evalu-
ated, predicted, resurfaced, and ultimately experienced. These platforms and tech companies 
not only solidify a certain view of remembering they may only purport to represent; instead, 
they actively seek shape our understanding of what memories are and what it means to remem-
ber the past in a digital context. They represent an attempt to make human memory-making 
increasingly machine-readable. Through this endeavour, they are increasingly able to know, 
engineer and modulate the conditions for human memory-making practices. 
Before examining how algorithmic systems shape people’s remembrance of the past in 
everyday life, it is important to discuss the underlying conditions through which such remem-
bering is made possible. Understanding what is meant by the notion of ‘remembering with 
algorithms’ starts with a critical analysis of those algorithmic systems, an analysis of their 
characteristics as well as their promises. For instance, similar to van Dijck and Poell (2013, p. 
9), there is a need to ask what ‘discursive regimes’ (Kitchin and Dodge, 2011) these 
technologies are symptomatic of, what they promise, how they are imagined, and how they are 
likely to be enacted in everyday life. As such, the notion of ‘algorithmic remembrance techno-
logies’ acts as a conceptual framework and analytical prism through which to investigate the 
intersections of memory, memory practices, and algorithmic systems. As I mentioned in 
chapter three, the notion of algorithmic remembrance technologies is not meant as an 
exhaustive typology; rather, it is meant to sensitise us to the emerging landscape of 
technologies that seek to algorithmically facilitate, mediate, shape, and reconfigure the way the 
past is captured and relived in everyday life. 
 
4.2 The Underlying Logic: Surveillance Capitalism 
Before examining the various technologies and their functional characteristics, affordances, 
and promises, it is crucial to first examine their underlying logic. I suggest that algorithmic 
remembrance technologies are best seen as integral parts of what has been called ‘surveillance 
capitalism’ (Zuboff, 2015; 2019). For Zuboff (2015, p. 77), surveillance capitalism is a form 
of capitalism both facilitated by and predicated on the extraction, analysis, management, and 
circulation of big data: ‘’big data’ is both a condition and an expression.’ It is a new form of 
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information capitalism, Zuboff (2015, p. 75) argues, that aims to render the social world and 
everyday life amenable to data extraction in order ‘predict and modify human behaviour as a 
means to produce revenue and market control.’ As such, the notion of surveillance capitalism 
does not only relate to big corporations such as Google and Amazon or social media platforms 
such as Facebook, but ‘appears to have become the default model for most online startups and 
applications’ (p. 77). It is argued in this chapter that algorithmic remembrance technologies 
share this underlying logic of surveillance capitalism, emphasising the centrality of data as 
resource and monetary value. In short, they constitute the ways in which data about people and 
their mediated memories are mined, analysed, and circulated.     
It is important to note, however, that the political economy of these technologies, 
although they share an underlying logic of surveillance capitalism, is not uniformly expressed. 
Indeed, their specific business models shapes how the apps function, and in turn their use and 
experience by users. For example, apps such as Timehop deploy a rule-based algorithmic 
framework, run ads as part of their ‘memory experience’. However, these ads are not 
personalised but are rather directed at the general user audience. For other memory 
technologies, data is a crucial factor in they operate and are experienced by users. For instance, 
on social media features such as Facebook Memories data is extracted from users in order to 
‘personalise’ the memories, seeking to predict what memories users want to engage with as 
well as modulating the frequency by which users see memories based on their interactions with 
the feature (Paluri and Aziz, 2016). Facebook Memories therefore seeks to produce a dual 
attachment in their users: an attachment to the platform itself, its products and other services; 
and, secondly, continuous participation with social networks, such as friends and groups, which 
further conjoins users to the platform, or at least makes it less desirable to leave. 
Cloud storage services such as Amazon Photos and Google Photos are produced by 
larger multinational tech companies that rely on the extraction of data in order to produce 
revenue. The data uploaded by users unto these services in form of videos and photos therefore 
have multiple uses and functions for these companies. For example, Google Photos stated in 
their 2018 Privacy Policy that their machine learning algorithm learned to do automatic image 
categorisations based on the training data from Google’s earlier storage iteration, Picasa 
(Google, 2018). This meant as ‘users sorted and categorised their photos on Picasa, these 
correlations and patterns became the training data for how Google’s current algorithm learned 
to curate their current users’ photos’ (Jacobsen, 2020a, p. 7). Data about users, and how they 
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interact with their mediated memories, provides another means through which memory features 
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This logic of ‘knowing’ (Thrift, 2005) users through data mining and diffusing a logic 
of participation can also be seen in the wider analysis below. For instance, in some algorithmic 
remembrance technologies mediated memories are made searchable in order to become more 
amenable to sharing with others. In other cases, mediated memories such as photos are 
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automatically categorised, using computer vision, and curated into collections to incentivise 
participation and interaction with the technology. As such, current technologies that mediate 
people’s data about the past not only have the potential to shape mediated memories 
themselves, but also the conditions through which people engage with their past data in the 
present. As such, algorithmic remembrance technologies embedded in people’s everyday lives, 
are part and parcel of a larger business model that seeks to mine, analyse, and circulate data in 
order to know users more intimately. Although these technologies vary in levels of automation, 
curation, and affordances, they embody a desire to better capture, cluster and resurface people’s 
pasta data as ‘memories’ in the present. Through an analysis of algorithmic remembrance 
technologies, there is an emergence of data-driven and data-led modes of engaging with one’s 
data past, with one’s mediated memories.  
 
4.3 Reconfiguring the Conditions of Memory Making 
Having discussed the underlying logics of algorithmic remembrance technologies, it is time to 
examine the technologies themselves along with their functions, affordances, promises, and 
commercial rhetoric. Drawing on a documentary analysis from 15 algorithmic remembrance 
technologies, this chapter outlines and discusses six themes or ways in which the conditions of 
memory making are being reconfigured. These themes illustrate both how algorithmic remem-
brance technologies conceptualise users, the nature of memory, and users’ memory making 







These themes highlight salient features and affordances of algorithmic remembrance techno-
logies. They showcase the particular ‘discursive regimes’ (Kitchin and Dodge, 2011) of these 
technologies, that is the ways in which memory and users are imagined and discussed. They 
accentuate the ways in which memory technologies position themselves in relation to users and 
their memory making practices, along with the various roles played by algorithms. I argue that 
these themes, echoing David Beer (2019, p. 21), emphasise the ways in which these techno-
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logies seek to ‘instigate, facilitate and afford the expansion of data-led processes’ into the realm 
of how people store, engage with, and relive their past.48 As a result, algorithmic remembrance 
technologies can be seen to promote a view of memory and memory practices that is inextrica-
bly linked to algorithmic agency and dynamics, as intimately enmeshed with data-led decision 
making. Thus, I argue that the conditions of people’s everyday memory practices being recon-
figured in terms of the algorithm. 
Before examining the first theme, ‘Unlimited’, which relates to issues and promises of 
storage, it is important to acknowledge the role and significance of commercial rhetoric. 
Although the chapter analyses technologies, products, that tech companies try to promote and 
sell, a danger would be to reduce these themes to solely being a marketing ploy, merely a way 
tech companies talk in order to sell. Instead, these should be seen as generative discourses and 
promises, as ways in which these companies and technologies ‘configure the user’ (Woolgar, 
1990) and conceptualise memory and the social world in specific ways. As David Beer (2019, 
p. 21) suggests, discussing emergent themes in his analysis of the data analytics industry:  
We are looking here at marketing materials. We would expect them to 
attempt to sell the features and benefits of data analytics to an imagined 
customer. To reiterate my earlier point though, this requires us to see this not 
simply as an exercise in promotion but as a series of attempts to instigate, 
facilitate and afford the expansion of data-led processes of evaluation, 
judgement and decision making. This is the rhetoric aimed at oiling the 
spread of data and the type of calculative judgments, ordering and evaluation 
that it brings.  
As Beer suggests, it is crucial to not only see ‘exercises in promotions’ when analysing the 
various features and affordances of algorithmic remembrance technologies; the appeal and 
attraction of these memory technologies lie in the features and opportunities they promise to 
their users. As Karen Barad (2007, p. 152) put it, ‘the relationship between the material and the 
discursive is one of mutual entailment’, adding that ‘matter and meaning are mutually 
articulated.’ For Barad, it is crucial to acknowledge the deeply intertwined and symbiotic 
relationship between discursive formations, material, and socio-technical practices. These 
algorithmic remembrance technologies promote particular discourses and conceptions about 
the relationship between algorithms and data-led processing, on the one hand, and storage 
 
48 It is also worth noting that these themes are often interconnected and sometimes overlapping. 
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opportunities and memory-making practices, on the other. These discourses and conceptions 
are generative, acting upon the world, becoming part of its reality. The themes discussed in this 
chapter explore the various ways in which algorithmic remembrance technologies shape the 
conditions of how memory-making practices are conceptualised, enacted, habituated and ulti-
mately legitimated. This is explored in further detail below, in the first theme I call ‘Unlimited’.  
 
4.3.1 Unlimited 
One salient theme that emerged throughout an analysis of the corporate materials and docu-
ments was the notion of limitless storage. Given that many of these algorithmic remembrance 
technologies are cloud-based photo and video storage services, this may not be surprising. Yet, 
the language of limitlessness permeates the material, which has interesting implications for the 
ways people capture, store and curate their experiences. Many online storage services, such as 
Amazon Photos, state that in the App Store that they ’offer unlimited full-resolution online 
photo storage, and 5 GB free video storage, to Prime members, who can save and share their 
photos on desktop, mobile, and tablet’ and ‘Unlimited photo storage’ for Prime members. 
Similarly, the online storage service Google Photos promise in their Google Play entry, ‘Free 
storage and automatic organization for all your memories’, and that people need ‘never run out 
of storage again.’ Likewise, the photo backup and storage app Ever state in their promotional 
material that their users may ‘Get free, unlimited private backup of all your life's memories, 
from anywhere they exist’ as well as proclaiming that ‘We have the distinct honour of hosting 
your photos and videos, so that you are free to make memories.’  
Before touching on this idea of being ‘free to make memories’ in more detail, as it is 
inextricably woven with the promises of limitless storage and therefore endless capture, it is 
worth pointing out that this language of near-limitless storage opportunities is also compli-
mented by promises of security and safe keeping. Emphasising protection and securing 
people’s data is not surprising given the cascade of cases where people’s data has been various-
ly compromised in recent times, most notably the case of Cambridge Analytica (e.g. Chan, 
2019). That being said, the protection of people’s stored data is central to most, if not all, 
algorithmic remembrance technologies. This means that tag lines such as ‘Save, Organize & 
Secure Photos’ (Fotofami), ‘Protect and organize photos!’ (Ever), and ‘Finally move those 
family photos from your old laptop, your phone, and your desktop so they're all together in one 
safe place’ (Amazon Photos) are commonly seen throughout the data. Algorithmic remem-
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brance technologies position themselves as the archons of people’s digital memory objects, the 
gatekeepers, and protectors of people’s mediated memory-making practices. Interestingly, the 
tagline from Amazon Photos pins ‘old’ digital means of storage against newer, ‘safer’ and more 
centralised cloud-based ones. This suggests that storage services such as ‘old’ laptops, phones, 
and desktops, are pictured as inadequate in this new age of cloud-based services; indeed, they 
are considered outdated both in terms of scope and security to facilitate people’s current 
memory-making practices. In other words, algorithmic remembrance technologies frame issues 
of storage around notions of limitlessness and increased security.  
It can be argued that these promises of infinite storage in the cloud are attempts to 
remedy the age-long angst that things decay, can be forgotten and forever lost, a sort of ‘archive 
fever’ (Derrida, 1995). Andrew Hoskins (2013), for instance, argues that whereas analogue 
objects inevitably decayed over time, digital objects and the digital archive ushered in what he 
calls ‘the end of decay time’. Permanence became a reality with digital objects. Hoskins (2013) 
also suggests that following the rise of Big Data and data mining techniques, the mining and 
infinite retention of people’s data became a desirable for data companies. 
 Crucially, data storage is depicted as a desirable to users as well. The threat of data 
loss is well depicted by the providers of Amazon Photos. Metalab, the company who helped to 
build the interface of Amazon’s photo storage and management feature state on their website: 
After a series of discussions with Cloud Drive users, our design and product 
learned that people want more photo storage. Lots more. They constantly run out 
of space on their smartphones - and they worry about losing important visual 
memories… Precious memories are left, neglected in a disorganized mass, 
vulnerable to technical meltdowns. Not an ideal scenario. 
Data loss, or the loss of ‘important visual memories’, is evoked here as a constant potential 
threat in the data age. The promises of unlimited storage are predicated on this threat. Algo-
rithmic remembrance technologies such as Amazon Photos promise the security of unlimited 
and safe storage for users, who do not have to worry about their precious visual memories. 
Although the risk of data loss exists, and the anxieties attached to this risk are justified, it is 
also important to point out that the notion of data loss is, to some extent, produced by the 
technologies themselves, ‘the enemy is created’. As seen in the case of Amazon Photos, data 
loss is figured as a threat to users, which in turn provides the rational basis for the platform 
itself. While data loss is figured as a threat, algorithmic remembrance technologies position 
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themselves as the solution. In a sense, the notion of people’s loss of data is instrumentalised, 
evoked as a way to make platforms and features more desirable and necessary. Fear of losing 
one’s data is used as a way for people to buy in, to use the platform, to become dependent on 
it. The simultaneous evocation of data loss and the promise of unlimited and safe storage is 
therefore a way to configure algorithmic remembrance technologies as indispensable in 
people’s lives, as a way to promote and legitimate their data storing services.  
 The reason these technologies promise unlimited storage to users is hardly a surprising 
one. It highlights the ‘logic of accumulation’ (Zuboff, 2015) as well as the imperative of what 
Mark Andrejevic (2020, p. 34) calls ‘total information capture’, a drive central to surveillance 
capitalism. The desire towards capturing all facets of social life as data, Andrejevic argues, 
demonstrates surveillance capitalism’s so-called ‘fear of missing out’: ‘if everything is known, 
then all opportunities can be exploited – nothing is missed’ (p. 7). In other words, everything 
needs to be made into data, everything must be captured, and everything must be utilised for 
commercial gains. This datafied ‘fear of missing of out’ is also well demonstrated by the claim 
made by Gus Hunt, the former Chief Technical Officer of the CIA, who stated ‘we 
fundamentally try to collect everything and hang on to it forever’ (cited in Sledge, 2013). Hunt 
was discussing storage and analysis capabilities and their relevance to surveillance. Total 
information capture, Hunt indicates, is crucial for extracting correlational knowledge from the 
data and being able to predict who may constitute a potential threat to national security. Within 
this perspective of total information capture, one cannot always know what data is important 
in the present until at some future point in time, when relevant correlations have been produced. 
The drive is therefore to capture everything because everything might be important. This 
coupling of promises of unlimited and safe storage is enveloped within this logic: let us store 
it for you, because it might be important for us in the future. 
It is also crucial to point out that the promise of unlimited storage has implications for 
how people capture their experiences, how people produce mediated memories in the present. 
As the photos and videos storage app, Ever, state in a Medium article introducing the company: 
‘we have the distinct honour of hosting your photos and videos, so that you are free to make 
memories.’ The key part here is the notion of ‘making memories’. The suggestion is that storing 
and curating photos is framed as a kind of burden that limits how people make memories in the 
present by capturing experiences photographically. A similar link between better storage and 
therefore better means of capturing the present can be observed by one of the marketing taglines 
of the smart phone, Google Pixel, which states 'Google Pixel: Memories by You, Phone by 
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Google’ and, again, ‘Capture more details. Keep more memories.’ At one level, this echoes 
Geoffrey C. Bowker’s (2008) suggestion that memory-making practices for any given epoch 
will both reflect the material tools that facilitate them, but also point to a particular way of 
working on the present. As he observes, memory practices ‘skew our available ontological 
space’ (p. 71). They frame the present in a particular way, and often they ‘indicate a drive to 
render the world memorable’ (p. 16). As such, it can be argued that when the means and scope 
of archiving practices are extended and developed, it has a qualitative effect on the way the 
present is captured and remembered.  
A certain drive to render increasingly larger parts of the world memorable are made 
possible by tools that promise unlimited and secure storage. In this case, the potentially infinite 
capacity for algorithmic remembrance technologies, many of which run cloud-based storage 
options, to store people’s mediated memories drives a logic of ‘free to make memories’ (Ever) 
or ‘capture more. Keep more’ (Google Pixel). This is also echoed in of the slides when setting 
up the memory feature Timehop: ‘More memories more Timehop.’  
  They make possible and propound a logic of inces-
santly working on the present. It is a logic that accentuates 
the more: capturing more of the present, keep more of it for 
the future, have more to look back on, and so forth. Echoing 
the notion of total information capture and the claim made 
by Gus Hunt, algorithmic remembrance technologies 
display a drive towards rendering the world memorable, 
regardless of whether or not experiences seem significant – 
they may become significant in the future. Memory 
practices, as both reflections on the past and a working on 
the present, therefore become caught in the interstices of 
what Bowker (2008) calls ‘the potential memory’ – namely, 
the extension of the ‘might be memorable’ or the ‘could be 
important to remember.’  
This idea of the potentiality of a memory would also help to explain the emerging 
attitude towards discard or deletion. In their Google Store entry, the producers of the smart 
phone Google Pixel pose the question ‘Why Google Pixel?’ and the answer is, ‘Never delete a 
photo again. Take as many pictures as you want and save them with Google Photos’ and ‘You'll 
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never have to delete a memory to make room for a new one.’ When storage is no longer 
considered an issue, then the idea of deleting photos takes on another meaning. Derrida’s 
influential notion of ‘archive fever’ not only suggests a certain relationship between the archive 
and remembering or between remembering and forgetting; it also emphasises how techniques 
of archivisation produce a certain relationship to the present and, indeed, the future. The 
attitude of ‘Capture more. Keep more’ therefore seems to emphasise as much a relationship to 
the present as it does to the past. Yet, more significantly, there is a certain ideology hidden 
behind statements such as ‘never delete’ or ‘you never have to delete’. If the aim for algorithmic 
remembrance technologies is total information capture, then acts of deletion seem to problema-
tise this, seem to run counter to this logic. However, Alex Hern (2019) writes that although 
Facebook launched a ‘clear history’ feature on its platform, following the Cambridge Analytica 
incident, the feature will not actually delete anything from the platform. As Hern points out, 
when a user clicks ‘clear history’, they are instead simply ‘disconnecting’ their user data, which 
is still stored on the platforms’ servers. Whether or not fully deleting one’s data off a platform 
is even possible, it is reasonable to suggest that ideas of deletion still remain an undesirable 
user disposition from a platform perspective. Whilst unlimited storage benefits the user, who 
never has to delete a memory, it also obfuscates the underlying logic of data storing, the value 
and knowledge about users extracted from this data. In other words, the logic of ‘never delete’ 
is disproportionately beneficial to the algorithmic remembrance technology that may still ‘try 
to collect everything and hang to it forever’ (Sledge, 2013). 
The slogan ‘Capture more. Keep more’ also reveals something telling in terms of how 
memory and remembering are conceptualised by algorithmic remembrance technologies. 
Memories, in this case, do not seem to be predicated on age and lived experience, or even social 
interactions, but rather on the production of digital traces. It is evident in one sense that these 
mediated memories, even though they carry traces of memories, meanings, and narratives, 
cannot be conflated with ‘memories’ per se. On Facebook, for example, ‘memories’ are care-
fully engineered and resurfaced objects consisting of past data such as posts, videos, photos, 
likes, shares, and friendversaries. These are programmed constructs. They are resurfaced at 
particular times based on a specific set of programmable criteria (Paluri and Aziz, 2016). In 
principle, therefore, any past data point can become ‘a memory’ on Facebook given the right 
combination of likes, shares, networks, and temporal position. However mundane and even 
unmemorable it may be, it can become worthy of remembrance if it fulfils the feature’s criteria. 
With algorithmic remembrance technologies, there is a particular conceptualisation of what 
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constitutes a memory. There is an underlying logic that frames remembering not so much as a 
result of age, experience and situated sociality as of production, accumulation, and density. 
Algorithmic remembrance technologies tend to discursively conflate memories and their digital 
objects. The digital object – whether it is a Facebook post, Instagram picture, or a video stored 
on your smart phone - is often equated with ‘a memory’. Whether or not these are memories 
per se, this tendency to conflate suggests something interesting about the changing nature of 
memory making. With algorithmic remembrance technologies, data points are compressed into 
‘memories’. In this view, memory making is intimately linked with how past data is stored, 
analysed, categorised, ranked, and resurfaced.  
This compression of data points into memories also becomes apparent when thinking 
about the volume of data needed for these memories to appear. For example, when trying to 
access my 2018 Year in Review montage video on Facebook, I was met with a mostly blank 
interface, which stated: 
Thanks for being here! Benjamin, we don’t currently have enough content to 
create your 2018 video. Keep posting to see more memories and have a happy 
new year.  
On one level, this may seem self-evident: if one does not participate on a platform then there 
will not be any content for the platform to mine and resurface as ‘memories’. Yet, this also 
begs the question: what is enough content? How much more do I need to post to start seeing 
my ‘memories’? For the LG G7 smartphone, for example, this question becomes clearer and 
more unequivocal. Within the Gallery app in the smartphone, there is a section called 
‘Memories’ that certain photos are grouped within at certain points. As LG states in their online 
Help Library, ‘To create a Memories album, enable location information in the Camera app 
and take at least 10 photos.’ It is important to note that both the LG smartphone and Facebook, 
albeit less explicitly, suggest a certain relationship between memory making and a threshold of 
participation, that is a certain level of participation that is needed for one’s ‘memories’ to be 
produced and resurfaced. On memory features such as Facebook Memories, there is a certain 
minimum amount of uploading, posting, sharing, and liking one must do before one can take 
part in reminiscing – or, before the platform can resurface and remind users of their ‘memories’. 
Therefore, the question is not simply about storing, but also about access and the criteria of 
access. On Facebook Memories and LG G7, the criteria for seeing ‘memories’ is based on the 
user’s level of participation. As such, there seems to be an inextricable link on algorithmic 
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remembrance technologies between participation and ‘making memories’ as well as being able 
to relive them.  
 This logic signals a notion of  memories in terms of capture, as documentation, as pro-
duction, as a certain kind of freedom, that is, the ability to be ‘free to make more memories’ 
(Ever). As Michel Foucault ([1967]1984, p. 1) observed in his lecture ‘On Other Spaces’, ‘our 
experience of the world is less that of a long life developing through time than that of a network 
that connects points and intersects with its own skein’. The same can be said about the way 
algorithms and memory-making practices currently intersect. Memory making is about con-
necting and intersecting points and networks. It is more about capture and production, instead 
of lived experiences and a ‘long life developing through time’. As such, algorithmic remem-
brance technologies facilitate a shift in the way remembering is conceptualised. Through 
discourses of unlimited and safe storage opportunities, algorithmic remembrance technologies 
are shaping the conditions through which the present is captured and the past relived. 
Moreover, through discourses of ‘capture more’, these technologies are also shaping the con-
ditions of memory making – as something produced, captured, accumulated, and resurfaced.  
 
4.3.2 Smart 
Another significant aspect that also emerged from the content material was the representation 
of algorithmic remembrance technologies as ‘smart’. The use of AI and machine learning is 
near ubiquitous in contemporary society. The use of ‘smart’ algorithms to find patterns in 
datasets, to generate correlations in quantities and frequencies, to reduce these into actionable 
outputs, is no longer solely the property of data analysts or programmers; its utility and 
relevance has spilled out into industries, social media, and everyday life at large. The use of AI 
and machine learning can also be seen incorporated into various algorithmic remembrance 
technologies. Many of these remembrance technologies employ discourses around ‘smartness’ 
and ‘smart technologies’ as a way of attracting customers and to frame themselves as providing 
cutting edge technologies that are dynamic in nature, taking part in how people store, curate 
and reflect over their mediated memories. Notions of smartness are integral to the ways 
algorithms are reconfiguring how people remember, how mediated memories are stored and 
organised.  
Before I discuss what exactly is meant by these technologies being ‘smart’, it is first 
important to note that algorithmic ‘smartness’ is framed as a desirable attribute. For instance, 
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the photos storage app Ever state in a 2016 Medium article that ‘you deserved a smart way to 
organize your photos, an easy way to backup all your photos, flexibility across devices, and 
powerful machine learning capabilities to identify the people, places, and things you love 
most.’ As we discussed earlier, unlimited storage and easy backup was a central part of the 
message of algorithmic remembrance technologies. Similarly, the storage app links ‘smart 
organisation’ and ‘powerful machine learning capabilities’ together with notions of entitle-
ment: you ‘deserve’ a smarter means of storage as well as powerful machine learning tools. 
These are framed as desirables and even must-haves for users, something one deserves and is 
entitled to in a data-driven age. 
Another characteristic that is associated with these smart technologies is flexibility and 
adaptability. Personalisation is a common characteristic of machine learning, that is, adapting, 
and tailoring the experience of a product or a platform to each individual user. Crucially, 
algorithmic remembrance technologies are framed as smart and able to adapt to each individual 
user. Google Pixel, Google’s answer to the smartphone, state that in their launch of Android 9 
Pie they aim to provide a service that is ‘powered by AI for a smarter, simpler experience that 
adapts to you.’ Moreover, they aim to ‘make your phone even smarter by learning from you 
and adapting to your usage patterns.’ A central characteristic of machine learning and AI, 
adaptability is achieved through mining and analysing the user’s data and attempting to predict 
future or likely behaviours, like what app one wishes to open next. Learning is evoked here as 
crucial to this process of adapting. Indeed, a device’s smartness is dependent on the extent to 
which data is available, which determines what can learned from users’ behaviours. As Luciana 
Parisi (2019, p. 4) observes, ‘The more data is available the more learning there can be’. For 
instance, in their Privacy Policy, effective from May 2018, Google Photos states that their smart 
algorithm, which automatically organises and curates people’s digital photos, is a result of 
learning from users through training data. Google states that ‘understanding how people 
organized their photos in Picasa, Google's first photos app, helped us design and launch Google 
Photos.’49 As such, the idea that smartness is inextricably linked to constant learning and data 
mining is apparent. 
Although this may raise concerns, this smartness is framed as a positive aspect of using 
Google Photos, as enabling a more customised service to user, to provide benefits it otherwise 
would not have been able to provide. This way of framing smart algorithms can also be 
 
49 This raises interesting questions about Google’s data mining practices, ideas of (positive) consent, as well as 
users’ rights to object to the use of their data. 
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observed with Samsung. In their Privacy Policy document from 2018, Samsung states that their 
‘Customization Service’ is ‘designed to help understand your interests, preferences, and 
location, and collects and analyses information about you in various ways.’ Through mining 
and analysing users’ photos, Samsung’s Customization Service is able to learn, understand and 
adapt – all for the benefit of the user. As Samsung states later on in their Privacy Policy, ‘the 
more the Customization Service understands and learns about you, the faster and more 
accurately it can provide you with customized content and information.’ Users are therefore 
encouraged to cooperate, or at least acquiesce, if they want customised, accurate, and fast 
content and information. As such, algorithmic remembrance technologies are able to adapt to 
users’ preferences through the constant mining and analysing of their data. As such, AI and 
machine learning are framed as smart and beneficial tools, providing users with content that 
would not be possible without learning and their data acting as training fodder for the algo-
rithm. 
Although this allows technologies such as Google Photos to provide a more customised 
service to their users, it also makes it possible to predict, pre-empt, and ultimately shape users’ 
behaviours on the platform. For Mark Andrejevic (2020), total information capture allows 
technologies to predict what users would like to see or engage with and in turn pre-empt these 
desires. As Andrejevic (2020, p. 77) argues, ‘pre-emption is the collapse of the future into the 
present… this deferred future is collapsed into the present so it can be acted upon now’ (original 
emphasis). In other words, pre-emption ‘imposes the imperative of ongoing, incessant, and 
accelerated intervention’ (p. 76). Through knowing users and their preferences, through the 
generation of correlations across the data, algorithmic remembrance technologies are able to 
‘know’ the future and therefore intervene in the present. This computational collapse of the 
future into the present has also been called ‘the politics of possibility’ (Amoore, 2013), the idea 
being that uncertainties and uncertain futures can be reduced, through data mining and 
algorithmic calculations, to possible and actionable futures. Through the interconnections 
between data, analysis, correlation, and smartness, an important facet of the power and politics 
of algorithms becomes visible. As Amoore (2009, p. 22) states:  
Algorithms precisely function as a means of directing and disciplining attention, 
focusing on specific points and cancelling out all other data, appearing to make 
it possible to translate probable associations between people or objects 
into actionable security decisions (original emphasis). 
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As such, algorithms function to not only know and predict the future, but to make it actionable, 
to arrange time in such a way ‘as to govern, to decide, or to act in the present’ (Amoore, 2009, 
p. 5). As I suggest in the section called ‘Organised’, this algorithmic smartness is coupled with 
automation in a way that seeks to learn from users’ behaviours in order to provide actionable 
or customisable content.  
The idea of smartness is also intimately coupled with the idea of depth. Personalisation 
is a powerful way in which algorithms come to matter in the social world. On many algorithmic 
remembrance technologies, the ability to tailor content to each individual user and to adapt to 
each user’s behavioural patterns is said to provide a ‘deeper’ understanding of the individual 
user themselves. For instance, Amazon Photos, deploy various computer vision algorithms, 
such as object and facial recognition, to understanding the ways in which people photograph-
ically capture, store, and engage with the present. In their ‘Amazon Photos UI Design Case 
Study’, the company and Amazon partner, Metalab, state that they provide users with ‘a smarter 
photo experience’. They state that:  
Together we broke down the photo lifecycle and examined every detail that 
could be automated. That deep understanding of the ‘capture, review, edit, share, 
store, and publish’ cycle informed every decision.’ 
Amazon Photos’ ‘deep understanding’ is predicated on the ability to pixelate and isolate data 
points in order to make analytics more effective. It is dependent on actively intervening in the 
photo’s lifecycle, in order to assess the extent to which processes should be automated. In other 
words, smartness in this instance implies a tripartite form of understanding: an understanding 
of the technology and the algorithm, a deeper understanding of the so-called ‘photo lifecycle’ 
as well as an understanding of the habits and behavioural patterns of the users.  
 On one level, this evocation of ‘deep understanding’ is a reference to deep learning and 
neural networks, which are designed to loosely mimic the operations of the human brain.50 The 
implication is that the algorithm’s smartness derives from their ability to discover patterns and 
in features in the data that would otherwise have been impossible. The evocation of ‘deep 
understanding’ suggests a novel mode of discovery, of finding patterns and deep structures in 
 
50 Deep learning is a specific mode of predictive modelling where algorithms recursively generate correlations 
and find patterns in large datasets, and in turn develop a set of rules to ‘interpret’ datasets. Once neural networks 
have learned how to identify patterns in training sets, they can be deployed to identify similar patterns and 
correlations in other similar data sets. For more on various machine learning and deep neural network systems, 
see Adrian Mackenzie’s (2017) comprehensive overview in his book Machine Learners.  
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users’ behaviours that users themselves were not even aware of. They are therefore depicted as 
inscrutable and powerful, as being able to dig ‘deep’ into the data and learn about users in a 
more intimate way. Through this form of ‘deep learning’, algorithmic remembrance techno-
logies are therefore able to better provide users with ‘the best’. For instance, the photo storage 
service Ever states in one of their promos that ‘our platform is getting smarter and more relevant 
in re-introducing you to your best memories.’ Deep learning is said to not only provides 
relevant memories, but the best memories. Of course, this highlights the link between 
algorithms and the production of relevance (Gillespie, 2014) whilst simultaneously raising the 
question: how to determine the best memories for someone? Yet, the evocation of deep learning 
suggests that algorithmic remembrance technologies are able to understand users on an even 
more granular scale and therefore provide them with their ‘best memories’. Through this, 
smartness inextricably linked with ideas of data mining, prediction, pre-emption, and ranking. 
As such, algorithmic remembrance technologies position themselves as smart, as being able to 
learn, know, predict, and pre-empt what mediated memories users would like to engage with.  
The idea of smartness is also intimately coupled with the idea of the individual user.  
For instance, one of Google Photos’ promotional taglines is: ‘Finally, a photo app that’s as 
smart as you.’ Here, smartness is figured in anthropomorphic terms, as something comparable 
and equal to humans. This is also echoed in the description of Google Photos on Apple’s App 
Store: ‘Google Photos is a smarter home for all your photos and videos, made for the way you 
take photos today.’ In short, smartness is meant as beneficial to the individual users, to their 
individual way of taking photos. As such, algorithmic remembrance technologies such as 
Google Photos depict themselves as smart technologies able to reflect users’ own patterns of 
image capture, technologies one can be alongside with, a harmonious balance and melding of 
individual human and machine agencies, a partnership between humans and algorithms. In this 
view, memory making practices are represented as a human-nonhuman assemblage, as a form 
of co-production between human actors and algorithms that are able to learn from users.  
However, this agential balancing act obfuscates a crucial aspect of the power and 
politics of algorithms, namely the inextricable relationship between the individual user and the 
wider user population. As I pointed out earlier, Google Photos’ algorithm was trained on data 
from user’s behavioural patterns on the technology’s prior iteration, Picasa. In the age of 
algorithms, mediated memories are never solely one’s own. Of course, mediated memories are 
captured, stored, networked, and connected to those of others (connectivity will be discussed 
later). Yet, mediated memories also provide tech companies with data to train machine learning 
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algorithms and to generate patterns and correlations across their user base. As Lury and Day 
(2019, p. 18) observe about algorithmic personalisation, ‘It is never about only one person, just 
me or just you, but always involves generalization’. Crucially, mediated memories in the age 
of the algorithm comprise, at least partly, the attributes, correlations, and patterns that have 
been generated across multiple data populations. As Taina Bucher (2020a, p. 615) argues, 
‘what a user sees is never just a reflection of their past choices and clicks but the image of 
multiple moments and residues of data involving others’ – a point also developed at length in 
Louise Amoore’s (2020) new book Cloud Ethics. Mediated memories, therefore, are not simply 
the result of individual habits – the ways they are captured, remembered, shared and networked 
with others – but rather the result of algorithmic calculations and the attributes, patterns, and 
correlations emerging from other people’s data residues.  
 
4.3.3 Organised 
Closely related to the idea of smartness are the issues of organisation, classification, and order. 
Sifting through photos, organising them into folders, can be a daunting and time consuming 
task when one has 4000 images on one’s the smart phone alone. Because of this, algorithmic 
remembrance technologies often position themselves as not only providing the means to 
capture and store photographs, but also as providing the means to organise them. Some techno-
logies draw a sharp contrast between traditional means of organisation and the ones they 
provide, telling an attractive story of their own efficacy. The photo backup and storage app 
Ever, for example, state that ‘Gone are the years of important memories stuck on the shelf 
collecting dust’. The implication is that using their app is a means by which these important 
memories are able to come to fore instead of lying dormant, collecting dust. On Samsung’s 
Support Page ‘Find Photos Quickly on Your Phone’, they write that ‘with so many photos, 
your Gallery is more unorganized than your desk.’ The implication here is that there is 
something reassuring and comforting about the promises of centralising all memories in one 
place. As the photo storage service Fotofami states on their homepage, ‘Save all your cherished 
photos and videos into one place’, or as Apple Memories’ tagline says, ‘Single destination for 
your Memories.’ Echoing Nathan Jurgenson (2019, p. 1), Samsung uses a metaphor here that 
‘frames newness within something familiar’ in order to create a connection between the user 
and a novel product based on their emotional back catalogue. 
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Metalab, writing about their work on Amazon Photos, produce a particularly vivid 
picture of the importance of organisation: ‘Precious memories are left, neglected in a 
disorganized mass, vulnerable to technical meltdowns. Not an ideal scenario.’ As we discussed 
earlier, the risks of data loss are often evoked as a means to rationalise or justify the platform 
itself. Still, there is another suggestion latent in this statement. It suggests that traditional means 
of organising photos are inadequate given the increasing deluge of data as well as the new 
means of capture and working on the present. It is not enough for ‘precious memories’ to be 
captured, stored, and collated; they must be organized as well. In a sense, organisation is here 
framed as a form of memory work. One must make sure to ‘keep your memories organized’ 
(Amazon Photos) or, more profoundly, ‘take care of your memories’ (Ever). Organisation is 
framed as the equivalent as tending a garden that could soon overgrow. Therefore, it seems the 
act of actively organising or curating one’s mediated memories becomes arguably more 
pressing as storage options continue to grow and capturing the present becomes easier. 
 Although algorithmic remembrance technologies encourage their users towards 
actively curating their digital photo libraries, they also position themselves as dynamic archons 
in their own right. As subscription-based genealogy app, MemoryWeb, states in the ‘Our Story’ 
section of its main webpage: 
We needed a photo app that could do more for us on all levels. More of 
the upload work. More of the organization. More to keep our photos 
safe but also at our fingertips. More to deliver effortless fun now and 
for generations to come. 
In this context, the role of automation becomes increasingly prevalent. As there is a demand 
for an app that ‘could do more for us on all levels’, a need for automation is created at multiple 
levels of analysis, both in terms of upload work, organisation, and safety. This is what Mark 
Andrejevic (2020) calls ‘the cascading logic of automation’. As Andrejevic (2020, p. 9) 
observes, ‘automated data collection leads to automated data processing, which, in turn, leads 
to automated response’. In other words, automation necessitates further automation: ‘once 
automated systems are used to make sense of the data, the next logical step is to automate 
response at scale’ (p. 9). As such, with automation, there is an emphasis on the need to delegate 
more and more roles to algorithmic systems such as capture, storage, safety, organisation, 
curation. Increasingly complex systems, it is suggested, require increasingly complex modes 
of assessment and response. 
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 The ‘cascading logic of automation’ as well as the evocation of organisation permeate 
the landscape of algorithmic remembrance technologies. Yet, it is crucial to note that auto-
mation is not coupled with organisation simply to make life easier for users; the automation of 
organisation necessitates further automation, namely of meaning and significance. Organi-
sation and automation are used as a way to shape the conditions of meaning of the mediated 
memories themselves. For instance, platforms and features such as Apple Memories, Amazon 
Photos, Google Photos, and Ever automatically curate people’s photos into pre-existing folders, 
or what Apple calls ‘curated collections’. As Apple writes on their Apple Support page called 
‘Enjoy Your Memories in Photos’, ‘Photos scans your library for significant people, places, 
holidays, and more, and presents them in curated collections called Memories. Day after day, 
you'll find new Memories ready for you to enjoy.’ Apple also states that their Photos app 
‘automatically creates curated collections of your most meaningful photos and videos’. This 
means that the app creates collections of photos called ‘In Nature’, ‘My Four-Legged Friend’, 
and ‘On Holiday.’ Using computer vision such as image and face recognition technologies, the 
Apple feature can differentiate between various photos as well as deconstruct what each photo 
consists of. This can also be seen on Amazon Photos, where one is able to tag and search photos 
by keyword (searchability will be discussed below). Google Photos, for instance, is able to 
recognise, within each photo, categories such as people, places, things, faces, famous geo-
graphical landmarks, moments such as birthdays, buildings, animals, good, and so on. One 
common thread for these algorithmic remembrance technologies is that they can analyse the 
content in each photo and identify various visual features. In a sense, mediated memories are 
then not merely organised, kept in order. They are organised, automated, and curated according 
to their level of meaningfulness. Again, the cascading logic of automation can be seen at work: 
photos are automatically collected and stored, automatically organised, automatically assessed, 
which in turn makes possible their automatic resurfacing.  
 These automated categories of meaning, however, do not naturally reside in the photo. 
Rather, they are based on prior assumptions and understandings of what counts as meaningful. 
As seen by Google Photos and its former iteration, Picasa, these automated categories of 
meaning can also be based on correlations and patterns generated from large datasets. 
Crucially, however, these categories form part of what David Beer (2013) called the ‘classi-
ficatory imagination’ of algorithmic remembrance technologies. That is, they form part of 
someone’s vision of the world, someone’s conceptualisation of users, of memory and the role 
it plays in everyday life. For Beer, a classificatory imagination suggests an entanglement of 
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classificatory processes, both by human and nonhumans. On algorithmic remembrance techno-
logies, this entanglement can be seen in the coupling of organisation and automation. 
By evoking organisation, algorithmic remembrance technologies seek to participate in 
the shaping of the meanings attached to mediated memories. They are capable of not only 
reflecting what a person thinks is meaningful but also to shape the very parameters of meaning-
fulness. For instance, the app Ever state something similar in their tagline: ‘Ever also organizes 
your photos to help you find and share the memories that matter the most.’ Moreover, Google 
Photos wants to organise people’s photos so that they may find ‘your best moments’, making 
sure that photos are ‘automatically organized by what matters.’ Through the relationship 
between organisation and automation, the politics and power of these algorithmic remembrance 
technologies comes to the fore. They generate the categories of meaning into which mediated 
memories are automatically organised. ‘Curated collections’ suggest grids of meaning that are 
produced and imposed on digital objects so as to appear more meaningful and memorable. 
Organisation and automation can therefore be seen to participate in the shaping and production 
of meaning as much as its ordering and organisation.   
 
4.3.4 Searchable 
Another theme that was salient throughout the content was the idea of searchability, that is, 
increasingly speedy navigational possibilities. As was discussed in the previous sections, 
algorithmic remembrance technologies are presented as unlimited, smart, organised, and auto-
mated. They are depicted as being able to learn what is meaningful for each individual and 
organise as well as automate accordingly. The idea of rendering photos and videos searchable 
emerged repeatedly in the data. For instance, in their Apple’s App Store entry, Amazon Photos 
encourage their users to ‘search your photos to find your memories’ and that ‘your photos are 
now searchable… no tagging required – just search ‘dog’ to find all the photos of your pup.’ 
In Google’s smart phone, Google Pixel, one can search pictures by ‘location, keywords or even 
emojis to quickly find and organise your photos.’ The same search criteria can be found on 
Amazon Photos and Apple Memories, where users may search based on animals, objects, and 
people as well as locations and environments such as sunsets and beaches. Moreover, Swarm, 
the lifelogging app developed by Foursquare Labs, Inc., also uses geotagging data to identify 
where people have been or where they have checked into. The app has incorporated a search 
feature within their platform, where users are able to search for past check-ins, cities, and types 
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of places such as hotels, restaurants, and shops. Their aim, they state in a Medium article 
introducing Swarm 6.0, is to help you ‘remember all the places you’ve been and lets you 
instantly rediscover them through search or browsing the map.’ Search seems ubiquitous to the 
efficacy of algorithmic remembrance technologies.  
One obvious reason for the widespread use of search is, of course, findability or 
speedier retrievability. As was discussed in the section on storage and capture, the current trend 
towards increasing storage and capture of the present means both that organisation will be 
increasingly important and that the ability to find certain things becomes more desirable. 
Organising thousands of photos and finding individual ones can be time consuming tasks. The 
emergence of searchability can therefore be seen as both an extension of the use of machine 
learning and automatic organisation as well as a way to navigate people’s ever-growing digital 
photo libraries. The logic of unlimited storage is inextricably linked with the logic of ‘capture 
more’. As Amazon Photos state in their App Store entry, ‘Your photos are easy to find because 
the app organizes your photos automatically.’  
Yet, the ways in which mediated memories are rendered increasingly searchable and 
findable, is inextricably linked to the emergence of a widespread ‘culture of search’ (Hillis et 
al, 2013). With the advent of Google, search became a prevalent mode of knowledge 
acquisition, shopping, and just being in the world. As Hillis et al. (2013, p. 4) claim, search is 
‘operationalized across the Web as a way of life.’ Indeed, according to some scholars, search 
engines reflect ‘an increasing cultural expectation of being able to search for items’ (Anderson, 
2018, p. 8). This cultural expectation has also permeated algorithmic remembrance techno-
logies, many of which are part networking sites, part search engines, part memory tools. The 
idea of searchability suggests the extent to which mediated memories have been pixelated and 
rendered knowable by algorithmic processes as well as the extent to which memory practices 
have been streamlined – there is no longer a need to sift through an extensive digital album 
when it is automatically organised and rendered searchable for users.  
Still, there is also a need to think about searchability in terms of data mining and value. 
The power and efficacy of search engines such as Google derived mainly from them 
capitalising on people’s searches, which in turn made it possible for the search engine to algo-
rithmically rank searches (i.e. the PageRank algorithm),51 as well as to order people’s para-
meters of vision and attention (who cares what is on page 15 of a Google search?). As such, 
 
51 For more on the PageRank algorithm, see Introna and Nissenbaum (2000) as well as Pasquinelli (2009). 
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searches become financially incentivised, modulating visibility, and ensuring that certain third-
party ads remain visible to the right kind of audience, echoing Lucas Introna’s (2016b) notion 
of ‘algorithmic choreography’. However, there is scope to examine what impact the politics of 
search and algorithmic mediations have on people’s memory practices.   
 For many algorithmic remembrance technologies, the idea of searchability is also often 
coupled with the notion of speed or speediness. Users can find particular images fast based on 
the particular search criteria the technology provides. Throughout the material, phrases such as 
these were common in the data: ‘find your photos fast’ (Google Pixel), ‘Prime Members can 
quickly find any specific photos by searching for the things in their images, like 'dog', 'sunset', 
or 'Seattle'’ (Amazon Photos), ‘Find your photos faster’ (Google Photos), and ‘Use Siri to 
quickly pull up photos and memories based on people, places, events, time, and keywords of 
objects and scenes in the photos’ (Apple Memories). As the last example suggests, search can 
also be instantiated through voice commands, which in turn evokes an interesting set of debates 
around the use of digital assistants, data mining the voice, and surveillance (e.g. Brause and 
Blank, 2020; Hoy, 2018).  
There is a considerable overlap, in this case, between the logic of search and the data 
imaginary of speediness found in the data analytics industry. David Beer (2019) argues that the 
notion of speed is vital when seeking to understand the seductive powers and potential of the 
data analytics industry. Whereas Beer discusses how data analytics allows companies to work 
on data rapidly, instantly, and continuously, algorithmic remembrance technologies tell users 
they can organise and search for their mediated memories with increased speed. As Swarm, the 
lifelogging app, state in the Medium article introducing Swarm 6.0, they let users ‘remember 
all the places you’ve been and lets you instantly rediscover them through search’ (emphasis 
added). The approach to big data in the data analytics industry is mirrored here in the wide-
spread capture and curation of everyday experience through photos and videos. The same logic 
of ‘real-time’ spills over into this context: the gap between capturing the present and remem-
bering the past is increasingly reduced, becoming almost instant with searching. It can even be 
argued that this is an example of how the ‘data gaze’ (Beer, 2019) has been extended beyond 
the walls, the physical and ideological parameters, of the data analytics industry, spilling over 
into everyday life, affecting how people capture, store, curate and reflect back on (past) data. 
The message of algorithmic remembrance technologies is clear: through our service, you are 
able to store unlimited digital traces, capture more of the present, worry less about the 
organisation of these mediated memories, and find these photos quicker through our cutting-
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edge search functionalities. Within this framework, searchability is seen as a key aspect of 
these algorithmic remembrance technologies, a seductive feature where the intersection 
between algorithms and memory-making practices is becoming ever more apparent.  
For some algorithmic remembrance technologies, such as Apple Memories, searcha-
bility is not only coupled with speediness, but also with machine learning and ‘smart’ 
algorithms. One of Apple’s taglines in their iOS 12 software update was ‘A smarter way to 
search your phone.’ In other words, the software update was an attempt to make search more 
salient, effective, and smart. As they stated, one of the benefits of the iOS 12 update was the 
‘search enhancements’ they had developed: ‘Search enhancements make it easier to find your 
photos with intelligent suggestions and multiple keyword support.’ Through incorporating 
machine learning algorithms that learned people’s habits and patterns of behaviour, Apple 
made it even more effortless to find and draw out whatever one was looking for on their phone. 
This notion of ‘smarter search’ was also extended to Apple’s Gallery feature. They state in 
their introduction of the iOS 12 smartphone update:  
Even before you start typing, you'll see suggestions for recent events, people, 
and places. And as you type, the results are smarter and more powerful, and you 
can refine them by adding multiple keywords.  
These search suggestions are framed as a ‘smart’ tool, and one which can be further refined to 
make it even smarter. This idea is furthermore framed within a discourse of power and em-
powerment, as one does no longer need to know the exact photo one is looking for.  
Yet, something interesting happens in the intersections of search, smartness, and 
automation. Exactness becomes proximity; the search terms need only be ‘close enough’ to the 
metadata of a photo in order to find it. As Gillespie (2014, p. 174) points out, algorithmic 
outputs or predictions need only be ‘sufficient approximations’ to be effective. Proximity and 
approximation become the responsibility of the algorithm. As is stated on Apple’s introduction 
of iOS 12, ‘Search suggestions help you find the exact photo you're looking for or rediscover 
a great one you forgot about.’ This language of exactness, conceptualised in relation to search 
suggestions, also echoes claims of objectivity and accuracy that mirror some of the character-
istics and promises of Big Data (Kitchin, 2014a). It is a language steeped in the confidence that 
being able to ‘search, aggregate, and cross-references large data sets’ (Boyd and Crawford, 
2012, p. 663) about people inevitably results in accuracy and exactness. The equation of 
becomes increasingly apparent: more data, more sufficient approximations, better search 
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suggestions, quicker retrieval. As digital traces such as photos and videos are increasingly 
pixelated, they are becoming better ‘known’ by machine learning algorithms. They become 
machine legible. These algorithms are able to break down the composition of a photo and 
attempt to organise according to what is considered meaningful categories. Through these 
examples, the theme of searchability emerges in relation to the way algorithmic remembrance 
technologies mediate memory-making practices. Moreover, it is coupled with notions of 
speediness, ease, accessibility, and exactness. As mediated memories become increasingly 
searchable and retrievable, they are rendered more instant and present. What effects this has on 
human memory and everyday memory practices will be explored in chapters five and six. 
 
4.3.5 Connective 
Another aspect which emerged repeatedly throughout the material was the way algorithmic 
remembrance technologies represented themselves as connective or networked devices. For 
instance, apps such as Timehop repeatedly state in their promotional material that they ‘help 
you celebrate the best moments of the past with your friends’ and that ‘The best memories are 
the ones with friends!’ Facebook Memories, when resurfacing people’s memories on their 
Timeline, state ‘we care about you and the memories you share here’ and ‘Only you can see 
this unless you share it.’ Moreover, Google Photos provides users with so-called ‘shared 
albums’, which ‘pool photos with friends and family using shared albums. So you never miss 
a moment, no matter what device everyone has.’ Evidently, sharing is a crucial way in which 
the connectivity and relationality of algorithmic remembrance technologies is operationalised, 
an important aspect of participating on the platform or feature.52 As such, sharing mediated 
memories with others is made as easy, as convenient, and as streamlined as possible. After all, 
mediated memories do mediate human relationships (van Dijck, 2007). 
 However, connectivity, sharing, and participation are salient ways which the logic of 
surveillance capitalism becomes visible on these memory technologies. As I mentioned earlier, 
data becomes an increasingly central resource for the production of monetary value. As such, 
it is crucial to note that remembrance technologies shape the conditions in which data is 
produced and shared by users. For instance, Taina Bucher (2012b) argues that Facebook seeks 
to configure users who participate, communicate, and interact through a particular regime of 
visibility, through the operational logic of Facebook’s EdgeRank algorithm, where users must 
 
52 For more on the logic and ecosystem of connectivity, see van Dijck (2013). 
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constantly engage with and participate on the platform so as to not succumb to the ‘constant 
possibility of disappearing and becoming obsolete’ (p. 1164). Indeed, the financial value of 
such platforms is interwoven with and predicated upon people’s levels of participation on the 
platform. One can argue that algorithmic remembrance technologies are similarly underpinned 
by a logic of participation, one which says ‘capture the present. Constantly share it with others.’ 
Through constant sharing, these memory technologies seek to drive activity amongst their 
users, to induce and maintain a user base that actively participates. 
Yet, going further, one could also argue that these algorithmic remembrance techno-
logies represent an increasing intensification of connectivity amongst users. Through the use 
of machine learning algorithms and AI, they embody a greater push towards constant 
networked sharing. These technologies are synthesised to afford an amplification of sharing as 
a means of connecting users into categories and networks of meaning: families, friends, 
partners, and so on. Many of the platforms and apps draw on machine learning to develop, what 
Apple said about their iOS 12 update, ‘a new way to share your best photos.’ It is a mode of 
participation and sharing supplemented, augmented, shaped, and ultimately reconfigured 
through machine learning. This is also demonstrated by a feature that Apple Memories call 
‘Sharing Suggestions.’53 This feature will both ‘show you great moments from your photo 
library’ and then it ‘intelligently suggests sharing photos with the people in them.’ As such, we 
see the coalescence of sharing, automatic categorisation, and ‘smart’ algorithms (or increased 
‘intelligence’) in mediating people’s memory practices and their sharing habits. Mediated 
memories are therefore not only produced digital traces, data points compressed into memories; 
they are also made amenable to ever more intelligent ways of diffusion. These Sharing 
Suggestions are framed as an intelligent way to share with others. Their intelligence is derived 
from the data the features have collated and analysed from users’ behavioural patterns. In this 
case, the use of machine learning is not only used to better organise people’s photos nor to 
render them easily searchable; they are also used to learn, understand and intelligently predict 
what mediated memories people find meaningful and are likely to share with others. 
Google Photos has a similar feature called ‘Suggested Sharing’, which they launched 
on their platform in 2017. When describing the particular sharing feature, they stated on their 
blog titled ‘Give and get the photos you care about’: 
 
53 This functionality was rolled out on their iOS 12 software update.  
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Suggested sharing uses machine learning to automatically identify 
photos and suggest recipients, making sharing as simple as a single tap. 
With shared libraries, sending and receiving photos with one person is 
effortless - You can automatically share your full photo library or 
customize just what you want to share. 
Their description uses some striking keywords which need further unpacking. Machine 
learning and automation are framed as tools of simplification, a means of making sharing easier 
(‘as simple as a single tap’). Curiously perhaps, the suggestion is that using increasingly 
complex systems will generate simpler solutions. Sharing and receiving photos becomes 
“effortless” with the incorporation of machine learning. This is clearly a prominent part of why 
these technologies are so seductive: they promise something automatic, simple, and effortless; 
let our intelligent algorithms do more so you have to do less. Sharing becomes increasingly 
automatic and frictionless.  
 The automatisation of sharing is also coupled with the suggestion that smart algorithms 
are able to know and predict meaningful interactions. For instance,  the smartphone application, 
Apple Memories, suggests that ‘Photos understands when you've done something meaningful, 
like taking a trip or attending an event, and will suggest sharing the photos with the people who 
are in them.’ The emergence of automatic categories of meaning suggests that the algorithm 
not only ‘knows’ and is able to predict what mediated memories users will want to engage 
with, but also to who they are likely to share these mediated memories. This is also echoed by 
Google Photos in their introduction of the ‘Suggested Sharing’ feature, who state that ‘you’ll 
see your personal suggestions, based on your sharing habits and the people in the photo.’ It 
becomes apparent that the intensification of connectivity, the interweaving of sharing, 
participation, and smart algorithms, is predicated on the data they have already been able to 
mine and analyse about users’ behavioural patterns. How people have shared mediated 
memories in the past will to a large extent determine what sharing suggestions individual users 
will see. In other words, algorithmic remembrance technologies are presented as being able to 
provide a service that both learns from, understands, and in turn is able to predict how a user 
will act or share.  
One can therefore argue that these technologies drive an intensified form of connec-
tivity, through AI, machine learning and suggested sharing, amongst users. Participation is no 
longer just a matter of prompting sharing amongst users; in a sense, this form of activity is too 
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general. Rather, these technologies have the capacity to analyse, know, and predict people’s 
sharing habits on a more granular level. This may create the perception that sharing, and sharing 
suggestions, become increasingly intimate, being able to ‘accurately’ suggest what mediated 
memories users should share with whom. In a sense, the engagement with mediated memories 
is increasingly transfigured in terms of a logic of targeting. But fundamentally, these predic-
tions are productions (Mackenzie, 2015). As Adrian Mackenzie (2015, p. 443) suggests, predic-
tions depend on relatively stable forms, categories, and classifications in order to function 
optimally. A potential danger of such stable forms is the way in which they may obfuscate 
variations that do not fit these forms. In other words, what if someone is sharing habits fall 
outside the prescribed grammar of sharing that these algorithmic systems provide? People are 
highly networked, and the push for smarter sharing patterns is a means to web people together 
in even more intricate, if not intimate, networks of programmed sociality. Yet, the question 
remains how the production of prediction changes the ways in which people remember and 
engage with their past.  
Given that algorithmic remembrance technologies seek to mediate people’s memories, 
it is crucial to interrogate how these conceptualise sociality. In other words, what categories of 
‘the social’ underpin these memory technologies? One of the ways ‘the social’ is imagined can 
be seen on Amazon Photos. As Metalab, the company behind the production of Amazon 
Photos’ interface, write in their description of the photo storage service: ‘Amazon Photos 
redefines how families experience their photos, while allowing them to rediscover their 
memories in more meaningful ways. After all, isn't that the whole point of our daily snapshots?’ 
The emphasis here is not only the way memories are shared amongst people or the way 
memories mediate relationships. Amazon Photos’ feature aims to change the way families 
relate to their photos, how they rediscover them, and how they experience the present. As 
Metalab further state, ‘It's an end-to-end experience that automates discovery, organization, 
and photo sharing for busy families’. The coupling of sharing and automation is framed as 
tailored for ‘busy families’. The application is therefore presented as well suited to certain 
relational structures (such as families) and, more specifically, a certain configuration of these 
relational structures (such as busy families).  
In order for the technology to be tailored to ‘busy families’, it is reasonable to suggest 
that Amazon and Metalab had an already-made notion of the family in mind when developing 
and rolling out the technology. The algorithms, in this case, can be seen to replicate and 
perpetuating certain normative values of family relations whilst also ‘scripting’ a particular 
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notion of the family. This could also be an example of conceptualising the family as a 
‘platformed’ structure (Goulden, 2019), and therefore amenable to the various logics of 
platforms. Thus, it can be argued that the line between rendering technologies amenable to 
certain pre-existing relational patterns, on the one hand, and subtly shaping and (re)producing 
the conception of those relational patterns, on the other, is fluid and ambiguous. In short, where 
to draw the line between descriptive and prescriptive design.  
To say that these platforms and apps are connective is therefore not merely rehashing 
prior arguments about how digital media connect people in various overlapping networks (e.g. 
van Dijck, 2007; 2010). It is pointing to the entanglement between memory making and 
sociality in the age of algorithms. As van Dijck (2013, p. 20) aptly observes, ‘Sociality is not 
simply ‘rendered technological’ by moving to a digital space; rather, coded structures are 
profoundly altering the nature of our connections, creations, and interactions.’ This section has 
attempted to show how mediated memories and connectivity, as a particular logic, are framed 
and evolve when interwoven with increasingly sophisticated automated processes. In this 
context, algorithmic remembrance technologies become a prism through which we can see how 
intensified connectivity is changing our media landscapes: evolving, becoming faster, easier, 
smarter, more automated, more intimate, more suggestive, more predictive. Algorithmic 
remembrance technologies represent an intensification of the logic of connectivity while being 
able to mediate human relationships on an even more intricate level. More generally, the 
combination of machine learning and sharing can be seen as an attempt to enhance participation 
amongst users on these different algorithmic remembrance technologies. But it is also impor-
tant to note that algorithmic remembrance technologies seek to mediate not only the levels of 
people’s participation but the nature of participation itself, shaping both the content of what is 
shared and the directionality of what is shared to whom. 
 
4.3.6 Reminding 
Another salient characteristic that emerged from the content material was the role of the 
reminder. Reminding often figures as central to how algorithmic remembrance technologies 
operate. Reminding relates to the ways in which past images and videos are brought back to 
the present, bringing back past data points or digital traces one has scattered throughout the 
years. With features such as Apple Memories and apps such as Timehop, for instance, it denotes 
the re-surfacing of past photos on the phone. In short, it is a mechanism of resurfacing. The 
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reminder is also variously conceived or framed in positive terms such as ‘throwbacks’ 
(Fotofami), a way to ‘relive’ (e.g. Apple Memories, Samsung Stories) and ‘rediscover’ (e.g. 
Amazon Photos, Swarm, Google Photos) memories, a means of being ‘re-introduced’ (Ever) 
to ones memories, and so on. The affordances of storage and capture seem inextricably linked 
to the idea of actively resurfacing past memories.  
For many applications and platforms reminding is central to their functionality (e.g. 
Timehop), whereas for others the reminder is an add-on feature (e.g. Facebook). On Instagram, 
for instance, where posting and sharing photos is at the core of the application’s DNA, one can 
encounter notifications such as ‘See your post from 5 years ago today,’ which have an icon of 
a clock going backwards. These are becoming increasingly mundane parts of the digital 
landscape. Snapchat is perhaps the most obvious example of a platform switching their 
business strategy from photos (or ‘snaps’) that fade after a certain number of seconds towards 
something that can be captured and stored indefinitely. Snapchat introduced the feature 
Memories which allowed users to collate, edit, and reshare their favourite snaps at a later point. 
It is Snapchat’s take on the digital, personal archive. But it is not only a tool for capturing and 
storing snaps. The feature also contains a functionality called ‘Flashback’, which pulls Snaps 
from Memories and resurfaces them to users as ‘Flashback from a year ago’ on their annual 
anniversary. It is a way for users to relive and reflect over their favourite snaps and the 
memories behind them. Lastly, for platform features such as Facebook Memories and apps 
such as Timehop, the reminder is a vital part of how users experience and use the app. Timehop, 
for instance, collates a user’s photos and videos that have been posted across their preferred 
social media platforms and they show these ‘memories’ on their anniversary, be it one year 
ago, two years, or 8 years ago. In the app’s Setup, one can choose for these memories to be 
delivered on a daily basis by pressing ‘Remind Me!’ The throwback or the memories reminder 
may seem like an inconsequential functionality in the grander design of platforms such as 
Facebook or apps such as Snapchat. Yet, they are becoming an integrated way for people to 
engage and reflect with their past photos and mediated memories. 
In one sense, the reminder is emblematic of the digital archive having become crucially 
algorithmic or dynamic, as Wolfgang Ernst (2018) observed. Reminding has always been an 
everyday contour of the memory make up. As scholars have pointed out, reminders are 
commonly used as tools of productivity and time management. Examining the intersections of 
time keeping and the Silicon Valley, Judy Wajcman (2018) argues that there is an increased 
interest in making reminders ‘smarter’, to develop smart scheduling applications that ‘codify 
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contemporary ideals about efficient time management’ (p. 1). As Casey (1987) states, it is a 
fundamental modulation of remembering. Yet, through algorithmic remembrance techno-
logies, the reminder is increasingly instrumentalised as yet another way to shape and produce 
relevance and meaningfulness. Reminding is not only a way for users to encounter past 
mediated memories, or being prompted to revisit and engage with these; rather, to echo Tarle-
ton Gillespie (2016, p. 2), reminding is a way that offers users past but relevant content and 
thus offers them ‘entry into and avenues through the archive.’ This, in turn, keeps users on the 
platform for longer (i.e. stickiness) whilst simultaneously ‘collecting more valuable data about 
them’ (p. 2). As such, reminding becomes a form of automatic navigation, one which navigates 
users through their large database of past data, providing them with relevant entry points and 
avenues. Yet, it also provides platforms with another a data mine, that is, people’s engagements 
with their mediated memories.  
In order to understand more fully the role of the reminder in the algorithmic mediation 
of memory, there is a need to examine in more depth some of the ways in which reminding is 
framed by memory technologies. These discursive frames around reminding help posit algo-
rithmic remembrance technologies as powerful tools in memory and meaning making prac-
tices. One of the ways in which reminding is framed is through the language of ‘rediscovery’. 
As the photo application Ever puts it in one of their main taglines, ‘Ever is a company dedicated 
to helping you capture and rediscover your life's memories.’ The tag line for Apple Memories 
is ‘Rediscover favourite and forgotten moments from deep in your photo library.’ As these 
statements suggest, the capturing of the present and the rediscovery of the past are seen as 
deeply intertwined. The function of rediscovery is predicated on users capturing the present. 
There is also an interesting metaphor of the ‘library’ and of ‘depth’ at play here. A user’s 
Gallery on Apple is compared to a photo library, a place where captured memories are stored 
but run the risk of lying in the depths of the library, dusty and forgotten, dormant and useless. 
But through algorithmic discovery, forgotten moments are revitalised, reanimated, and brought 
back to life. In short, they are brought back to the surface. The terminology of ‘hidden’ and 
‘deep’ on algorithmic media can be read as a reference to the ‘hidden layers’ of deep neural 
networks, which means that this act of digging therefore is a very specific one – one which is 
complex, automatic, inscrutable, algorithmic, and ultimately useful.  
The idea of rediscovery as a form of resurfacing mediated memories simultaneously 
perpetuates and problematises the notion of ‘dormant memories’, which was discussed in the 
literature review. It is perpetuated in the sense that rediscovery presupposes something hidden, 
 
130 
something latent, something dormant. In a sense, mediated memories must be dormant for them 
to be algorithmically rediscoverable. Yet it is problematised in the sense that rediscovery also 
indicates that mediated memories are, in fact, never truly dormant. Through these algorithmic 
systems, mediated memories are always in a state of potential rediscoverability. In other words, 
they are ‘potential memories’ (Bowker, 2008) because they may at any time be resurfaced by 
the algorithm and ‘rediscovered’ by the user. As such, reminding as rediscovery as well as the 
use of algorithmic systems suggests that mediated memories are more ‘lively memories’ than 
‘dormant memories’: always in state of rediscoverability, potentially resurfaced.   
The idea of rediscovery is also connected with making memory making more con-
venient for users. This is echoed in promotional statements such as:  
As your photo library continues to grow, we hope that features like this one 
make it easier to look back at your fondest memories (Google Photos).  
We're making it easier to look over the most recent highlights from your 
photos. If you take a lot of photos of your child, for example, you may 
occasionally get a card showing the best ones from the last month (Google 
Photos). 
It's become even easier to easier to access, organize and relive these memo-
ries wherever you are (Ever). 
Features like the reminder is framed as a tool which is supposed to make it easier to reminisce. 
It is framed as tool as a tool which bypasses the hurdles and labour of organising one’s photo 
library. As the algorithm resurfaces the ‘most recent highlights’, users ‘are free’ to engage with 
potential memories without having to spend excess time categorising and curating the ever-
growing photo library. As was discussed earlier, the reminder becomes another way to position 
users as ‘free to make memories.’  
 Yet, it is crucial to interrogate the politics of this reminding feature. Algorithmic 
remembrance technologies represent themselves as memory prosthesis, as merely memory 
practices easier and more convenient for users. However, through the resurfacing of mediated 
memories, an additional circulation of data (Beer, 2013) is introduced into the blood stream of 
people’s digital lives. Being revisited by past memories generates new situations where users 
may like, share, or otherwise engage with their data, which in turn creates new knowledge 
about the user and creates more value for the platform. As Lee Humphreys (2018) argues, when 
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we are reminded of various mediated memories, the structures that underlie those memories 
are also ritualistically reinforced (as well as those relational and social structures those 
mediated memories portray). It is therefore crucial to note that such reminders simultaneously 
reinforce and legitimate the technologies that facilitate these memory-making practices. The 
memory technology seeks to render acts of engaging with one’s past data an habitual 
occurrence; it seeks to legitimate algorithmic remembrance technologies as part of people’s 
everyday lives. 
 Through this characteristic of reminding, notions of storage, capture, smart organi-
sation, sharing, and resurfacing are seen as intimately linked in an economy of algorithmic 
remembering. In this economy, people can store more, capture more, and organise less. 
Reminders become more specific and more intimate, and sharing becomes increasingly inevi-
table or at least desirable. It is an economy which seeks to frame remembering within a frame-
work of deep understanding, participation, and connectivity. Reminding becomes a form of 
mediation, a way of mediating past data and legitimating the continual engagement and sharing 
of past data. But more than that, the ways in which mediated memories are resurfaced by 
algorithmic remembrance technologies shapes the conditions of memory making.  
 
4.4 Conclusion: Mediated Memories as ‘Quantifiable Field of Frequencies’ 
In this chapter, I have looked at what happens specifically when the conditions of memory-
making practices become algorithmic. As was said in the chapter introduction, algorithmic 
remembrance technologies are reconfiguring the conditions of memory making and what 
memory means. I have argued that algorithmic remembrance technologies are driving, to echo 
Hoskins (2016b, p. 15), ‘an ontological shift in what memory is and what memory does’, which 
in turn gives ‘remembering new scale’. I has shown how the conditions of memory making 
have become deeply computational and algorithmic. More specifically, I have discussed six 
ways in which mediated memories have been pulled within the remit of datafication and 
computational thinking. The chapter has also sought to examine how algorithmic remembrance 
technologies conceptualise the relationship between memory and algorithms. It looks at the 
potential ramifications of memory objects being reduced to data points to be mined and 
processed by machines.  
 I argue that mediated memories are not simply amalgamations of brain, material 
objects, and culture, as van Dijck (2009) suggests. Rather, I argue that in the age of the algo-
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rithm mediated memories constitute what Michel Foucault (1971) calls ‘a quantifiable field of 
frequencies.’ What is meant by this? In his Archaeology of Knowledge, Michel Foucault (1971, 
pp. 51-52) describes the hospital as ‘a place of constant, coded, systematic observation… 
constituting a quantifiable field of frequencies.’ For Foucault, the hospital was not primarily a 
place for the careful analysis of bodily sensations or sensory experiences. It was a discursive 
space. It had become a place where these embodied sensations were subsumed and analysed 
within a framework of quantification and calculability, trial, and error. It was a place with 
constant, coded, and systematic observation, a place where symptoms and illnesses were 
reduced to repetitions, frequencies, and quantifiable patterns and correlations. Reducing 
illnesses and symptoms into quantifiable patterns and correlative knowledge rendered them 
increasingly knowable and manageable to medical professionals. And as a quantifiable field of 
frequencies, the hospital signified a promise to manage and eradicate illnesses through num-
bers, through systematic observations and correlational knowledge. 
 Memory making, in the age of the algorithm, similarly constitutes a ‘quantifiable field 
of frequencies.’ Mediated memories are reduced to that which can be datafied, pixelated, 
analysed, counted, coded, classified, ranked, automated, and algorithmically resurfaced. 
Algorithmic remembrance technologies seek to render memories more machine-readable and 
more susceptible to computational problem-solving, more searchable, more quantifiable, and 
thus more easily manageable. As the chapter has shown, mediated memories constitute the 
patterns and correlations that have emerged through mining users’ data and using it as training 
data for machine learning algorithms. They are reduced to frequencies in people’s behavioural 
habits, frequencies that are then made actionable in the present through algorithmic resurfacing. 
As such, there are echoes of the clinical approach that Foucault spoke of, a logic of observation 
and quantification, at work within algorithmic remembrance technologies.  
 There are two overarching ways in which mediated memories are reduced to a quanti-
fiable field of frequencies: pixelation and exteriorisation. Generally, these represent simul-
taneous yet inverse movements: a movement inward and a movement outward respectively. 
Pixelation, taken from Louise Amoore’s (2009) work, refers to the processes by which 
mediated memories are increasingly deconstructed on a granular level, broken down into 
fragments or pixels so as to become more ‘knowable’ to the algorithm. The engineers at 
Facebook Memories call this process ‘content understanding’ (Paluri and Aziz, 2016). In this 
process, the focus moves away from the individual user and to the mediated memory itself. 
Using convolutional neural networks, Facebook Memories is able to identify and recognise 
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various visual concepts within each photo or ‘memory’ such as objects, scenes, actions, and 
places (Paluri and Aziz, 2016). Through pixelation, mediated memories are deconstructed to 
reveal their ‘hidden’ visual components. As a result, machine learning algorithms are able to 
provide a more granular understanding of what is contained within user’s ‘memories’. In other 
words, memories become increasingly perceptible and readable to the algorithm. As a result, 
mediated memories are dislodged from the brain, embodiment, socio-cultural networks, and 
material objects. Rather, pixelation is a ‘strategy of separation and isolation’ (Amoore, 2009, 
p. 19), a process in which mediated memories can be known on a more granular level so as to 
afford their automation, classification, and resurfacing. 
 Exteriorisation, on the other hand, represents the opposite movement. Mediated 
memories are a result of the patterns and correlations that are generated through machine lear-
ning algorithms. For French archaeologist Andre Leroi-Gourhan (1993), human memory was 
fundamentally a product of ‘exteriorisation’, the process by which it is stored within the 
geographically, biologically, and socio-culturally bounded regions of ethnic groups. On one 
level, algorithmic remembrance technologies suggest a drive to externalise and diffuse 
remembering across various platforms and software features. In the age of the algorithm, 
remembering is further externalised and exteriorised, distributed across a plethora of digital 
archives, databases, algorithmic networks, platforms, and applications. Yet, mediated 
memories are also exteriorised in the sense that they constitute the always-already Other, or 
better yet, Someone Else. That is, as the conditions for memory making become algorithmic, 
mediated memories are never purely one’s own. They are, to a large extent, the product of the 
memory practices of others. They are constituted, promoted, and resurfaced as a result of the 
patterns that have been generated from a wider user population. As such, mediated memories 
come to constitute a quantifiable field of frequencies through this dual motion of pixelation 
and exteriorisation – the move inward, towards the granularity of mediated memories as data 
objects, and the move outward, towards the patterns and correlations generated from the 
algorithmic clustering and analysis of other people’s memory making practices.  
Lastly, it is crucial to return to the underlying logic of surveillance capitalism. As 
mediated memories are ontologically reconfigured as a quantifiable field of frequencies, they 
also become economically valuable. On the one hand, the intersections between algorithms and 
memory can be reduced to platforms and data companies wanting to increase activity and 
participation amongst their users. On the other hand, they represent a drive to ‘know’ (Thrift, 
2004) users on a deeper level, encapsulating their mediated memories within the remit of what 
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counts as knowledge. As mediated memories are automatically categorised and resurfaced in 
the present, more opportunities for user interactions are generated, which in turn makes the 
user more amenable to algorithmic recommendation systems. As mediated memories are 
reduced to a quantifiable field of frequencies, they become more easily knowable and 
actionable, additional entry points for third parties.  
In the next two chapters, I will examine both users utilise and negotiate these techno-
logies in their everyday lives (chapter five) and how these technologies affect and shape 
people’s memory practices in the present (chapter six). In the following chapter, I discuss the 
various ways in which users utilise and negotiate these technologies while ‘emplotting’ a sense 




















5.0 The Emplotment of Mediated Memories: How Humans and Algorithmic Remem-
brance Technologies Shape Identities 
 
5.1 Introduction 
As I pointed out in the previous chapter, there is an emerging landscape of algorithmic remem-
brance technologies that has the potential to variously shape remembering and everyday 
memory practices. I argued that these technologies have the capacity to shape memory making 
through diverse algorithmic processes including curation, classifications, rankings, data-
fication, making data discreet ‘memories’, and so on. However, it is important to bear in mind 
that these technologies do not exist in a vacuum or deterministically exert their force on users. 
Although the apps and platforms discussed in chapter four are algorithmic decision-making 
systems, the act of engaging with the past and remembering past experiences through them 
constitutes a highly interpretative and generative process. One crucial reason for this is that 
algorithmic systems only tell partial stories from a user’s data past. As Tarleton Gillespie 
(2014) states, algorithmic systems do not simply exert their force on the social world, 
deterministically moulding it at will, but they always exist in complex assemblages and 
networks as well as in relation to various human practices and resistances, or what Michel de 
Certeau (1984) famously called ‘tactics’. It is also important to note that any form of 
remembering, of engaging with the past or with mediated memories such as data or digital 
objects, requires active work (Kuhn, 1995). In this chapter, therefore, the attention shifts from 
the technical aspects and advertising rhetoric of these technologies to the ways in which they 
are (tactically) appropriated by users in everyday life. Hence, I seek to give voice to that 
complex interplay between algorithms and humans in relation to memory making practices and 
processes, investigating the algorithmic mediation of memories ‘from the bottom up’, so to 
speak (Couldry and Powell, 2014). As such, this chapter explores the performative, fluid, and 
malleable qualities of both memory work and our encounters with algorithms in everyday life.  
 This chapter takes conceptual inspiration from Annette Kuhn’s (2000) understanding 
of remembering or memory work as a performative and highly productive process. As she 
states:  
Memory work takes on board its productivity and encourages the practitioner to 
use the pretexts of memory, the traces of the past that remain in the present, as 
raw material in the production of new stories about the past (Kuhn, 2000, p. 186).  
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The narrative qualities of our past memories are crucial for notions of identity and sociality, 
and it is important to investigate ideas of stories and memories in relation to users and 
algorithmic remembrance technologies. As such, the argument in this chapter is two-pronged: 
Firstly, drawing on Steph Lawler’s (2014) understanding of ‘emplotment’, this chapter argues 
that people use algorithmic remembrance technologies and mediated memories as means to 
emplot their lives, that is, to make use of the narratives that past memories generate ‘to give 
deeper meaning to, and if necessary to change, our lives now’ (Kuhn, 2000, p. 187). Lawler’s 
understanding of emplotment foregrounds the role of memory practices in constructing 
coherent narratives of self, which never remain fixed, whilst also highlighting the moments 
when such endeavours become problematic and even fail. Through this, algorithmic remem-
brance technologies and their mediated memories are seen to be implicated in the ways in 
which people make sense of themselves. 
Secondly, this chapter also argues that memory technologies actively participate in 
these processes of emplotment. For instance, the resurfacing of memories on features such as 
Timehop, Snapchat Memories or Facebook Memories is based on certain computational and 
temporal criteria, which shape user’s memories of the past in particular ways (the idea of 
temporality will be explored in more depth in the following chapter). This means that people 
encountering their digital past are not engaging with a blank slate, but rather with a medium 
that actively and algorithmically mediates and directs which aspects of the past one encounters. 
This echoes the notion that algorithmic systems function as, what Taina Bucher (2012a) calls, 
‘technicities of attention’. Attention does not simply refer to a cognitive faculty by which we 
focus on one thing at a time. Rather, as Katherine N. Hayles (2012, p. 14) suggests, attention 
is ‘a focusing action’ that ‘codetermines what we call materiality.’ Hayles argues that 
‘materiality, like the object itself, is not a pre-given entity but a rather a dynamic process that 
changes as the focus of attention shifts’ (p. 14). As such, attention is a crucial way in which 
things become matter and come to matter in the world. Similarly, by directing which aspects 
of the data past users encounter, algorithmic remembrance technologies shape people’s 
parameters of attention, which in turn shapes what aspects of the data past become matter and 
come to matter to people. Attending to the ways algorithms are actively involved in emplotting 
people’s sense of self through the memories that are resurfaced also brings attention to the 
various tactics that people use in negotiating and making sense of this algorithmic emplotment 
and the technologies themselves. Remembering, therefore, also involves the negotiation of 
those algorithmic technologies as well as the memories that they resurface.  
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This chapter, therefore, proposes that emplotment in this context should not be con-
sidered solely in terms of human agency. I propose that emplotment also be considered in 
relation to what Bruno Latour (1992) has called ‘non-human actants’, thinking about techno-
logies and memory features as dynamic agents, as actively mediating and shaping how the past 
is approached, remembered, and understood. In this context, emplotment therefore constitutes 
a socio-technical process. One of the implications of widening the conceptual framework of 
emplotment is that the focus shifts away from people solely using technologies, drawing on the 
memories they resurface in order to weave narratives of self and others. Instead, this chapter 
will investigate both how memory features actively participate in these processes of emplot-
ment and how people contend with, negotiate, and navigate the technologies themselves as well 
as the memories they are reminded of. As such, algorithmic remembrance technologies and 
people’s engagement with them can be understood as complex sites of memory work, of labour, 
of discontinuities and gaps, unrecognisable moments, recognition, and redefinition. In short, of 
weaving together past memories into present narratives.  
Drawing on interview and focus group data, I outline and investigate three ways in 
which emplotment can be understood in terms of socio-technical practices: managing, sharing, 
and anticipatory positioning. These practices or areas emerged as a result of participants 
discussing the various dimensions of using algorithmic memory features as well as their 
experiences encountering their digital past. Through management, sharing, and anticipatory 
positioning this chapter suggests that both humans and algorithms actively participate in the 
shaping, constructing, maintaining, and emplotting of identities, drawing on mediated memo-
ries resurfacing via memory features. But first we need to clarify what exactly we mean by 
‘emplotment’ and it how it relates to memory practices.  
 
5.2 Emplotment as a Conceptual Framework 
In order to explore how my participants used algorithmic remembrance technologies, encoun-
tering the digital past through the memories that these technologies routinely resurface, I will 
here revisit the notion of ‘emplotment’ in more detail. Emplotment originally derives from the 
field of literary and narrative theory, especially the works of Aristotle and Paul Ricoeur. Steph 
Lawler (2014) draws on Ricoeur’s understanding of emplotment when exploring how memo-
ries feature in the formation and maintenance of narratives of self. For Ricoeur, the term 
delineates the minimally necessarily elements needed to constitute a narrative – these elements 
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being characters, action, and plot (Ricoeur, 1983). Every narrative, in other words, needs to 
have someone in it, something that happens, and a plot which, as Lawler (2014) points out, is 
what actually ‘makes’ the narrative. As she states, emplotment signifies the ‘processes of 
producing an identity through assembling various memories, experiences, episodes, etc., 
within narratives’ (2014, p. 24; original emphasis). This means that memories, experiences, 
and episodes are not ‘thrown together at random but are linked together’ (p. 24). Emplotment, 
in this context, Lawler suggests, is the mechanism by which these disparate elements are 
brought together into ’a meaningful whole’ (p. 24). Ricoeur defines emplotment as ‘a synthesis 
of heterogeneous elements’ (quoted in Lawler, 2014, p. 27) As such, emplotment refers to the 
processes of weaving together disparate events and actions in order to construct a meaningful 
plot. It is the synthesis, as Ricoeur states, or the linking together of disparate events and 
experiences into something more wholistic, something meaningful. Remembering, in this 
context, is therefore always an act of membering and re-membering, that is of re-assembling 
memories, narratives, and meanings (the idea of ‘re-membering’ will be explored later in the 
chapter). 
 The crux of Lawler’s argument is that this process of synthesising events and episodes 
into a meaningful narrative, of weaving wholistic stories, is fundamental to people’s memory 
practices and their sense of self through time. Lawler points out that identities do not come pre-
packaged, but are rather continuously made and remade, woven with the mingled yarn of 
stories, meanings, and memories of the past. Emplotment therefore figures as a powerful 
conceptual framework, Lawler suggests, to understand how people remember the past and 
make sense of their memories in the present. In her work on processes of identity formation, 
Lawler examines ways in which people draw on memories of incidents and episodes that 
happened at various points in their lives in order to make sense of themselves. Crucially, these 
experiences may not be causally or ‘naturally’ connected, and in fact the efficacy of emplot-
ment does not depend on it. Rather, experiences, events, and memories are made connected, 
they are emplotted, synthesised in a narrative structure that provides people with a framework 
to make sense of themselves and their place in the world.  
Memories are particularly crucial in Lawler’s analysis. They provide the basis for an 
understanding of the self through time. As Lawler (2014, p. 29) suggests, memories are made 
to form part of a continuous narrative of interconnected episodes that give the impression that 
these incidents have ‘inevitably’ led individuals to where they are now. As such, we see that 
memories are heavily implicated in the narratives we produce and the causal inevitably that 
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accompanies them. As Lawler (2014, p. 26) argues, the relationship between processes of 
emplotment and sense making are imperative since it is ‘through the narratives themselves that 
we produce our identities in this way’ (original emphasis). Therefore, a sense of continuous 
self is ultimately a product of these recursive processes - of engaging with, interpreting, reinter-
preting, negotiating, and organising one's memories in relation to the narrative of one’s life. 
 Emplotment can also be seen as a crucial part and dynamic of the ‘memory work’ 
(Kuhn, 1995) people do when encountering the past. For Annette Kuhn, photographs are a 
powerful medium through which the past is made present, engendering various affective states, 
yet they are also imbued with politics and power.54 Moreover, she argues that any act of 
remembering or any encounter with the past through objects requires a form of ‘memory work,’ 
that is, ‘an active and directed work of memory’ (Kuhn, 1995, p. 3). Memory work is con-
ceptualised as a ‘form of inquiry’: ‘like detective work and archaeology’, it is ‘searching clues, 
deciphering signs and traces’ (p. 4). Kuhn’s notion of memory work can be brought into dia-
logue with Lawler’s understanding of emplotment, as both seek to examine how remembering 
is fundamentally active and investigative. As such, drawing on Lawler and Kuhn, remembering 
can entail interrogating and negotiating the objects through which memories are mediated, be 
it photographs, diaries, or Facebook posts. Emplotment means that memories often seem to 
configure ‘a self which appears as the inevitable outcome and actualization of the episodes 
which constitutes a life’ (Lawler, 2014, p. 29-30). Memory practices, conceptually informed 
by both Kuhn and Lawler, can be understood as performative, active, and interrogative; ways 
in which people weave narratives of self through the memories they encounter.  
Although both Lawler and Kuhn emphasise the active and performative qualities of 
memory, there is scope to use their frameworks to go beyond discussions of (analogue) 
photography to also investigate how contemporary algorithmic systems may be implicated in 
these processes of emplotment. Similar to what Lawler wrote about emplotment, algorithmic 
remembrance technologies can be seen to configure a wholistic self as an inevitable result of 
past memories (Jacobsen, 2020a). However, memory features such as Facebook Memories or 
Google Photos do not provide users with memories in the form of completely pre-packaged, 
fully realised, and easily discoverable autobiographies. Instead, these mediated memories have 
been variously emplotted, based on certain computational criteria as well as processes such as 
 
54 Kuhn (1995) argues that photographs, when deconstructed, often reveal how notions of gender are reified and 
perpetuated. bell hooks (1995) similarly argues that photographs have the potential to depict and perpetuate racial 
biases and prejudices in wider society, and therefore require an interrogating eye.  
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datafication, classification, and resurfacing. As such, the analysis in this chapter seeks to move 
towards a more socio-technical understanding of emplotment, as distributed amongst various 
human and nonhuman actors.  
This conceptual framing has implications for how to think about remembering and 
memory work, how people encounter and engage with mediated memories. When technologies 
such as Timehop or Apple Memories display certain images or posts to users (‘here is a memory 
from five years ago’), people engage with these ‘memories’ in various ways. During the 
interview period, participants discussed how these algorithmically resurfaced memories set the 
stage for remembering, prompting certain feelings from the past, instantiating certain acts of 
sense making in the present. In other cases, mediated memories would refer back to a time or 
an event that participants had forgotten and therefore needed to revisit and investigate. There 
were also cases where participants were faced with painful memories or memories that reflect 
a time or person that they no longer associated with. As a result, many of the participants I 
talked to not only sought to make sense of the memories themselves that were resurfaced, but 
they also sought to navigate and interrogate the technologies themselves as well as why some 
memories were resurfaced and not others. This means that the remembrance technologies 
themselves also figure in the ways participants seek to emplot their lives. In this chapter, the 
relationship between mediated memories, algorithms, and emplotment emerges as a set of 
complex and multifaceted processes, involving various active agents (human and nonhuman), 
memories, technologies, and forms of socialities. As a result, I examines three ways in which 
emplotment features in people’s uses and reactions, to algorithmic remembrance technologies; 
three ways in which people used these mnemonic encounters as a mode to emplot their lives. 
One of the main ways emplotment emerges as a visible process is through issues of manage-
ment. 
 
5.3 How Humans and Algorithms Weave Remembering 
5.3.1 ‘A little pre-emptive damage control’: Managing the Data Past 
As people’s data and their digital traces only increase over time, some of the interviewees 
worried about the repercussions of this development. In this section, I will discuss some ways 
in which interviewees sought to manage undesirable, uncertain, or fragmented aspects of their 
data past. In particular, I will discuss the use of deletion as well as the practices of what I call 
‘filling in the gaps’ and ‘putting the pieces together.’ As one of the interviewees, Imogen, 
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pointed out, ‘who knows what sort of old pictures you might have hidden away in the depths 
of your phone that you don’t necessarily pop up on an app five years later.’ Yet, being revisited 
by the algorithmically-resurfaced past was not solely a question of seeing surprising images, 
but also how to manage mediated memories that referred to painful events in the past, awkward 
images, content one no longer believes in, or something that simply does not make sense in the 
present. Emplotment, in this instance, refers to the different tactics used by the participants to 
manage the digital past, especially its more ‘undesirable’ aspects. As such, one salient aspect 
of algorithmic remembering and emplotment was how to manage the data past and certain 
mediated memories that resurfaced. 
 One way in which participants sought to manage the data past was through acts of 
deletion. For Francis, remembrance technologies such as Timehop were useful for what he 
calls ‘a little pre-emptive damage control.’ Their resurfacing mechanism allowed her to go 
back and ‘delete some of the more cringy things I might have put on social media or put out 
there.’ Still, this was merely ‘damage control in an innocuous sense’ as it chiefly related to 
corny jokes from high school. Similarly, Jack would only delete memories ‘for weeding out 
meaningless content that I don’t really need to see every year,’ whereas Oliver found memory 
features useful as a way to assess whether some resurfacing memories met a ‘certain threshold 
of stupidity,’ which meant he would ‘delete this so that I never have to encounter this tweet 
again.’ In the cases just mentioned, the use of deletion as management tool was understood 
more as an act of curating, organising, or simply tidying ones digital photo galleries, a form of 
‘weeding out.’  
However, there were also cases where people were faced with resurfacing memories that 
were less innocuous, so to speak. Miriam, for instance, stated that she would delete mediated 
memories if they no longer seemed ‘appropriate,’ including photos and posts she did not ‘agree 
with anymore.’ In these cases, deletion constituted a way to manage and tweak the past 
presentations of self, ensuring that such memories would not be resurfaced in the future. Oliver 
mentioned that he would similarly delete mediated memories that now seemed inappropriate 
and embarrassing. Yet, in his case, deletion figured less as a tool to ensure damage control and 
instead a way in which he could negotiate the meaning of the past in light of the present. In the 
interview, Oliver discussed how he, some years ago, had taken a ‘very short-sighted point of 
view’ when tweeting about a certain football team. As this tweet now resurfaced as a memory, 
it represented a disjoint between his past and present perceptions. As such, Oliver stated that 
‘I’m going to eliminate this’ since ‘I no longer believe that’s true anymore.’ This suggests that 
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deletion is not simply a technology of self in terms of self-presentations or image management; 
rather, it is a tool for reflection as well as a mechanism to ensure consistency. In other words, 
it is a way to hone past memories in order to construct a consistent story of the self, progressing 
through time. As certain mediated memories from the past no longer fit the trajectory of the 
self and where it is in the present, deletion comes to figure as a complex and intimate way of 
emplotting a present self by reasserting certain opinions or characteristics whilst discarding 
others.  
Acts of deletion were also deployed as a way to manage different or imagined audiences. 
This was echoed in the interview with Paul who stated:  
I actually deleted a few tweets just because we live in such a social media age. 
Anything you say can get you in trouble… In America there are people just 
bringing back tweets that people said or interviews. Anything you say can be 
held against you. I actually always believed that... tweets that I see now that I 
wrote 7 years ago, and I wouldn’t have noticed, and even last year that I thought 
were funny, at least now I’ll say, even though I think it’s funny it can definitely 
be misinterpreted and I delete them. I’ll go and find it and delete it. 
Paul highlighted the potential tensions or risks implicated in the resurfacing of past memories 
in the present. Some aspects of his data past, he suggests, pose a potential threat to his future 
prospects. This is a salient issue since every digital trace that is produced is archived and 
retained indefinitely in the current social media age. Paul’s dilemma suggests that mediated 
memories are not only memories to be enjoyed, recalled, and shared, but also constitute data 
that can be resurfaced and therefore become subject to misinterpretation. This sentiment was 
also echoed in the interview with Keith, who stated that he would only delete memories ‘if it’s 
something that I truly think could really hurt me going forward.’ As such, acts of deletion can 
figure as a way to eradicate the risks associated with certain aspects of the data past resurfacing 
in the present, a way to ensure that they are not misinterpreted in the present and in turn come 
to impinge on the future.    
For others, this relationship to imagined audiences was more complex or ambiguous. For 
Grace, for instance, her use of Twitter and Timehop had changed significantly over time. As 
she observes:  
When you think about it, what we do on social has really changed… I don’t have 
200 followers anymore; I have 14,000 followers. It makes space to really go 
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really go back and say, okay this is inappropriate for the audience I have now. I 
should delete this.  
This relationship between memories and evolving audiences demonstrates the ambiguities and 
fluidity inherent in acts of deletion. Grace suggests that things that may not have been offensive 
to 200 Twitter followers may come across as inappropriate to a group of 14,000. As such, 
deletion may constitute a strategic response to the meaning of changing audiences, assessing 
to what extent certain aspects of the past will be offensive to online audiences. As a mode of 
management, acts of deletion constitute highly reflexive ways of revisiting, assessing, negoti-
ating, and making sense of one’s data past. Deletion figures as a tool of managing online 
presentations of self as well as a tool of removing certain aspects of one’s data past deemed 
inappropriate. Overall, deletion constitutes a complex, contested yet intimate way to relate to 
one’s mediated memories whilst simultaneously making sense of oneself in the present.  
As we have just seen, deletion can be understood as a tactics of dealing with undesirable 
‘memories’ resurfacing on algorithmic remembrance technologies. Given the possibility that 
users’ data might not be fully deleted off social media platforms,55 deletion in this context can 
be understood as a way of rendering certain aspects of the past invisible, or at least to ensure 
that they do not resurface again at future points. However, many of the participants found the 
idea of deleting memories, or data points from their past, a problematic management tactic for 
various reasons. Many participants, therefore, found other ways to manage the aspects of their 
data past they found painful. For instance, Keith stated: 
The only time I ever delete photos is if it’s a blurry photo or a screenshot I don’t 
need anymore. I don’t like to delete anything, just because I have enough storage 
on my phone, through the cloud and all that crap, that I don’t need to. And every 
story has some sort of focus or point or story or something that when you delete 
a photo, whether or not it’s five photos in a row of the same thing, each one can 
evoke a different memory, can evoke a different feeling. Whereas I don’t want 
to lose that. That’s the whole point of taking photos is that you want to remember 
everything. 
For this participant, every digital photo was a potential conduit for a memory, and the idea of 
deletion was therefore seen as problematic. Deletion amounted to the loss of memories and 
 
55 When users ‘delete’ their data off of social media platforms or online databases, it does not necessarily mean 
that these are fully deleted. For more, see section called ‘Unlimited’ in chapter four as well as Hern (2019). 
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various feelings images could evoke. In his book How We Became Our Data, Colin Koopman 
(2019, p. viii) argues that the idea of deletion will occupy an increasingly contested and 
complex role as people are increasingly ‘swaddled in data.’ Contemporary life is constructed 
and construed through data, which means that data is intimately implicated in people’s notion 
of agency and personhood. In other words, data are intimate parts of who we are. It therefore 
follows, Koopman (2019, p. 4) suggests, that deletion comes to engender a kind of existential 
fear. As people increasingly make and are made up by data, the deletion of their personal data 
can come to be seen as a sort of violence, a tampering with the self, or even a removal of the 
self. Much research has already been done in how people’s data-led lives produces so-called 
‘data doubles’ (e.g. Ruckenstein, 2014; Lupton, 2012). It is crucial, however, that these doubles 
are not seen as somehow detached or external representations of already-holistic analogue 
selves. Rather, they suggest how data and selves are becoming increasingly interwoven and 
inextricable in daily life (Lupton, 2020). Deletion may not amount to an existential angst for 
Keith. He nonetheless expresses an explicit desire to not lose the memories and feelings that 
may be evoked by his digital images.  
The contested space deletion occupies also suggests, in this case, a problematisation of 
any clear ontological limits between mediated memories, data, and the self. This blurring of 
ontological boundaries is alluded to in the interview with Charlie, who stated:  
My photo gallery on my phone has actually been left intact for Timehop, and it 
has caused me a lot of problems because I have past relationship photos in there, 
and my girlfriend will say to me, like, why don’t you want to delete these? I have 
built the concept that if I eradicate these, I’m sort of eradicating the memories. 
Deletion, in this case, is no longer a question of simply honing or curating a certain presentation 
of self by discarding certain points such as images or posts. It amounts to the deletion of actual 
memories. Rather, it has become intimately entangled with issues of identity and memory, and 
any decision of what to delete and what to keep therefore becomes not only highly affective, 
but also becomes a complex negotiation and process of emplotment of one’s own sense of self. 
How to manage one’s data past, then, becomes a question of how to manage aspects of oneself 
or one’s narrative of self.   
 This connection between the tensions of deletion and a sense of self was more starkly 
suggested with other participants. Some interviewees did not want to delete anything because, 
as Becky put it, ‘bad memories make you who you are as much as good memories.’ Others, 
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such as Diana, did not want to be ‘too Eternal Sunshiny about it’ and have ‘a hand in creating 
a rosy past. That feels artificial in ways that makes me uncomfortable.’ Paul stated that he 
would not want to delete memories he was shown by algorithmic remembrance technologies 
because ‘I don’t want to lose my sense of humour.’ However, he also points out that whilst 
‘I’m funny and I’m weird and I’m different and I think that’s amazing,’ he is aware that some 
mediated memories, were they to resurface and become public again, ‘definitely can be 
misconstrued.’ For Paul, the question of what to delete and what to keep was not only a question 
of presentations or managing different imagined audiences; rather, it becomes intimately 
related to the question of identity and people’s individual personality, or in this case, his sense 
of humour. 
 Several participants also mentioned other ways in which they sought to manage the 
resurfacing of painful or awkward memories. For example, when shown certain memories from 
Facebook, Miriam responded that ‘I just try to scroll past it as fast as possible, because I’m like 
oh I don’t want to be reminded of that.’ Similarly, Oliver stated that in order not to relive certain 
a American presidential election again, ‘I just kind of opened it and clicked it a couple of times 
without looking till I looked through past 2016.’ This tactic of just tapping or scrolling through 
those painful reminders was also echoed in the interview with Diana, who stated that:  
There are times of year when I know that the vague tweedy thing that I said was 
referring to something that I prefer not to remember. There are times of the year 
– or if I see something and I’m like, oh I know what we’ve come up upon because 
it’s been years – I’ll give myself permission to tap very quickly through it and 
not engage with it, and just get to the end, and close the app and be done with it. 
For this participant, quickly tapping through the mediated memories that are resurfaced on the 
memory feature became her way of managing the more uncomfortable aspects of her data past. 
When asked if she still has emotional connections to these memory objects that she is reminded 
of, Diana responded: 
DIANA: Only choosing not to have an emotional connection that day. Not today, 
maybe next year I’ll reread this memory 
INTERVIEWER: Is there a particular reason for you maybe not to have an 
emotional connection to some of the photos? 
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DIANA: Yeah, I think it’s more just, okay I know what just happened. I will deal 
with this emotionally at the time and place of my choosing. It’s not today. But I 
also want that streak number, so I know what I have to do to get over it, to get to 
the end of this. I don’t know, there’s something kind of survivalist about it, not 
now, go away, delaying you for another year. I know that I won’t have to think 
about this for a year once the notification goes away. 
As this case shows, remembering with algorithms involves conscious decisions when to 
emotionally engage with certain memories. As such, there is a temporal dimension to these 
encounters with one’s data past. By delaying the memory, engaging with it ‘not today, maybe 
next year’, the participant can be more emotional prepared to ‘deal with this.’ More generally, 
this demonstrates the ways in which users are situated in relation to these algorithmic 
remembrance technologies, as active agents, utilising multiple tactics to manage and navigate 
the more uncomfortable mediated memories from the past. However, it also suggests how 
memory features are not passive conduits or archives for personal biographies, but are rather 
active agents themselves, curating and resurfacing certain memories at certain times. It can be 
argued that as people increasingly become their data, the role of deletion will occupy an even 
more contested and complex role in relation to digital memory practices. As such, the decision 
whether or not to delete resurfacing memories becomes intimately interwoven with how people 
manage, make sense of, and ultimately emplot the story of themselves through time.  
Another salient way in which the past is managed and made sense of is through filling in 
the gaps, so to speak. As people use algorithmic remembrance technologies, they are not only 
occasionally reminded of painful memories from the past but also memories that seem out of 
place, where the original context has been lost. As Lydia pointed out:  
Sometimes a few things will come up and I will look at it and think, what was 
that? There was no link… then you don’t know what the link is. Like yesterday 
it must have lots of them, because I was constantly going back to the links and 
reading the tweets. I think it was just I was having conversations with people and 
I was curious as to what started the conversation off. 
The seeming absence of ‘links’ suggests that algorithmic remembrance technologies do not 
resurface pre-packaged, coherent narratives, but often resurface decontextualised and even 
disjointed mediated memories. Emplotment, in this case, amounts to a reflexive process of 
linking, of joining tweets together, so as to produce meaningful coherence and meanings that 
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cohere. It corresponds to the management of voids and invisibilities, that which is not shown, 
said, or contextualised.    
The importance of context for remembering was also echoed in one of the focus groups, 
where members Brian, Daniel, and Anna discussed the idea of a relationship between con-
tinuance and remembrance technologies. The discussion is worth quoting at length: 
BRIAN: If you’re cued during conversation, that one then leads to something 
else; if you’re cued off a phone, you go oh look that’s interesting! I remember x 
y z and then it stops 
DANIEL: Exactly! 
BRIAN: There’s not a continuation of it, it’s very short, and I presume that’s 
why you have to do it often, because you get no chain. You don’t get the chain 
of thoughts and memories because it just dies itself down, because it’s not being 
reinforced by the other person 
ANNA: If Catherine and Daniel, for example, were having a conversation about 
some boat fishing out of Hull, they would already be thinking that part of their 
memory’s already being accessed, accessing memories on Hull and fishing, and 
then something crops up, so it’s already partially activated your memory in that 
area, so then you’ll tie in. Whereas if a boat just arrives out of the blue and you’re 
in the middle of the garden there’s no – 
BRIAN: The only time the chain can continue is if you then decide like oh that 
was Dave, I better email him and say ‘hello how are you doing.’ Then you might 
get the chain. There’s no chain just from a picture.  
Here, the continuance of memory is conceptualised as ‘a chain.’ That is, the extent and 
emotional depth of a (resurfacing) memory depends on its context or, more specifically, the 
position it occupies in the linearity of the chain of events. Later in the interview, some of the 
focus groups members further suggested that memories are shallower because algorithmic 
remembrance technologies only provide what they think is a memorable image and not the 
context around it. As such, the seeming disjoint between someone’s memory of the past and 
the mediated memories resurfaced by these features may generate tensions, especially when 
‘there’s no chain.’   
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The absence of a chain, of sufficient contextual information, implies the importance of 
processes of emplotment in weaving together disparate elements. Reacting to cases where there 
was a lack of context, Oliver stated:  
In the times that I do have a bunch of photos there, it is occasionally fascinating 
to be like, ‘oh what was I doing on this day? Oh right, that was my brother’s 
wedding.’ And that’s why there are 45 photos there, when the day before there 
were zero and the follow day there is probably going to be zero. If I see that there 
is a whole bulk of activity on a platform that I don’t usually have a bulk of 
activity, that’s a sign that I should be digging a little bit further to remind myself 
what was this. 
The absence of a chain, the insufficiency of contextual cues, and the absence of links - these 
necessitate greater involvement by the people using these memory technologies. As Oliver puts 
it, remembering with algorithmic systems requires ‘digging.’ Digging is understood here as a 
form of active contextualisation, a process akin to ‘linking’, as was discussed earlier. Still, how 
is this process of contextualisation, this ‘digging,’ actualised? This was well expressed in an 
interview with another participant, Keith, who stated: 
There are some days where I’ll see a status, I’ll see a photo in my library, and 
I’m just like ‘what the hell was I doing that day?’ I have to go down a rabbit hole 
almost to figure it out. I’ll go on Facebook; I’ll look who I tagged, and I’m just 
like trying to figure out why are we there? Eventually I’ll get to it. 
As Keith suggests, the process of making sense of mediated memories can be akin to going 
down ‘a rabbit hole.’ Digging can be seen as a process by which participants would revisit the 
original platform the mediated memory originated from, checking the tags, who tagged, when 
it was tagged, and so on. Thus, digging, or what Oliver later in the interview called ‘social 
media palaeontology’, becomes a way to fill in the gaps and make these memories intelligible 
and meaningful in the present. Here, engaging with algorithmic remembrance technologies 
becomes an active form of meaning making: a process of making sense of the resurfaced past. 
It showcases a way in which aspects of the digital past, insufficiently contextualised, come to 
matter in the present. However, this process of digging does not amount to an unearthing of a 
‘pure past,’ so to speak. As one Diana pointed out, ‘the story is a lot more complicated than 
that, but that requires a lot more digging and thought and memory, than the thing that I’m 
shown regularly.’ As such, making sense of these insufficiently contextualised memory objects 
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is akin to digging, a form of labour. That is, the process of emplotment is simultaneously a 
process of memory work.  
 Another way that participants managed and made sense of the digital past was to look 
at what was not shown, to attend to the voids or the gaps themselves. As Lydia states:  
If there’s very little coming up and I think, ‘I wonder what I was doing that I was 
so busy that I didn’t have time to be on here.’ So even if there’s nothing there, 
I’m thinking, ‘what was I doing?’ Then I look in my diaries, ‘yeah I was doing 
I was here, I was there, I was on holidays or something’... what was happening 
on that day? Was I somewhere where I couldn’t access it?... But if it is very very 
quiet, I am sort of curious and think, ‘what was I doing that I was busy that I had 
no time to do that? What engaged me?’ So yeah, I wonder why I’m not doing 
things on Twitter. 
Whereas earlier tensions arose from a lack of context surrounding certain memories, this 
participant points out the importance of examining the voids, so to speak, ‘why I’m not doing 
things on Twitter.’ Accessing remembrance technologies and not seeing anything on certain 
days made Lydia is curious as to what she was doing that made her too busy to take photos or 
post on social media. Similarly, Anna stated: 
When you go through Timehop, it’ll show single photos or it throw a series. It’s 
not unusual to come across in mine a series that says 63 photos. There will be 
1,2,3 63, 1,2,3, 40. So when I look at Timehop, I have a lot of photos… This last 
year I didn’t take very many photos, and it made me sad, because I thought next 
year there is going to be a hole in the series. And 2018 is going to be a big fat – 
I wasn’t feeling very feel, and I wasn’t taking photos. So Timehop made me 
aware that coming up there will be a space. 2018 was a year of depression, I 
wasn’t seeing, I wasn’t taking photos, nothing interested me. For me, it’s really 
been a useful tool of self-reflection, personal history. 
Paying attention to these 'spaces’ and reflecting over them made the participant aware of how 
her mental condition affected her use of social media and Timehop. In this case, the space both 
presupposed and revealed a narrative about the effects of depression: ‘I wasn’t taking photos, 
nothing interested me.’ As such, the emplotment of gaps and empty spaces, the things not 
shown on algorithmic remembrance technologies, emerge as a way to manage and make sense 
of the digital past. It showcases that these technologies can figure as ‘tools of self-reflection’ 
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where they can encourage one to think around the memories, to interrogate the offline con-
ditions for certain gaps, why one is not shown something. Overall, these examples demonstrate 
that emplotment is heavily implicated in the ways in which people variously manage their 
digital past. More specifically, in this case, it relates to the ways in which people manage the 
lack of context surrounding certain memories and the empty gaps, the things they are not shown 
and why. It suggests that engaging with and remembering through memory technologies 
constitutes active memory work. It suggests that people weave stories of themselves, drawing 
on memories that are resurfaced on remembrance technologies. But it also shows that 
coherence and meaningfulness are not a given, but rather are the result of active processes of 
emplotment. Thus, filling in the gaps is a way in which people manage, negotiate, and ulti-
mately make sense of the past in the present.  
If the issue in the last section was on too little data concerning their individual narratives, 
the issue here is what people do with disparate and dispersed past data or mediated memories 
as fragments. Here, emplotment also constitutes managing multiple platforms. Algorithmic 
remembrance technologies function in various ways even if there are substantial overlaps. One 
common feature is to resurface in the present particular images, posts, or data in general from 
a certain point in the past. However, whereas Facebook Memories and Apple Memories 
resurface data that has been produced exclusively on their platforms (e.g. Facebook Memories 
only resurfaces images or posts people have uploaded to Facebook at some point in the past), 
Timehop is, as Oliver described it, ‘platform agnostic.’ That is, one can choose how many 
platforms to incorporate into its functionality, whether that is Facebook, Snapchat, Instagram, 
iCloud, or Dropbox or all of them. This is not to prioritise one remembrance technology over 
another, but rather to highlight their differences, which in turn suggests both what they resur-
face and how they resurface varies from platform to platform.  
Discussing the memory feature Timehop in particular, I asked one of the participants, 
Beth, how she found Timehop in comparison with other remembrance technologies and she 
responded that: 
The major difference that I like is that it doesn’t just pull in Facebook, it pulls in 
Twitter and Instagram and other places as well. I think I’ve realised that, partly 
because of Timehop I think, I’ll talk about professional stuff that I’m doing on 
Twitter and more family and friends-oriented stuff that I’m doing on Facebook; 
and it’s an interesting split to see what I’ve shared in which places, and realise 
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that, you know, some things that are more work-related but that friends and 
family might also be interested in hearing about don’t always end up in both 
places. 
As Beth points out, using Timehop has made her aware of the differences in content from 
platforms such as Facebook and Twitter, to see ‘what I’ve shared in which places.’ Whereas 
she would post more ‘work-related’ things on Twitter, she would post more ‘family and 
friends-oriented stuff’ on Facebook, and this is reflected in mediated memories she is reminded 
of in the present. When asked how she finds being reminded of this seeming ‘mix’ of memories, 
Beth replied: 
I think it gives me a more wholistic picture of what the year has been or what the 
couple of years has been since then, right... There’s a something of a difference 
between remembering what you did last year in your personal life and 
remembering what you did last year in your work life, sometimes. So it’s been 
an interesting like wait, hang on, that happened around the same time as that did? 
Oh, I guess so! And so it’s a weird kind of ‘putting all the pieces together’ 
experience. 
Encountering resurfacing memories enables her to draw parallels between her work and private 
life, examining the past within this broader framework. Drawing on memories from these 
different platforms ultimately allows her a ‘a weird kind of ‘putting all the pieces together’ 
experience.’ Another participant, Donna, echoed something similar when stating that ‘there’s 
just many pieces and that’s just like me utilising different platforms to express different things 
and then Timehop pulling it all together.’ The notion of ‘putting the pieces together’ suggests 
that remembering with algorithmic systems can be a fragmentary experience, and thus requires 
work. It requires not only digging, but the pulling together of disparate pieces from multiple 
sources and platforms. 
Through these examples, remembering with algorithms can be seen as platform 
dependent. In other words, using algorithmic remembrance technologies entails drawing on 
memories that are platform specific. As such, one could argue with Pierre Nora (1989) that 
social media platforms are ontologically akin to what he calls ‘sites of memory’ (lieux de 
mémoire). He argues that such sites of memory originate where there ‘is no spontaneous 
memory, that we must deliberately create archives, maintain anniversaries, organize cele-
brations, pronounce eulogies, and notarize bills because such activities no longer occur 
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naturally’ (1989, p. 12). Nora argues that as memory is increasingly divorced from socio-
collective groups, it instead ‘crystallizes and secretes itself’ into material, symbolic, and 
functional sites such as ‘museums, archives, cemeteries, festivals, anniversaries, treaties, 
depositions, monuments, sanctuaries, fraternal orders’ (p. 12). In essence, ‘memory attaches 
itself to sites’ (p. 21).  
In today’s media- and data-intensive society, there is scope to argue that (social media) 
platforms are material, symbolic, and functional sites of memory: people do indeed remember 
through and because of them. Yet, this is only a partial argument. In a sense, it is too general. 
These are heterogeneous platforms that people use in different ways and for different purposes. 
Platforms also have different underlying logics as well (van Dijck and Poell, 2013). It therefore 
stands that the mediated memories that these platforms resurface will reflect this heterogeneity. 
As a result, there is a need to think of and conceptualise algorithmic remembrance technologies 
not simply as sites of memory, but as sites of particular kinds of memory. The memories these 
resurface are variegated and reflect how people use various technologies and platforms. This 
suggests how people ‘live,’ so to speak, differently on different platforms, which in turn affects 
everyday memory practices.   
In the context of emplotment as a form of management, it suggests, metaphorically 
speaking, how people use various kinds of yarn from the past to weave a story of themselves 
in the present. In other words, people emplot wholistic stories about themselves, drawing on 
and piecing together memories from different places, whether that is Facebook Memories, 
Snapchat, or Timehop. Emplotting, therefore, or remembering with memory technologies, 
entails not only managing painful memories nor digital memory objects with insufficient 
context; neither does it only suggest how people manage those gaps when nothing resurfaces, 
how they fill those spaces. It also entails managing different platforms and different kinds of 
memory. It entails putting the pieces together, drawing from various platforms and memory 
features to weave a ‘more wholistic picture’ of one’s self, and thus emplotting a narrative about 
the self in the present that is both meaningful and significant.  
 
5.3.2 ‘Keeping the past alive’: Connecting with Others Through Sharing 
It is crucial to acknowledge that any form of memory making, any mode of remembering and 
engaging with the past, involves other people. Memory practices are emphatically social 
practices. Practices of remembering and negotiating the past are embedded in various networks, 
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groups, and relationships, and this was also reflected in how people used memory apps and 
platforms. As such, encountering mediated memories through algorithmic remembrance tech-
nologies does not only engender issues of management; it also encompasses social practices 
and various ‘networked socialities’ (Baym, 2010; Hoskins, 2018), that is, connections, 
communities, relations. In this section, I want to examine in more detail three ways in which 
sharing can be seen as a central aspect of people’s memory practices as well as those processes 
of emplotment through which people, drawing on the data past, weave narratives of themselves 
and others. I have chosen to call these: reaching out, building community, and re-membering 
identities.  
As Steph Lawler (2014) suggested, emplotment is always already a social process of 
identity formation. Emplotment involves drawing on not just memories from one’s own past, 
but also various shared digital pasts as well as already established social cues, images, and 
metaphors. Moreover, processes of emplotment involve working on past memories in the 
present. It is way of rendering the (social) present meaningful. One way in which emplotment 
can be seen as intimately connected to notions of sharing is through people ‘reaching out’ to 
others as a result of the resurfacing of mediated memories.  One participant, Jack, stated:  
One thing that I enjoy seeing is some past interactions with people maybe I don’t 
have contact with, and it’ll kind of remind me, ‘I kind want to reach out to that 
person, see how they’re doing, it’s been a while,’ that kind of thing.  
This was also echoed by Keith, who noted that memory features such as Facebook Memories 
were a ‘kind of a tool to keep me engaged with old friends.’ As we see here, algorithmic 
remembrance technologies feature as tools of connectivity (van Dijck, 2013), that is, ways of 
connecting with people in the present. The connection between sharing and emplotment also 
highlights how memory practices entail a ‘working on the present’ (Bowker, 2008), weaving a 
story involving, amongst other, ‘old friends.’ Sharing mediated memories and ‘reaching out’ 
becomes a form of communication, a sort of communicative act, an effort to maintain certain 
relationships in the present. 
 For Anna, the use of algorithmic remembrance technologies such as Timehop was 
closely related with the idea of reconciliation. As she states:  
In a few instances I have sent Timehop pictures, the ability to share them is sort 
of reconciliation: whether we have active relationships right now or not. I 
treasure the memories, I treasure those times, so I place high value on relation-
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ships and expressing gratitude and appreciation. So through this means of using 
of photo to say, ‘Hey didn’t we have a good time’… So as to the definition of 
reconciliation and establishing relationships, Timehop has been really useful to 
find, remember, and reshare. It has kept the past alive, so to speak. It uses the 
photos we are so busy taking in a positive way. 
Here, practices of sharing mediated memories is implicated in efforts to maintain and care for 
past relationships as well as ‘keeping the past alive.’ Moreover, the suggestion is that as algo-
rithmic remembrance technologies repeatedly resurface memories, these mediated memories 
can be used as a way to reconcile with people from one’s past. It is a means of reconciling past 
relationships, a means of weaving together social networks. Remembering with algorithms is 
always already remembering with and through others.   
 Sharing practices also facilitate the reciprocal exchange of mediated memories. When 
I asked whether he ever shares memories that he has been reminded of on Timehop, one of the 
participants, Francis, replied: 
I have another friend who uses Timehop every day, and sometimes our memories 
will intersect, because we would always hang out through our high school. Even 
though we went away to college now, we still maintain a really close friendship. 
But he’ll text me a photo when maybe I hadn’t gone on Timehop myself that 
day, and I’ll wake up with the daily reminder to use Timehop, and then a message 
from him, something that he pulled from his own Timehop. So it kind of lets us 
reconnect over these memories that we both share during our social media 
experience and that we share again with each other. 
As is suggested here, the effectiveness of memory features is predicated first and foremost on 
how the present has been captured. Francis and his friend both use Timehop routinely, which 
engenders the potential for their mediated memories to intersect. These mnemonic inter-
sections, where both are separately reminded of the same mediated memories, provided a space 
to ‘reconnect over these memories’ and to maintain their friendship. Conceptually speaking, 
this form of reaching out – that is, continually sharing and resharing memories from the past - 
can be understood as, what Blakely and Moles (2019) call, a ‘system of reciprocity.’ Drawing 
on Mauss’ concept of ‘gift,’ Blakely and Moles explore how people share narratives and 
material artefacts with and within their wider socio-cultural community. The sharing of 
material artefacts produce, they argue, wider ‘systems of reciprocity’ (p. 1) where mediated 
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memories are routinely exchanged, which in turn assigns value to both the memories them-
selves and the relationships underlying these reciprocal systems.  
Similarly, using algorithmic memory features to share resurfacing memories, to reach 
out, can be understood as facilitating such a system of reciprocity. The sharing of mediated 
memories allows for the continual exchange of the past, which in turn may produce mnemonic 
intersections, as well as help to establish and perpetuate networked socialities. ‘Reaching out,’ 
as a modality of sharing practices, can thus be seen to be implicated in the ways the participants 
emplot their lives. It refers to how people not only negotiate their own past but also the various 
ways in which people chose to populate their past and may still populate their present. Sharing 
mediated memories and establishing reciprocal systems figure as a way to emplot one’s story 
of the past in the present, negotiating one’s position in relation to others, reconciling oneself 
with others, staying in touch. Sharing memories can be seen to engender minor systems of 
reciprocity where value is assigned to both the act of sharing memories but also to the relation-
ships underpinning it.  
In the section above, algorithmic remembrance technologies were used as a means of 
‘reaching out’ or deepening existing social relationships. The connection between emplotment 
and sharing, however, could also be seen through the various socio-technical communities that 
are engendered through remembering with algorithms. One of the interviewees, Nicole, talked 
about the way memory features, and Timehop in particular, were an effective connective tool 
in relation to social media group chats. As she explains at length:  
It’s one of the ways that I will start convos in a group chat that I have with some 
of my girlfriends. We have been in some version of a group chat for the last ten 
years. Over that time, our lives have gone in very different directions. Some are 
parents, some are married, some are divorced. A lot of these memories give us 
something to look back on really fondly, and we can ask that question of like, 
‘when we were this age we were doing this, would you let your kid do x? Would 
you feel comfortable doing this? Can you imagine what it would be like to be 
that age in this time and have all of these things available to you, what do you 
think that would feel like?’... It’s definitely a window into some conversations 
with other people either to say, ‘oh wow look how far we’ve come or how things 
are still the same.’ 
 
156 
Using Timehop figured as a useful social tool, for Nicole, a ‘window into some conversations 
with other people,’ and a way to relive and re-appreciate the conversations she and her friends 
have had over the years in their group chat. But moreover, seeing such memories resurface 
affords the maintenance of that group of friends she has had over the course of ten years. Grace 
mentioned something similar with regards to friendship groups on social media:  
From a lot of times in group chats, someone else will be going through Timehop 
and they’ll drop a memory in there, and it allows us to bond all over again over 
this moment that happened a year ago, two three years ago. And it takes us right 
back and reminds you why people are in your life, and it helps to secure those 
connections. 
Using remembrance technologies provided Grace and her friends with the mnemonic means to 
‘allow us to bond all over again.’ As Grace puts it later in the interview:  
At one point in time, I would go through my old Twitter Timehop memories and 
reshare. And then it became, on the Timeline, a kind of like community, looking 
back together, and I was like, ‘oh my gosh that was so funny!’ 
Sharing mediated memories, therefore, highlights the collective aspect inherent in algorithmic 
remembrance, as well as emphasising the social attachments that are strengthened as a result 
of sharing mediated memories. Sharing figures as that which affords the possibility of ‘a kind 
of like community.’ In short, it builds and maintains (digital) communities of people. 
 Yet, there were also participants who talked about what happens where the sharing of 
memories is not reciprocated. As Lydia stated in her interview, when asked whether she shares 
memories and whether these memories get much engagement from others, ‘No, that doesn’t 
tend to happen. I will share tweets from the Timehop app but it gets no response at all.’ As 
such, Lydia states that Timehop ‘it’s more for personal use.’ Connectivity and sharing is an 
underlying logic of memory technologies, which means that it may create tensions and disap-
pointments when shared memories are not reciprocated.  
 Seeing resurfacing memories on algorithmic remembrance technologies, as these 
examples suggest, can also become a way for users to emplot other people into the narratives 
of their own lives, and to strengthen and maintain the manifold narratives they are already 
implicated in. As Grace puts it, encountering algorithmically resurfacing memories reminds 
her ‘why people are in your life.’ This echoes some of the claims made by Maurice Halbwachs 
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about the nature of collective memory. ‘We preserve memories of each epoch in our lives,’ 
Halbwachs ([1952]1992, p. 47) stated, ‘and these are continually reproduced; through them, as 
by a continual relationship, a sense of our identity is perpetuated.’ The sharing element of using 
algorithmic remembrance technologies demonstrates not only its role in building communities 
and networks; it also highlights how all attempts at making sense of people’s personal 
narratives always already involves other people. By engaging with and making sense of their 
past memories being resurfaced, people are simultaneously emplotting and weaving their 
relationships with other people – as, indeed, they are being emplotted and woven by others in 
return.  
 However, some participants acknowledged the fact that relying too heavily on remem-
brance technologies to experience and remember the past runs the risk of insularity. As Oliver 
explains:  
There are definitely times when it’s nice to be able to go back and say, ‘oh hey, 
this is the way that I remember doing x and this is what it reminds me of.’ But 
there are definitely times where my experience of an event was either limited or 
was less than positive, and there are times where I would wish that somebody, 
who had a different or better experience of that event, were the one reminding 
me of it, so that I might get more rose-coloured glasses on the recollection, rather 
than the brown ones that I am currently wearing. 
As he points out, remembering with algorithms, through memory features and platforms, runs 
the risk of providing a ‘limited’ and therefore ‘less than positive’ lens on some past experiences. 
Oliver suggests that these potential negative experiences do not necessarily reflect the event or 
experience itself, but rather indicates that memory features, by focusing heavily on the indi-
vidual user and his/her own past data, can provide a seemingly narrow perspective on the past. 
Oliver found that the best way to obtain such ‘rose-coloured glasses’ was through sharing his 
mediated memories on social media such as Twitter. As he stated: 
If I do go back and share something that was my recollection of an event, I’m 
doing it because I’m hoping that the other people, who I am connected to on 
social media who were a part of that event, or who remembered me being there, 
will then tag on their own recollections of it. 
When I asked Oliver if this was a way ‘of building on to your own memory,’ he replied ‘A bit, 
yeah. It gives people a little bit of that opportunity, that soapbox on which they can explain and 
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share what they were thinking about and feeling at that time.’ As Oliver points out, sharing 
those memories he has been reminded of on memory features constitutes a means by which 
other people can ‘tag on their own recollections of it’, thus skewing the memory in a positive 
direction. On one level, this raises the question of even if the algorithmically resurfaced 
memories may be accurate to the individual, it may not be helpful. Indeed, there is a suggestion 
here that a ‘skewed’ perspective of the past is needed in some cases in order to obtain more 
‘rose-coloured glasses’ of the past. It also suggests that we need to critically examine what is 
meant by ‘sociality’ in an age of algorithmic remembrance technologies. Although Oliver 
suggests there is a need for other people’s perspectives to combat potentially insular viewpoints 
of the past, there is a need to interrogate what kind of communities algorithmic remembering 
is engendering and how these differ to those communities described by Halbwachs.  
Through these examples, one gets a snapshot of some of the dynamics of collective 
remembering in a social media context: when memories are shared, they are engaged with by 
others who attach their own remembrance and experience to them. Memories, therefore, are 
extended, enriched, and even skewed in a social context, made to fit certain narratives, 
becoming both something more than and something different than it was before. Through this, 
Oliver states, people are provided with a ‘soapbox,’ an opportunity to share their version, so to 
speak, of a past event. As such, sharing memories can be seen as one of the mechanisms of 
emplotment, since it not only maintains and develops existing communities but has the poten-
tial to give rise to new ones. People can bond and develop relationship over the remembering 
of certain past events shared in the present.  
These different aspects of sharing mediated memories cement the social processes under-
lying emplotment. Moreover, I want to highlight how the sharing of mediated memories can 
be seen to affect and shape people’s identities. In one of the interviews, Sarah talked at length 
about her relationship with her sons and how they all use memory features such as Facebook 
Memories and Timehop. Given the fact that Sarah’s youngest son was 14 years old, and been 
using Timehop in particular daily for two years, provided rich discussion about the family 
dynamics of remembering with algorithmic remembrance technologies. Sarah pointed out that 
the importance of her family for her own use of Facebook Memories: 
I started using Facebook when I was pregnant with my second son. So 2008, and 
I have always posted their funny quotes. That has been one of the things that I’ve 
done a lot, and it’s always fun to get those served back to me on a regular basis 
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so I can remember the funny things that they say. You know, that’s one of the 
number one pieces of advice that people give you is write down what your kids 
say because you’ll forget it. I just chose to do that on Facebook, for the most 
part, and so it’s really great to have a way for those to come back and be 
reminded of them. 
As I have reiterated elsewhere in this chapter, memory features are often used as a means to 
‘be served’ on a regular basis with one’s past, with data one has captured and documented, 
repackaged for present consumption. Sarah also points out that being a mother with young 
children became a motivation for her to capture everything they say. Here, the capture of the 
present and the sharing of mediated memories can be seen as an outgrowing of motivations 
such as familial relationships. But as she also points out later on in the interview, the dynamics 
of having a family and using memory features did not simply encourage her to capture and 
document their shared present moments. Instead, she felt a seeming obligation to share these 
memories back with her sons. This led to an interesting and rich discussion, which I have 
consequently chosen to quote in full: 
SARAH: I think that at the point that my oldest son got an Instagram account, I 
started to see the moments as things that I could share back with him. When I 
was able to start, I love that it’s something I originally posted it on Facebook but 
I can share it as a memory and post it on Instagram… It became this way for me 
to share with him the funny things that he had said. I actually think that the way 
that I have shared their funny quotes has shaped part of them seeing themselves 
as funny human beings 
INTERVIEWER: In what way sorry? 
SARAH: Yeah, because I think being able to capture what was funny about it. 
My husband is really funny too, and so they have this natural ability to say funny 
things, sometimes intentional, sometimes not intentional. And I think I have this 
really good ability to capture it in a way that is really succinct and gets at that 
heart of the moment. They can see it in written form what that funny moment 
looks like. They laugh when they see it fed back to them. I hear all the time when 
I talk to people who are connected to me on social, ‘oh your boys are so funny!’ 
I think it has created part of their identity as being funny 
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INTERVIEWER: By constantly being able to see like oh you have been funny 
and capturing that almost reinforces that? 
SARAH: Yes  
Sarah’s penchant for sharing memories from Facebook with her sons is predicated on a two-
pronged mode of perception: firstly, she started seeing present moments as ‘things’ to be 
shared, and secondly, she saw her past data on social media as a ‘memory’ to be shared with 
her sons and the wider community. Based on this observation, and taken more theoretically, 
Nathan Jurgenson’s (2019) notion of ’documentary vision’ is not simply a uniform mode of 
perception; rather, it is multi layered, referring to a mode of perception where multiple 
meanings coinhabit and converge. Sharing mediated memories can also be seen here as a mode 
of assigning and continually recognising certain relationships and social structures. Moreover, 
Sarah suggests that her memory sharing habits have helped shaped the way her sons understand 
and see themselves. Sharing mediated memories, in this instance, can be seen as a way to 
emplot or weave a narrative of self, but not necessarily one’s own narrative. As this case 
suggests, the sharing of memories with others helps weave multiple stories. On one level, Sarah 
seeks to weave or emplot ‘they are funny’ into the narrative of her son’s identities for their own 
sake. One another level, it also helps weave a wider narrative of her family (‘my husband is 
really funny too’), which in turn can be validated and recognised by the wider community (‘oh 
your boys are so funny’).  
As such, it is reasonable to suggest that the emplotment of individual narratives is not 
an isolated process, involving only the remembering human and technical agents. Sharing 
memories with others becomes a means to, as it were, re-member: shape, reconstruct, and 
reassemble identities and how people see themselves. In the case of Sarah, sharing mediated 
memories is a way through which to re-member her son’s view of themselves, a view which 
parallels their father’s personality. This form of re-membering also requires a form of 
witnessing and recognition, as people Sarah is connected to can say ‘oh your boys are so 
funny!’. As such, emplotment, the weaving of narratives through memories, affords the 
reconstruction and shaping of identities. An understanding of the significance of sharing 
mediated memories helps to demonstrate the ways people draw on the algorithmically resur-
faced past to emplot a multiplicity of overlapping narratives: of identities, of social attach-




5.3.3 ‘I know that it’s going to surprise me’: Anticipating the Memory 
Another salient feature of remembering with algorithms, participants suggested, was the 
affective states that memory features, apps, and platforms engendered. People stated that one 
of the main reasons for using technologies such as Apple Memories and Timehop was for ways 
these technologies made them feel on a continual basis. People, however, not only used 
memory features because it made them feel good about the past; participants mentioned how 
they drew on and sought to make sense of what Kathryn Stewart (2007) calls ‘ordinary affects’ 
such as joy, surprise, or comfort in order to negotiate and weave narratives of self and others.  
Yet, what was particularly striking was not only these ordinary affects themselves but 
how exactly these were engendered in users. Often, they were not randomly felt by users, but 
rather anticipated. More specifically, users would position themselves in such a way, in antici-
pation of the memory, in anticipation of being affected by the memory features. This I call 
‘anticipatory positioning’, and it was a crucial practice by which the data past was felt, 
negotiated, and emplotted in people’s everyday lives. More specifically, the notion refers to 
users positioning themselves in such a way, in relation to the technology, that these affective 
encounters between the data past and the present became possible and meaningful. For, ‘it is 
the way in which the body sits in space that allows signification to be grasped’ (Gill quoted in 
Thrift, 2000, p. 46-47). Participants often mentioned how they put themselves in the way of 
the memory feature, in order for the feature to resurface memories and remind them of 
increments of their data past. Many suggested that they would position themselves in relation 
to algorithmic remembrance technologies because they anticipated seeing mediated memories 
resurface. In other words, users were in anticipation of a variety of affects – of being surprised, 
of being moved – rather than actively seeking to dig through their digital memory archives. As 
the interviews pointed out, anticipatory positioning also figured as a crucial aspect of 
emplotment as well as remembering with algorithms. In this section, I look at particular 
instances where the anticipatory positioning of interviewees using memory technologies 
becomes salient: then-and-now moments, surprise encounters with the past, ‘big’ and ‘small’ 
memories, and comforts and discomforts. 
One aspect through which the relationship between emplotment and anticipatory 
positioning could be seen was through the ’then and now’ perspective that algorithmic remem-
brance technologies afforded users. This may not be surprising, however, considering that 
algorithmic remembrance technologies such as Facebook Memories and Apple Memories are 
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essentially mechanisms for collating and resurfacing past content to a (social media) user. The 
past content or ‘memories’, as they are also called, are resurfaced typically on their annual 
anniversaries, with taglines such as ‘Here’s a memory from 5 years ago.’. As Francis noted, 
‘it’s a comprehensive look back at your social media personality’ and an insight into ‘specific 
snapshots from different increments of time.’ As such, the main thrust of algorithmic remem-
brance technologies therefore remains this backwards glance at particular increments of time 
in the past, drawing on data and content such as Twitter and Facebook posts, images stored on 
a user’s smartphone or those uploaded to Instagram, Snaps saved unto to Snapchat Memories, 
and so on.  
For some participants, it was fun and sometimes embarrassing to see an image pop up 
from years ago where the hair style was different or where one was skinnier. Miriam even said 
that seeing such memories resurface ‘definitely makes you feel older.’ Generally speaking, 
algorithmically resurfacing memories becomes something ‘we encounter, that hits us’ some-
thing that produces emotional responses in us (Bennett, 2001, p. 4). In her book The Enchant-
ment of Modern Life, Jane Bennett (2001) explores mundane affects and ‘the wonders of minor 
experiences’ through the notion of enchantment, that is the various affective states that are 
produced in the encounters between humans and other (nonhuman) beings. In this context, it 
is important to attend to these algorithmic encounters as enchanting states, because it provides 
a better understanding of the affective, intimate, and embodied dimensions of everyday memo-
ry practices as well as remembering with algorithmic memory features. Stewart’s (2007) notion 
of ‘ordinary affects’ relates to Bennett here, and both are crucial for understanding the encoun-
ters between humans and other (nonhuman) beings and the various affects these may engender.  
 Enchantment, for Bennett, is not only something people encounter passively, but an 
‘active engagement with objects of sensuous experiences’ (Bennett, 2001, p. 5). This active 
engagement Bennett calls ‘comportment.’ By this she means that a state of enchantment is not 
only given, but can be achieved through people positioning themselves in such a way that 
renders them susceptible to enchantment. In other words, a state of enchantment is achieved 
through a specific posture, an active positioning of oneself. In Bennett’s view, positioning is 
conceptualised as a form of practice, a form of actively engaging with objects and processes. 
This understanding also underlies what is meant by anticipatory positioning. It is an active 
engagement with algorithmic remembrance technologies, a way in which users position 
themselves in relation to memory features that renders them susceptible to the mediated 
memories these resurface, thus engendering affective states. In other words, ‘using’ memory 
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features, apps, and platforms often becomes equivalent to putting oneself in a position of being 
affected by algorithmically resurfacing memories. In the context of these algorithmic 
technologies, anticipation, positioning, and practice are intimately interwoven.  
What are some of the outcomes, then, of this anticipatory positioning? For many partici-
pants, for example, encountering the algorithmically resurfacing past was a helpful tool as the 
memories documented growth and change over time. As Oliver suggests, using memory 
features such as Facebook Memories constituted a ‘self-contained measure of growth.’ It 
measures change and how interactions with other people have changed ‘commensurate with 
that.’ ‘It’s reassuring to see how I have grown,’ Grace puts it, ‘but it’s also a reminder that like 
yikes I used to be this person (laughter).’ Remembering with algorithmic remembrance 
technologies, Grace suggests, affords a mix of emotional responses as the various increments 
of the past resurface in the past. It can be both reassuring and embarrassing.  
Grace also mentions that using memory features can be both a measure of growth, but 
also a ‘time and space to reflect’ over these digital increments time that are being algorith-
mically resurfaced. Rather than a disinterested record of the past, some participants also hinted 
at the active engagement with these resurfacing memories. As Quentin states, ‘I don’t want to 
say I feel smarter from it, but I feel like I know myself better after I use it.’ This ‘then and now’ 
perspective taps into notions of self-knowledge and getting to know oneself better through 
seeing mediated memories from various increments of time in the past. One participant, Jack, 
even described the use of such memory apps as a form of ‘self-check-up,’ a way to see that 
‘hopefully I have improved as a human being.’ As such, using memory apps was understood 
to have a certain pedagogical value, a means to learn and to know oneself better, a sort of 
ethical stance towards oneself. Memory features, one can also argue, constitute what Jane 
Bennett (2001) calls ‘sites of enchantment’, a space where users can encounter mediated 
memories being algorithmically resurfaced, a space where affective states are engendered and 
where people can actively engage with their past and weave narratives of self and others.   
However, some participants also pointed out that the pedagogical value of resurfacing 
memories depends how far back in the past the memories reach. After asking whether she feels 
more emotional invested in the more recent memories rather than the early ones, Diana 
responded:  
Yeah. They’re fresher, I guess, because I haven’t thought about them, but also 
because they were closer in the past. Whereas I have thought a lot about the more 
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distant past… I feel like there’s less to learn at least from what Timehop shows 
me. 
As Diana points out, the usefulness of remembrance technologies such as Timehop depends on 
how ‘fresh’ a certain memory is. For this interviewee, notions of distance and proximity matter. 
The extent to which one can learn from the past is predicated on its distance from the present. 
For Diana, there was ‘less of an emotional connection’ to the more distant past, because it had 
already been emotionally processed. 56 Conversely, the pedagogical value of remembering, 
Diana states, was based on memories that ‘were closer in the past’ and therefore she hadn’t 
‘thought’ about them.’ The enchanting quality of seeing memories resurfacing depends here 
on a variety of factors such as proximity, distance, and emotional investment. These algo-
rithmic remembrance technologies can therefore only provide users with isolated, resurfacing 
memories, fragmentary threads and affects through which users must weave stories of how 
they have developed and progressed. Users drew on these memories, ‘then and now’ perspec-
tives, and affective states in order to learn about themselves as well as to make sense of their 
progression and growth through time. 
Another prominent way emplotment can be understood as a form of anticipatory 
positioning is through everyday encounters with what some participants perceived to be 
difference between ‘big’ and ‘small’ mediated memories. Encountering and navigating an 
apparent mix of memories, what Francis called a ‘comprehensive look back’ at one’s data past, 
was a common experiential aspect of remembering with memory apps amongst my interview 
and focus group participants. For example, memory apps were commonly said to be used for 
reliving and appreciating the big milestones. Describing her use of Timehop since becoming a 
mother, Imogen stated:  
My daughter is two and a half. It’s like one of my favourite things every day to 
look and see, like, ‘oh my gosh, look at her two years ago, look how tiny she 
was, look at what she was doing’... What I like about it is just being able to watch 
my daughter grow and have those constant reminders every day, the big mile-
stones in her life that sometimes maybe you forget about. 
As Imogen points out, her memory app usage has been dominated with memories from her 
daughter’s life. The emotional connection to the past and to the remembrance technology itself, 
 
56 This question of distance and proximity raises an interesting, and probably impossible, question: what is the 
threshold? When do memories become distant and when do they remain ‘fresh’ and ‘closer in the past’? 
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she suggests, has changed following the birth of her daughter. Whereas as she now tends to 
scroll through work-related memories ‘a lot more quickly,’ her daily use of Timehop has 
become ‘more emotional for me in a kind of positive way,’ seeing her daughter’s transition and 
growth through time. 
 Yet, algorithmic remembrance technologies such as Timehop and Facebook Memories 
are mechanisms for resurfacing a wide variety of past content and not just big milestones. When 
I asked Oliver what he thought about being reminded of this seeming ‘mix of memories’ on 
Facebook Memories, he responded: 
I think it’s helpful. I think if it were just major things that I’ve posted over the 
years I think that a) there would be a lot less to look through. There would be 
days where just nothing major happened. It was only the mundane. And I think 
it also could become overwhelming. If you only have major things to sort 
through you don’t have that palate cleanser of, ‘oh yeah, here is this time I 
tweeted about another team’s crazy acquisition.’ I don’t need to be inundated 
with the intense. It’s helpful to have the mundane as the palate cleanser. And 
oftentimes some the conversations I have with people, that are most entertaining 
to relive a year later, are the ones that sprung out of the mundane rather than the 
intense. 
As Oliver points out, the enjoyment of using memory apps would be affected if only the ‘major 
things’ were resurfaced. For Oliver, there is therefore a link between the enjoyment of using 
memory apps and the accumulation of content being resurfaced. In short, the enchanting 
qualities of algorithmic remembrance technologies is predicated, at least in part, on how much 
is resurfaced and not only what is shown. He also suggests that being reminded of more 
mundane images and posts from the past functions a ‘palate cleanser,’ which helps downplay 
the intensities of some of the major things, so one is not ‘inundated with the intense.’ As such, 
some of ways in which algorithmic remembrance technologies are used and anticipated in 
everyday life resides not in the big milestones, but also in those mundane moments – in those 
moments described by Paul as ‘little gems that can make you very happy.’  
 One participant, Diana, also pointed out that being reminded of ‘smaller’ memories, 
such as mundane moments aspects of her data past, helped put the bigger milestones such as 
‘jobs and relationships and apartments’ in perspective. The emotional value of this kind of 
perspective is not necessarily the same that was discussed in the ‘then and now’ section above. 
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Instead, Diana talks about the value of being shown the ‘continuity of smaller things.’ What 
does she mean by this? Later in the interview, she stated: 
In a short-term way, it’s actually been more interesting and more, for me, 
beneficial to see what I’ve was doing 2 years ago as a way of creating a sense of 
the past where a lot of things in my life haven’t change in the past 4 years. I have 
been in the same job, I’ve been in the same apartment, a lot of things have been 
the same. It’s a cool daily low-lift way of showing the dynamics of all that time, 
provides a smallish way of being, ‘oh year ago today I was flying to New 
Zealand.’ That’s so interesting, that would not have occurred to me. The smaller 
forms of backwards reflections have come to be more useful and more beneficial 
to me than the really heavy-lifting stuff of what I did when I was in my early 
twenties. 
Being encountered with the data past through algorithmic remembrance technologies affords 
not only glimpses into big milestones or dramatically different ‘then and now’ moments. As 
Diana points out, seeing the mundane aspects of the past resurface provides her ‘smaller forms 
of backwards reflections.’ The value of this form of remembering resides in getting a ‘sense of 
the past’ where most of life has remained the same over the years. This was also echoed by 
Nicole, who stated that memory apps allowed her to say:  
Let’s see what you were up to, let’s see how much you’ve grown as a person, 
but also let’s see how you’ve stayed the same, your coffee order is the same and 
it has been since 2008 and that’s cool.  
As a result, both ‘big’ and ‘small’ memories featured in the ways people made sense of their 
own progression through time, to make sense of the various ‘dynamics of all that time,’ as 
Diana put it. As people used memory features, they expected to encounter both ‘big’ and 
‘small’ memories from their data past. One could argue that part of the emplotment value of 
these remembrance technologies resides in the way they both resurface a mix of memories, 
milestones as well as continuity and consistency – what Diana aptly calls a ‘smallish way’ of 
remembering the past. This mix of memories provides materials for more nuanced and textured 
narratives of self.  
Another prominent way emplotment relates to affective states and anticipatory 
positioning is through surprise encounters. As algorithmic remembrance technologies resurface 
a wide variety of past content to users, it is inevitable that some of these mediated memories 
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they present may surprise and strike, evoking feelings and moments from the past that have 
been forgotten or are not fresh in someone’s mind. Yet, some participants stated that these 
surprise encounters were one of the main reasons they used these technologies. That is, many 
of the participants mentioned that they anticipated being surprised by aspects of their data past. 
Miriam claimed that ‘there are things that surprise me every single day,’ whilst Nicole noted 
that ‘it’s always a surprise even though I’ve done it every single day for the past, I think, 703 
days.’ Surprises or surprising memories, it seems, are a common and even daily experiential 
characteristic of using algorithmic memory apps. These surprise encounters also accentuated 
the way emplotment figured as a way to anticipate as well as mentally and emotionally 
’prepare’ for such encounters, a way that users positioned themselves in relation to memory 
technologies.  
But what is the value of such surprises? Oliver stated that ‘It is definitely helpful to 
have the flexibility to click through and be reminded of that. I would never have come up with 
that context, with that memory, on my own.’ For this participant, surprise encounters were a 
result of engaging with memory features that are not passive conduits or archives of memories. 
Rather, they actively resurface past content in the present. This ability to ‘click through,’ 
according to Oliver, has provided him with a flexible approach to the past, one where he can 
enjoy the memories he ‘would never have come up’ on his own.  
Yet, these surprise encounters can also come across as a somewhat disruptive. As 
Nicole mentions:  
I have had some mornings where Timehop has caught me a little off guard. Even 
when the memories that come up are not necessarily positive memories I can 
look at how long it’s been since that time and go, ‘wow, this amount of time has 
passed!’ Look where I am, the date after this I thought this is going to suck 
forever and here we are three, four years later, and I was actually surprised by it, 
because it wasn’t the thing that took over the entirety of my brain space. 
As this statement suggests, surprise encounters are often ambivalent, taking users ‘off guard.’ 
This is echoed in Jane Bennett’s (2001) understanding of surprise encounters and their 
relationship to the notion of enchantment. For Bennett (2001, p. 5), enchantment can be under-
stood more specifically as a form of ‘surprise encounter’, that is, a ‘meeting with something 
that you did not expect and are not fully prepared to engage.’ Central to Bennett’s under-
standing of surprise encounters is their inherent ambivalence. As she states, surprise encounters 
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can give rise to both ‘a pleasant, charming feeling’ but also a ‘slightly off-putting sense of 
having been disrupted’ (p. 5). This duality of affect implies that surprising memories must be 
worked on, reflected upon, and investigated. The value of surprise encounters, Bennett states 
(2001, p. 6), lies in that which they engender: ‘new ideas, perspectives, and identities.’    
The generative nature of surprise encounters is also echoed in the case of Nicole. For 
this participant, being reminded of certain memories sometimes ‘caught me off guard’, especi-
ally if these were not entirely ‘positive memories.’ Yet, encountering surprising memories on 
algorithmic remembrance technologies became a way for Nicole to engage with aspects of her 
past she would not necessarily have done otherwise. For example, being caught off guard in 
this manner provided her the space to think ‘wow this amount of time has passed’ and ‘I thought 
this is going to suck forever.’ Through these encounters, Nicole was able to emplot a different 
story, one where the past and the present are forced into perspective, where they are 
dialectically interpreted and negotiated. As such, encounters with surprise memories not only 
engendered various emotional reactions, but that these surprises were a key aspect of people’s 
attempt to emplot their lives, weaving together a narrative that stretched from certain aspects 
of the past they had not engaged with before and into the present. 
It is also important to note that different memory features operate and resurface memo-
ries differently, and this had an impact on how certain users encountered and engaged with the 
digital past. Donna, for instance, mentioned that one of the main reasons she uses remembrance 
technologies was ‘for the element of surprise, the element of I anticipate seeing or finding 
something, and something that I can either look at or feel.’ The element of surprise was there-
fore not only a desirable aspect of using memory features, but was expected, anticipated. 
Comparing memory features to subscription-based make-up boxes, Donna states that this 
feeling of being surprised was central to how she wanted to encounter her data past. As she 
points out, ‘For me, that’s like how I use Timehop. It’s like I really never know what I’m going 
to come across. I love it for that reason.’ However, as mentioned above, the criteria for what to 
resurface and when varies from feature to feature. Where Facebook Memories and Google 
Photos attempt to select and to resurface only certain things, Timehop would resurface content 
indiscriminately. This was Donna’s reason for not using Google Photos as much as Timehop: 
she knew that there would be a lot of past content that she would never encounter, that would 
never be resurfaced which, to her, was a shame because ‘I think the most interesting things are 
things that you’re not looking for.’ However, Donna stated that: 
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Timehop to me – I know its purpose. It’s like that package, I know that it’s going 
to surprise me and it’s something I look forward to. I have absolutely no expec-
tations versus every other app. I feel like it’s [the app] very intentional and I 
know its purpose and I know basically what to expect, so it’s just really different. 
Through this, an interesting paradox emerge: these memories, these surprise encounters, are 
not entirely surprising. They are expected and anticipated. They have been selected, they are 
programmed, and they are algorithmically resurfaced. As such, algorithmic remembrance 
technologies figure as so-called ‘spaces of anticipation’ (Thrift, 2004, p. 175), where they are 
accepted and enjoyed because ‘they show up more or less as expected.’ Although these techno-
logies may resurface surprising or shocking memories from the past, they operate in expectable 
and unsurprising ways. As such, users position themselves in front of memory features, 
wanting and expecting to be reminded, surprised, and even taken aback. Through surprise 
encounters in particular, the notion of emplotment must consider the role of the algorithmic 
remembrance technologies themselves and the way they actively participate in the narratives 
people create of themselves as well as the way users anticipate this narrativisation of their own 
past. The next section will look more closely at what happens when the participants were 
reminded of something that brought not only comfort but also discomfort.  
For some participants, there was a certain sense of comfort attached to the use of 
remembrance technologies. For instance, Becky stated using memory features such as 
Facebook Memories does not affect how she lives ‘other than that I feel more grounded in who 
I am and where I exist in own my personal timeline.’ Diana called it a ‘very strange form of 
comfort’ to know that memory features are able to both document and ‘replay’ the past ‘at a 
point in the future.’ Echoing this idea of comfort, Miriam stated that algorithmic remembrance 
technologies and their ordering mechanisms engender ‘a kind of a sense of stability,’ adding 
that ‘It’s just comforting to know that I have something to keep all of my memories in order 
by year by day.’ As such, there is a comfort in both how memory features are able to document, 
store, resurface and order the past. This also echoes the discussion in chapter four. As the photo 
backup and storage app, Ever, put it in one of their promotional taglines, ‘We have the distinct 
honor of hosting your photos and videos, so that you are free to make memories.’ The promise 
and comforts of using algorithmic remembrance technologies resides, at least in part, in the 
delegation of storing, ordering and resurfacing people’s mediated memories to these features.  
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 Conversely, using algorithmic remembrance technologies also engendered a sense of 
discomfort in some participants. The reasons for this discomfort were various. For some 
participants, there was a sense that the technologies ‘knew’ too much. In one of the focus 
groups, one member, Lily, suggested that the reason she no longer visited Facebook Memories 
was ‘the fact that they constantly involve themselves, pick more stuff up about you leaves me 
a bit creeped out.’ To her, Facebook’s memory feature came across as creepy because there 
was a sense that increasing aspects of her everyday life were being mined and exploited, 
echoing a form of what Nick Couldry and Ulises Mejias (2019) call ‘data colonialism.’ Within 
this framework, the increasing extraction of people’s past data churned into resurfaceable 
‘memories’ comes across as exploitative and a breach of boundaries (‘they constantly involve 
themselves, pick more stuff up’). For Lydia, a data threshold seems to have been transgressed, 
leaving her ‘a bit creeped out.’ This sense of the invasiveness of memory features was also 
echoed by Helen. When asked what she thought the purpose of Facebook Memories and Apple 
Memories was, she promptly replied ‘Well, I think basically what it’s doing is having access 
to all your past photographs’, adding that ‘I would be very loathed to let third-party apps have 
access to my photographs.’ For this participant, memory features are not merely resurfacing 
memories in the present but also engender a sense of anxiety in terms of their data mining 
practices.  
 Yet, as other participants also pointed out, this sense of being creeped out was platform- 
and context-dependent. Raymond noted:  
You know what Timehop is going to want you look at, which is something I’ve 
been on this year. Whereas Facebook – it thinks it knows what you want. I don’t 
know, that’s creepy, I don’t like that... I mean it’s different in that I know I’m 
not going to get tripped. I know what I’m going to get. I don’t know what the 
content is going to be, but I know what the algorithm is. The algorithm is very 
simple. It’s like, what I posted on these days in the previous years, whereas 
Facebook I just don’t know. The trust level just isn’t there. 
In one sense, the algorithms underpinning these different memory features presuppose different 
ways of mediating memories, different ways of remembering with algorithms. Raymond points 
out that where the algorithm is relatively simple, it is easier to know ‘what I’m going to get’ 
and that ‘I know I’m not going to get tripped.’ As a result, the participant also found it easier 
to position himself in relation to the technology, because he knew what he could expect. In 
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short, technologies with more complex algorithmic mechanisms for mediating memory (e.g. 
Facebook Memories) engendered a sense of discomfort because, Raymond stated, ‘it thinks it 
knows what you want.’ This, in turn, gave rise to a sense of something creepy, a sense of 
unknown, a sense of artificiality.  
This idea that memory features think they know ‘what you want’ was also echoed by in 
one of the focus group. Commenting on the difference between remembering with diaries and 
photo albums, on the one hand, and algorithmic memory features, on the other, Eva noted:  
I think there’s a definite difference because if you’re a writing a diary, making a 
photo album, it’s you actively writing down what you want to remember. But if 
it’s like Apple or Facebook or Snapchat, they’re picking this is probably what 
she wants to remember. So in my opinion, when I see it, I’m not like this is a 
photo album; I’m like this is a Snapchat photo album or this is what Apple chose. 
I’m never like totally immersed in it, it’s always through a technological lens. 
As the participant suggests, there is a certain discomfort that arises from the awareness that 
remembrance technologies are not passive tools in memory making. She is aware that they are 
actively participating in shaping and emplotting her life through approximating what she would 
want to remember. On one level, this is not surprising, since a salient aspect of algorithmic 
systems is their supposed ability to predict people’s future patterns of behaviour based on large 
data sets (Mackenzie, 2015). This means that memory features such as Apple Memories, 
Facebook, or Snapchat do not simply repackage and resurface someone’s past data as memo-
ries; rather, they actively seek to show those memories they think users would most like to 
engage with. In such cases, memory features can then be seen to actively participate in the 
emplotting of people’s lives.  
Still the narrative of self they weave is underpinned by particular by criteria. For 
example, Facebook’s annual Year in Review memory feature actively seek to avoid showing 
what they consider ‘painful’ memories (Jacobsen, 2020b). This sense that mediated memories 
are not simply resurfaced, but have been analysed, sorted, curated, and classified produces, for 
some users, a ‘technological lens.’ That is, a lens through which remembering is filtered, where 
the user is never ‘totally immersed’ in the experience of using memory features. As Eva 
implies, this distance between the user, their data past, and the technology in question creates 
an awareness that the participant is implicitly ‘configured as a user’ by Apple Memories 
(Woolgar, 1990). The sense of discomfort and detachment derived from this discernment 
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serves as a reminder that people do not simply domesticate algorithmic remembrance techno-
logies. Rather, they are also constructed and positioned as users in relation to the technology. 
Users do not merely anticipate algorithmic technologies; they are also anticipated by the 
technologies themselves.  
There is, therefore, a sense that algorithmic remembrance technologies are not just 
passively facilitating people’s remembering. For users such as Raymond and Eva, there is an 
awareness of their underlying memory politics, which engenders a critical eye towards the 
features themselves. As this section has begun to explore, emplotment in relation to algorithmic 
remembering seems to be distributed amongst human and nonhuman agents. It is a dialectical 
process, which engenders both a sense of comfort as well as discomfort and detachment. 
 
5.4 Conclusion: Towards a Socio-Technical Understanding of Emplotment 
This chapter has sought to highlight the social, technical, entangled, and fluid qualities of 
memory making and memory practices in relation to algorithmic remembrance technologies. 
Drawing on Steph Lawler’s notion of ‘emplotment’ as the overall conceptual framework, I 
have investigated the ways in which users may draw on algorithmically resurfacing stories, 
meanings, and memories from the past to make sense of and negotiate their identities in the 
present. Whilst Lawler’s notion has great analytical value in understanding processes of 
identity formation, emplotment also helps to amplify some of the micro dynamics of what 
Annette Kuhn has called ‘memory work.’  
However, the analyses in both Lawler and Kuhn is predicated on the centrality of human 
subjectivity, agency, and memory. It accentuates the ways in which humans remember the past 
as well as work on it, anticipate it, interpret it, seek to make sense of it. It focuses on the ways 
in which users negotiate its importance for the present as well as the multiple meanings neces-
sarily emerging from any ‘evocative objects’ such as photographs, diary entries, and Snapchat 
‘memories’ (Turkle, 2007). In response, I has sought to widen the conceptual frames of emplot-
ment, understanding it as a socio-technical process of memory. I have suggested that 
remembering with algorithms constitutes, amongst other things, a multifaceted negotiation - of 
the mediated memories themselves, of the algorithmic technologies, and of various social 
groups. Through the intersections of human users, memory practices and algorithmic remem-
brance technologies, this chapter has demonstrated that the emplotment of identities and 
narratives of self are distributed amongst both human and algorithmic agencies. 
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Firstly, I have argued here that humans draw on past data and content that is resurfaced 
through algorithmic remembrance technologies as ‘memories’ to make sense of themselves 
and to weave narratives of self and others. The chapter looked at some of the principal reasons 
why and how people use memory features. For instance, some the participants that were 
interviewed stated that they appreciated the affective states that the features engendered from 
seeing various mediated memories from the past resurfacing on a continual basis. They also 
pointed to the importance of anticipatory positioning, that is using these technologies with the 
anticipation to be surprised, shocked, and affected by the technologies and the memories that 
were resurfaced. Moreover, seeing certain mediated memories resurface helped provide users 
with meaningful perspectives, as they encountered both small and big memories as well as 
more distant reminders in contrast with fresher, more recent ones. Moreover, many of these 
memories were not only meaningful to the individuals using memory features, but on multiple 
occasions became the means by which people maintained relational ties, friendship groups and 
wider communities through acts of sharing. As such, the findings from the interviews and focus 
group data corroborate Lawler’s claim that emplotment is an emphatically social process as 
well as fluid, malleable and subjective. In fact, sociality runs through the fabric of any narrative 
and any form of remembering. 
Secondly, I have argued that algorithmic systems actively participate in the emplotment 
of identities, making decisions of what memories to make visible and when. This has impli-
cations for memory making practices. Many participants suggested that they did not only have 
to negotiate and make sense of the memories being resurfaced, but also the very technologies 
doing the resurfacing. This engendered multiple situations of tensions and contradictions 
amongst participants. This was demonstrated in the comforts and discomforts people felt when 
being encountered with their data past. For some, encountering the past was always accom-
panied by a feeling of seeing through a ‘technological lens,’ an underlying discomfort and 
awareness that the parameters of what users see and remember have always already been 
demarcated by the technologies themselves. For others, it raised questions about the nature of 
algorithmic visibility such as: why are certain memories resurfaced and not others, which ones 
are being left out and why, and when are they resurfaced. These various questions and 
considerations informed the ways people sought to make sense of their past and present.  
For other research participants, using algorithmic remembrance technologies engen-
dered more visceral encounters and responses. Many participants, for instance, experienced 
being reminded of mediated memories alluding to painful or socially awkward events and 
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experiences from the past. As a result, processes of emplotment emerge as a form of manage-
ment, that is, processes and practices of managing the past in the present through deletion, 
filling in the gaps, and putting the pieces together. It also became apparent to many participants, 
through such instances, that memory features are not neutral archives or conduits for their 
mediated memories. As such, remembering the past through algorithms produced multiple 
levels of interpretation and reinterpretation. Emplotment is seen as an iterative process.  
Yet, within this framework, emplotment is not only subjective, fluid, and malleable. It 
is, as Tarleton Gillespie (2014, p. 183) noted, ‘a multidimensional entanglement between 
algorithms put into practice and the social tactics of users who take them up.’ Anticipating, 
encountering, engaging with, working on, remembering and emplotting the past should be the 
domain of the assemblage. It should be seen as a complex and contested interplay between 
algorithms and humans, between a variety of human and nonhuman agencies, all of which 
participate in the weaving of stories and identities through the resurfacing of mediated 
memories. Within a socio-technical conceptualisation of emplotment, any notion of self and 
others is not a given, but is rather emplotted. That is, a heterogeneity of meanings, feelings, 
memories, events, and past experiences are synthesised into meaningful wholes and made to 
matter in the present. Moreover, moving towards a more socio-technical understanding 
of emplotment also helps to make visible some of the dynamics inherent in all forms of 
memory work, whilst also showcasing some of the tensions specifically inherent in the various 
human interactions with and uses of algorithmic remembrance technologies. In the following 
chapter, I will focus on one such dynamic, namely the issue of temporality and timing in 


















6.0 ‘Not just an arbitrary date’: The Importance of Timing for the Algorithmic Resur-
facing of Memories 
 
6.1 Introduction 
The emphases of the previous chapters have been on the algorithmic affordances and archi-
tectures of memory features as well how people use and negotiate these features in everyday 
life. In contrast, this chapter will look at how these technologies affect and shape people’s 
encounters and experiences of the past, that is the ways people experience the effects of algo-
rithms. As I have already underlined, algorithms come to matter in particular situated contexts 
as they fold data, methods, epistemologies, social relations, tensions, negotiations, and so on 
(Lee et al., 2019). Algorithmic systems take on meanings and showcase their social power in 
situated practices and experiences, such as being recommended music on Spotify, seeing 
personalised ads on Amazon, or being identified in a crowd by facial recognition software. 
However, the central argument of this chapter revolves around the issue of algorithms and 
temporality. Understanding algorithms as ‘apparatuses of mattering’ (Amoore, 2020), here I 
examines particular instances when algorithms come to matter. This chapter suggests that 
analysing specific temporal instantiations and dynamics of algorithmic media may provide a 
better understanding of the social power of algorithms in everyday life. 
In recent years, there has been considerable scholarly work written that focuses on the 
relationship between algorithms and data, on the one hand, and speed, acceleration, and 
efficiency, on the other (e.g. Beer, 2018; Wajcman, 2015; 2018). Past research has focused on, 
for instance, the temporal affordances of algorithms in the financial sector (Borch, 2016; 
Hayles, 2017; Mackenzie, 2011, 2018), driving a logic of speed. In her book Unthought: The 
Power of the Cognitive Nonconscious, N. Katherine Hayles (2017) points out that the allure of 
high-frequency trading (HFT) algorithms is not only the ways in which they are capable of 
locating the opportune stocks to either buy or sell, but also the sheer speed by which they 
operate, a speed which far exceeds the cognitive abilities of human stock traders. This, Hayles 
argues, results in ‘incommensurable timelines of human and technical cognizers’ (p. 155). The 
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financial incentives of speeding up as well as the capacity for real-time data analyses has led 
to a so-called ‘arms speed race’ amongst investment companies, that is, a push toward ‘faster 
and faster algorithms’ (p. 165). In the case of financial derivatives and high-frequency trading, 
algorithms are efficacious because they occupy temporal slices inaccessible to human actors, a 
time frame in which only algorithms can operate. 
There have also been many studies examining the importance of algorithms for ‘real 
time’ data analytics. Rob Kitchin (2014b) pointed out that real-time analytics was one of the 
promises offered by the advent of Big Data. Within this framework, data could be processed 
and analysed immediately after it was mined, eradicating the temporal delay which existed 
between the period when the data was collected and the period it was analysed and made 
actionable in particular social or institutional settings. The importance of real-time analytics is 
also echoed by José van Dijck (2014) who argues that real-time analytics remains an essential 
component of the meta-process of datafication. In van Dijck’s (2014, p. 198) view, datafication 
refers to ‘the transformation of social action into online quantified data, thus allowing for real-
time tracking and predictive analysis.’ Commenting on the close interrelation between speed 
and real time, David Beer (2019, p. 39) states, ‘visions of speediness and the promises of real-
time knowing are central to the spread and intensification of data-led processes throughout the 
social world.’ This coupling of speed and real-time data analytics has been widely diffused in 
society. In education, for example, developments in AI and machine learning promise regula-
tory bodies the abilities to analyse and intervene in school systems in ‘real time’ if schools 
were experiencing problems (Luckin et al., 2016). Along with data mining and predictive 
analytics, real-time tracking has become a crucial part of what Couldry and Mejias (2019) call 
‘data colonialism,’ the exploitation of people and societies through the mining and processing 
of vast amounts of data.  
 It is evident from these sources that algorithmic systems encapsulate a variety of hetero-
geneous temporalities. As Bruno Latour (2002) would say, multiple temporalities are ‘folded’ 
within the functionalities of technological objects such as algorithms. Although the focus of 
recent critical media scholarship has tended to gravitate towards speed and real-time data 
analytics, others have claimed that algorithmic media such as Facebook highlight another, yet 
equally significant, temporal configuration (Bucher, 2020b; Humphreys, 2020). According to 
Taina Bucher (2018), Facebook’s News Feed is as much governed by a logic of ‘right time’ as 
it is real time. In fact, Bucher argues that this logic of right time is ‘the key temporal mode of 
algorithmic media’ (p. 80). Her line of argumentation derives from a series of claims made by 
 
177 
representatives of algorithmic media companies such as Facebook. On their NewsFeed FYI 
blog series, Facebook claims that ‘Our goal is to show the right content to the right people at 
the right time so they don't miss the stories that are important to them’ (quoted in Bucher, 2018, 
p. 80; original emphasis).  
This issue of timeliness has also been touched in relation to the way Twitter trends 
appear (Gillespie, 2016), and in relation to some of the algorithmic remembrance technologies 
discussed in chapter four. For instance, the cloud-storage service app called Ever claim that 
they are ‘a platform we built to dynamically show the most meaningful photos to you at just 
the right moment’ (emphasis added). For platforms such as Facebook and Ever, the focus is not 
only to operate in real-time, continuously learning about people’s behavioural patterns, but also 
to be able to operate at the right time, being able to find and show content that is most relevant 
to users at opportune points in time. 
During the qualitative interviews and focus groups, the intersections of temporality, 
timing, memory, and algorithms became salient. One participant noted the importance of not 
only what she was being reminded of, but also when memories were being resurfaced. As Alice 
stated, their timing matters as ‘it’s not just an arbitrary date.’ This chapter works with Bucher’s 
concept of ‘right time’ on algorithmic media as well as Alice’s claim about the specificity of 
the date in order to investigate the intersections between memory practices, timing, and 
algorithms. In this chapter, I argue that timing is a crucial aspect of algorithmic remembrance 
technologies. They algorithmically resurface and remind users of their past data in the form of 
‘memories’. It is therefore vital to examine how their timings are algorithmically instantiated 
and how users are affected by this mode of temporality. When a person is reminded can be as 
significant as what they are reminded of. As this chapter will show, these technologies are a 
crucial way in the temporal mode of algorithmic media can be explored in further detail. 
In order to better understand when algorithms come to matter, I propose the notion of 
‘anniversification.’ Anniversification can be understood as a particular manifestation of the 
way timing, temporality, algorithms, and affect intersect. Through this conceptual framework, 
timing emerges as a particular temporal and computational practice rather than an already-
given reality. It suggests that even if well-timed moments and the ‘right time’ may feel natural 
and inevitable, they can be manufactured and algorithmically produced. More specifically, this 
chapter argues that through algorithmic remembrance technologies and their timing the logic 
of anniversification is encapsulating increasing segments of social experience and everyday 
 
178 
life. Although anniversaries are both highly socio-cultural and personal phenomena – such as 
birthdays, public holidays, commemorations as well as mundane events – these technologies 
have pulled common occurrences, everyday experiences, and mundane ‘non-events’ into the 
realm of ‘anniversary.’ I argue that through algorithmic remembrance technologies these 
occurrences have been incorporated or pulled into the logic of anniversaries, producing 
‘memories’ to be remembered, celebrated, and shared in a cyclical manner. The notion of anni-
versification therefore functions as a way to investigate how algorithms temporally frame 
remembering in order to produce affective states, behaviours, habits, and routines. It is an 
avenue for exploring the ‘politics of temporality’ on algorithmic media, that is, how temporality 
and timing are used and practiced by these media to shape how people remember the past and 
work on the present. 
 The chapter starts by unpacking the notion of anniversification in more detail, focusing 
on the idea of timing as something computationally manufactured or engineered. Afterwards, 
I discuss Taina Bucher’s (2018) notion of ‘right time’ and how it relates to anniversification. I 
then investigate how the intersections between temporality and algorithms affect and shape 
people’s memory-making practices and their overall engagement with the past, themselves, 
and with others. Overall, I argue that the concept of anniversification will contribute to our 
understanding of the social power of algorithms and how they generate new, heterogeneous 
temporalities. 
 
6.2 What is Anniversification? 
Before examining the various ways in which algorithmic timing affected the participants and 
their memory practices, this section will unpack the notion of anniversification in greater detail. 
As I mentioned in the chapter introduction, anniversaries carry a plethora of often-competing 
meanings. The idea of ‘on this date in history’ has long been a staple feature of various news-
paper outlets (Humphreys, 2018; 2020). These dates provide snapshots of interesting or note-
worthy occurrences in the past. With algorithmic remembrance technologies, however, this 
anniversal logic increasingly shapes and defines people’s encounter with their mediated memo-
ries as well. For these technologies, anniversification refers to a particular logic and temporal 
dimension of how memories are repeatedly resurfaced. Basically, they are a mechanism for 
collating a person’s past data content from their phones or various social media accounts and 
resurfacing this data on its (annual) anniversary as a ‘memory.’ Apple Memories, a built-in 
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feature of the smartphone software, resurfaces photos one has taken and stored in the gallery 
as a ‘new memory.’ Snapchat Memories resurface old Snaps one has saved on their annual 
anniversary. Instagram occasionally notifies users with throwbacks such as ‘See your post from 
4 years ago today.’ Facebook does a similar thing, but also uses machine learning algorithms 
to rank, classify, and ultimately determine what and when memories are resurfaced (Paluri and 
Aziz, 2016; Konrad, 2017). Features such as Timehop are a bit different in the sense that the 
app asks for access to all of a user’s social media platforms and resurfaces this content within 
the app on its annual anniversary as a memory one can revisit and share. Platforms such as 
Facebook Memories and Apple Memories have also started experimenting with resurfacing 
monthly or even weekly memories: ‘look at your memories from last month.’ 
What all these technologies have in common is that mediated memories are resurfaced 
according to a specific temporal pattern or logic. I have chosen to call this logic ‘anniversifi-
cation.’ Although these mediated memories are not explicitly called ‘anniversaries’ within 
these technologies, the concept highlights an underlying temporal logic through which algo-
rithmic remembrance technologies attempt to position mediated memories as ‘right’ moments, 
as important moments, as moments that stand out, as moments that beckon to be remembered, 
celebrated and shared. In short, moments that inevitably draw the user closer to the platform. 
In other words, memory technologies frame past events, stories, meanings, and memories in 
specific temporal ways in order to try and maximise users’ experience, engagement, and 
participation on their platforms, in order to generate affective states and new behaviours and 
behavioural patterns. It is a form of data slicing, that is temporally freezing certain past experi-
ences into discreet ‘moments’ or ‘memories’ in the present.  
In March 2019, I interviewed software engineer and Timehop co-founder, Benny Wong. 
During the online interview, we covered a wide variety of topics relating to the app itself, issues 
of privacy, the role of platforms in memory making, what counts as a memory, and so on. A 
subject I was especially interested in was this idea of when users are reminded of their data 
pasts. When I asked Benny Wong what the relation was between memories and their anni-
versary-like resurfacing, he replied: 
The year timeframe was something that we had arrived at after testing a whole 
bunch of stuff. We started off with a year but we were like, wouldn’t it be 
interesting to do a month or six months or some other timeframe? But the year 
ago timeframe was actually very powerful, because so much of your life is the 
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same year to year on this day. It’s like the seasons are the same, the weather is 
about the same, holidays are around the same time. Because all of those things 
are things are the same, the differences in your life, between you right now and 
you then, is almost highlighted by contrast, right. We did something where we 
did six months back and so much is so different that you can’t place your own 
self in that time. Right now it’s in the middle of winter and if we see photos or 
memories from the summer, we can’t really sort of like put yourself in that 
mindset, but since you are already in this mindset of this same environment, it’s 
much easier to see the differences from a year ago to years ago and so on. 
In other words, the resurfacing mechanism on features such as Timehop follows a cyclical 
understanding of time, reflecting the way wider society is already structured. That is, it follows 
the same logic and temporal structure as other more ingrained societal anniversaries such as 
birthdays, weddings, national holidays, and festivals. A more generic notion of anniversary 
might signify specific, special, memorable, socio-culturally significant events that ‘beckon’ to 
be remembered, celebrated, or at least noted. For some participants, this (seeming) parallel 
between the inhabited temporal structures of society and the way apps like Timehop resurface 
memories was noted and came across as a ‘an organised way’ to do remembering. For instance, 
Jack stated that:  
I think it’s cool because our lives progress by year. Everything is done, that’s 
how we process things, our lives are segmented by years is what I should say. 
So being able to take myself on this date and compare to that date the same time 
previous year I think it’s worth something. 
Of course, the idea of anniversary can also signify something personal and unique to certain 
individuals or groups. Anniversaries can be appropriated and modified, suggesting that they 
are highly fluid and contextual phenomena. In short, they can mean various things to various 
people. As Benny Wong points out, algorithmic remembrance technologies such as Apple 
Memories or Timehop exploit this ‘floating signifier’-quality of anniversaries. As we see here, 
mundane happenings such as picking up coffee from Starbucks or seeing a rainbow on the way 
back from work, are repeatedly resurfaced as if they were anniversaries. This might seem like 
a mundane and inconsequential fact, but the processes through which resurfacing mechanisms 
on algorithmic remembrance technologies are temporally determined suggests otherwise.  
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As Benny Wong further notes, the software engineers at Timehop tested multiple time-
frames such as resurfacing a memory after only a month and after six months to see which one 
would work best for them and have most emotional impact on their users. They then settled on 
the ‘a year ago’ timeframe because, as Wong states, ‘it was actually very powerful.’ One of the 
reasons for this, Wong continues, was that annual memories generated a sense of both ‘parallel’ 
and ‘contrast’: by mapping a memory unto a similar season, similar weather, similar cycles of 
holiday, the development, trajectory, and narrative of the user would be heightened as a result. 
By doing annual anniversaries, the parallel would highlight a contrast between the state of 
current and former self. In other words, memories from only six months ago are unable to elicit 
this same sense of contrast, Wong proposed, because the parallel is not strong enough: ‘you 
can’t place your own self in that time.’ This suggests, therefore, that the memory feature 
inscribes significance into certain past events or experiences by engineering distance and 
juxtaposition into its functionality. In short, the memory is far away enough to still be relevant 
and close enough to still be meaningful. By juxtaposing the past and the present in this manner, 
drawing parallels between different ‘memories’ and their temporal position in the present, 
Timehop was able to create memory ‘anniversaries,’ or what Benny Wong later in the interview 
called ‘a memory product’, which is aimed at extracting the meaningfulness of every mundane 
situation. Within this framework, every mundane event can therefore become an opportune 
memory, something one needs to engage with. 
It is also important to stress at this point that the ways in which memories that are 
resurfaced on algorithmic remembrance technologies are highly contingent. Timehop’s 
decision to choose the ‘one-year framework’ between the documentation of a memory and its 
resurfacing may seem like a given, a logical decision arising from the inevitable condition of 
the ways in which society structures time and conceptualises anniversaries. Yet, as Benny 
Wong points out, that decision was presupposed by and the result of a culmination of multiple 
trial runs. It was a product of careful consideration and testing, feedback loops, and processes 
of trial and error. As a result, the logic of anniversification implicates everything from 
philosophies of time, socio-cultural observations, presuppositions about memory, and the 
affordances of algorithms. It not only reflects the way anniversaries are framed in wider 
society; rather, the temporal ‘one-year’ framework emerges as part of specific contexts, con-
crete circumstances and sometimes contested sociotechnical processes. 
Anniversification is therefore not a given, but refers to the socio-technical construction 
of memories resurfacing at the ‘right time.’ It must be understood as an algorithmic tailoring 
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of events as well as a sociomaterial reality, emerging from various contested processes that 
have a hidden ‘social life’ (Savage, 2013). This was echoed in the interview data, where one 
participant stated that Timehop is ‘specifically tailored towards a daily memory’ (Imogen). The 
logic is part of a certain politics, a certain way to conceptualise time and remembering and the 
affordances of algorithmic systems. Anniversification is a logic that asks when to resurface 
what memories. It is a logic that extends the imperative to remember and celebrate, to increase-
ingly larger parts of everyday life. Moreover, the underlying drive behind anniversification is 
to induce remembrance, engagement (e.g. sharing), and further participation on the platform. 
While the temporal framework of when to resurface memories may only seek to extract the 
meaningfulness out of mundane everyday events and memories, it also participates in 
generating affective states. But before examining how anniversification can be seen to shape 
people’s experience of the past in specific ways, it is crucial to define what exactly is meant by 
‘right moments.’  
One of the central features of anniversification is the production of timing, of what Taina 
Bucher (2018) calls ‘kairos moments’ or ‘right moments.’ In her book If…Then: The Power 
and Politics of Algorithms, Bucher (2018) claims that ‘right time’ is the key temporal mode of 
algorithmic media. This notion of right time is drawn from the work of J. E. Smith (1986), who 
examines two particular modalities of temporality, ‘chronos’ and ‘kairos’, and how these were 
originally understood in Antiquity. The former, Smith defines as ‘the uniform time of the 
cosmic system’ (p. 4), a sort of absolute or ‘objective’ notion of time. Chronos, within this 
framework, is temporality as measured, as quantifiable duration. As Smith (1986 p. 4) states, 
‘In chronos we have the fundamental conception of time as measure, the quantity of duration, 
the length of periodicity, the age of an object or artifact’ (original emphasis). It is a notion that 
sees time as measurable, as a linear succession, constituting hours and days, summers through 
to winters. It is the imposition of an objective order on time as something that can be measured, 
compared, predicted, anticipated, and shared. 
Smith’s (1986) notion of ‘kairos,’ on the other hand, refers to the more qualitative 
character of time. As he states, kairos points to ‘the special position an event or action occupies 
in a series, to a season when something appropriately happens that cannot happen just at 'any 
time,' but only at that time, to a time that marks an opportunity which many not recur’ (p. 4). 
In a fundamental sense, kairos refers to something that eludes the sequential order of things, to 
the ‘special position’ of an action or event that happens within an intersection of other actions 
or events, something that could only happen then. It is a sense of time that ‘does not allow itself 
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to be measured in conventional ways,’ as Stuart Elden (2006, p. 174) wrote about Martin 
Heidegger’s notion of Ereignis (‘event’). As such, the term is often translated as the ‘right time’ 
(Smith, 1986, p. 4), the special temporal position of a particular action or event. In short, 
opportune times or moments. It emphasises time as a flow of lived, embodied, and inter-
connected experiences, as points in time that resist the conventional measures and objective 
order of chronos. It is something that stands out from past and future points in time. 
Bucher (2018, 2020b) draws on this notion of kairos in her own work on the temporality 
and politics of algorithmic media. As she notes, it is a ‘useful way of understanding the kind 
of temporal work that algorithms perform’ (Bucher, 2018, p. 80). For instance, in her study of 
Facebook and the algorithmic construction of visibility, Bucher (2012b) points out that ‘time 
decay’ or timeliness is one of three central components of Facebook’s EdgeRank algorithm in 
determining what will resurface on a user’s Facebook Newsfeed and when (p. 1167). On 
Facebook, something is considered relevant if it is the right content for the right user, resurfaced 
at the right time. Algorithmic media, Bucher (2018) claims, seek to surface content at the ‘right 
time’ to users, when the content will have most emotional or cognitive impact, making it 
increasingly likely that content will be shared or liked, which in turn makes it more likely that 
people will continue participating on the platform. Although there has been ample focus on 
temporality and social media, especially with regards to real time, Bucher (2018) argues that 
the way social media platforms increasingly emphasise finding the most interesting and 
relevant pieces to show users means that the issue of timing is bound to become more promi-
nent.  
Similar to Smith, then, Bucher uses kairos to signify temporal slices or moments that 
are uniquely positioned in the succession of things. In other words, it is a question of timing. 
In contrast to Smith, however, Bucher conceptualises timing as a sociotechnical construction 
rather than something ontologically fixed, as something inherent to temporality itself. As Smith 
(1986, p. 13) argues, the time of kairos is not a ‘human standpoint’, but rather constitutes ‘an 
ontological element in the basic structure of things.’ Timing, for Bucher, is rather imagined, 
designed, tested, contested, implemented, and tweaked.57 In short, what can be considered the 
'right time' is never ontologically pre-determined but always-already programmed or engi-
neered. This conceptualisation of timing is best demonstrated by the ways in it is operationa-
lised algorithmically. As Bucher (2018, p. 80) asks, how does ‘the news feed algorithm 
 
57 For more in the interconnections between complex temporalities, technical objects/assemblages, and ‘time as 
enfolded’, see Bruno Latour (1994; 2002).  
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determine when the time is right?’ How platforms and algorithmic remembrance technologies 
determine what is the ‘right time’? What criteria underpin these decisions? As the interview 
with Benny Wong illustrates, the power and politics of algorithms are made apparent in the 
interstices of these decisions. When algorithms resurface memories to users constitutes a way 
in which algorithms ‘give account’ of their own temporal logic (Amoore, 2020).  
 What is the relationship, then, between anniversification and kairos? I argue that the 
logic of anniversification can be seen to underpin the ways in which algorithmic remembrance 
technologies make the data past matter in the present. The concept of kairos or right time helps 
to illustrate how the logic of anniversification seeks to produce well-timed reminders from the 
past. Drawing on interview and focus group data, this chapter examines situated encounters 
where timing can be seen to be algorithmically programmed and the logic of anniversification 
revealed. Anniversification could be seen in the data to generate a variety of affective states in 
users. More specifically, the chapter will examine four particular ways in which the logic of 
anniversification is seen to participate in shaping people’s encounters with and experience of 
the past: Alignment, personalisation, habituation, and performativity.  
 
6.2.1 ‘It’s more momentous to remember it at that exact moment’: Alignment 
Many participants talked about the effects it had being reminded of memories exactly a year, 
or 3 years, after a photo was taken or a tweet was shared. For example, Helen stated that the 
difference between photo albums and features such as Facebook Memories is that the latter is 
‘so much more immediate. You can easily get your hands on something, cause you can look at 
the date.’ Having the exact date of a digital image at hand creates, for Helen, both greater 
immediacy between photo and memory but also makes images more easily findable and 
searchable. For other participants such as Quentin, the feeling was more visceral and corporeal. 
He stated that:  
You think like, oh photos bring back that memory or something, and when 
people look back at photos that brings that whole nostalgic feeling. But to get it 
on that same day, I feel like I could walk outside and the weather was closer to 
the same. 
Quentin points out that receiving a memory on ‘that same day’ on algorithmic remembrance 
technologies helps to make it more real, more visceral. He suggested that this was something 
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that went beyond feelings of mere nostalgia, but rather is something that emphasises the way 
remembering is always an embodied process (Connerton, 1989). Thus, seeing memories 
resurfacing ‘on that same day’ helps brings back his whole frame of mind, feeling the earth 
underneath him and how the weather was close to the same as well. Another participant, Paul, 
stated something similar to Quentin. He said that being shown memories on their exact date on 
Timehop produced a similarly embodied feeling: ‘Sometimes I think I can actually almost feel 
like where I was a year ago or two years ago or three years ago.’ For Imogen, seeing memories 
resurface on their annual anniversary did not transport her back to the past as much as it made 
the memory more acute in the present. As she observes:  
I think it makes it more acute where it maybe if I don’t have the exact time 
marker to it, or the exact chronology, it can kind of feel like just a nebulous 
[inaudible] that’s out there. But having a reminder that shows up in this tangible 
way of like this day, this year, it’s February 19th 2016… or what exactly popped 
up this morning, but I think it makes them more acute and more real. There are 
definitely times where I’m able to remember what I was feeling or how funny I 
thought that was or I was sad about something or whatever the case might be, 
but I think it makes it just a little bit more real and just in context if that makes 
sense. 
The reason that memories felt ‘more acute’ or ‘more real’ for Imogen was that when memories 
surface in this manner they show up ‘in this tangible way,’ they are made more concrete, more 
immediate. As a result, the timing of resurfacing memories helps to create a sense of 
immediacy, acuteness, and a tangible sense of the past and its memory as well as a corporeal 
sense of being transported back into the past.  
 However, other participants also mentioned how the exact timing of memories on 
algorithmic remembrance technologies added weight to their own remembrance of the past in 
the present. For example, when asked about what Timehop has meant to her over the years, 
Sarah stated: 
Timehop has meant that I feel connected to those daily moments that meant a lot 
to me when I experienced them. There’s something special about having them 
delivered back on the same day a year later, five years later, three years later. I 
guess because there does seem to be a thread that runs through time and space 
on that same day that makes it feel more momentous to remember it at that exact 
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moment. I don’t feel that way every day, but there are certainly days when I 
think, oh that’s right! That was eight years ago today, how crazy that that’s, you 
know, already been eight years since that moment? 
This participant noted that there is ‘something special’ about the way memories are resurfaced. 
In her view, being reminded of memories ‘exactly’ a year ago, or two years, or five years ago 
helps make these memories feel more ‘momentous’ and significant. Yet, she points out that the 
reason ‘it makes it feel more momentous to remember it at that exact moment’ is because of 
the ‘thread that runs through time and space on that same day.’ She adds that this does not 
happen every day, but seeing the present and the past run parallel on memory apps produces 
what can be seen as ‘kairos moments’ (Bucher, 2018) for her, that is ‘days when I think oh 
that’s right!’ The logic of anniversification is seen here to provide so-called a thread through 
time, which adds a sense of continuity and specificity that makes memories feel more 
momentous in the present. 
 This was also echoed in other interviews, where the specific timings of memory 
reminders helped ‘heighten’ the memory of certain events. As Francis stated:  
I think that Timehop’s useful in that sense because I think the exactness when it 
comes down to the timing I think that does heighten the remembrance of it a 
little bit, because it’s such an even way to break it down, rather than like oh this 
happened around this time, this happened in this group, you can just say that for 
a while that this happened exactly three years tonight. So I think it’s really 
interesting in that sense, because it’s a more rigid structure of time. In that sense, 
it’s easier to recognise it, so it takes away all the vagueness of the time passing. 
My friends and I go to premiers of films a lot in the theatre. Two years ago we 
were seeing this, now we’re sitting in our seats seeing this so it’s kind of 
interesting in that sense, seeing how things maybe align… it maybe provides 
easier linkages to what you’re doing that actual day, what you’re doing in the 
present versus what you did in the past. 
Francis touches on several interesting notions to do with the exactness of memory reminders. 
Firstly, he states that being reminded of something on the day ‘heightens’ his memory of it 
because it is ‘such an even way to break it down.’ In other words, by resurfacing memories at 
particular times, algorithmic remembrance technologies such as Timehop impose a ‘more rigid 
structure of time’ on memory making, making it both ‘easier to recognise’ and ‘it takes away 
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all the vagueness of the time passing’. Framed temporally as anniversaries, Francis finds that 
these reminders ‘heighten the remembrance’ of his past. Still, what exactly is meant by this 
notion of ‘heighten’? As Francis has already pointed out, this temporal framework makes 
remembering certain memories less vague as well as providing ‘easier linkages to what you’re 
doing that actual day’ and ‘what you’re doing in the present.’ When asked to elaborate on what 
he meant by ‘easier linkages,’ Francis stated: 
I’d say maybe in the sense that when things align it makes it more unique. If it’s 
just every day, and I’m looking at it as part of my daily routine and it’s just a day 
when I go to school all day or work all day, it might not be that unique, but if 
it’s, like I said, when things align, like when we’re at the same event with the 
university, or my friends and I were in the theatre again, watching a different 
movie something like that, and we see oh we had a picture from the premier three 
years ago. I think it makes it unique in that sense because it has a definite link to 
the past that that specific day has that maybe the next day or the previous day 
wouldn’t have. 
In one sense, the timing of certain resurfaced memories helps to make memories clearer. More 
specifically, Francis suggests that the way memory reminders are framed temporally, in terms 
of their timing, also creates a particular relationship to the past, one which is more acute, more 
real, and more recognisable. In short, one which heightens the memory itself. Echoing what 
other participants also mentioned, Francis stated that anniversaries provide ‘definite links to 
the past.’ This helps make certain memories seem ‘more unique’ as things in the past are made 
to align with the present in such a manner. Crucially, Francis emphasises that the anniversary 
of a memory functions as a mechanism of alignment, bringing past memories to bear on the 
present day in a more visceral, ‘definite’ way.  
Drawing a link back to the beginning of the chapter, the notion of alignment echoes 
what Benny Wong, co-founder of Timehop, said about the reason for choosing their specific 
temporal framework for the resurfacing mechanism. Benny Wong stated, as I mentioned 
earlier, that they chose the ‘a-year-ago’ framework because it provided enough contrast to 
seem different and yet enough parallel to seem familiar. Francis suggested earlier, the 
particular timing of resurfaced memories helps to align these memories with other memories 
and with events in the present. As a result, this heightens the remembrance of the past. What 
other participants stated – the feeling of exactness, of memories being more real, more acute – 
 
188 
constitutes effects of the temporal alignment of memories, where the past and present are 
juxtaposed in such a way as to create a sense of contrast and parallel. Here, exactness is not 
just a question of presenting a memory as an exact object, but also a question of presenting it 
at exactly the right moment. Exactness and alignment therefore become augmentation, ways to 
heighten the remembrance of the past.  
Here, alignment emerges as a key effect of the logic of anniversification, which in turn 
demonstrates how opportune moments can be algorithmically programmed and executed. Yet, 
Anniversification can be seen here to problematise the distinction between chronos and kairos, 
as both temporal modes participate in producing a sense of affective alignment with the past. 
As Francis put it, the sense of alignment was partly an effect of ‘a more rigid structure of time’ 
in which memories were resurfaced. Overall, the logic of anniversification generates a sense 
of alignment, which in turn shapes and affects how people encounter, experience, and remem-
ber the past.   
 
6.2.2 ‘These self-dates just have more internal feel’: Personalisation 
Temporally framing the resurfacing of memories in particular ways also gave participants a 
sense of intimacy in relation to certain aspects of their past. The particular ‘memories’ or ‘an-
niversaries’ that popped up on algorithmic remembrance technologies were often conceived in 
personal terms as a result of the timing of their resurfacing. This point became particularly 
salient in the interview with Ethan, who stated:  
I know what I put out there. Will I get surprised? for sure. But I’m more so 
surprised on two basis – that’s the second dynamic I want to take – my ability of 
surprise when I look at dates is based upon wow that’s five years ago, two years, 
three years ago today?... Then it’s the date. I’m more conscious of dates and I 
always say this is the more exploratory part, see if you can see this trend. Cause 
it’s almost like my own holidays in the sense of if today February 12th I did this 
a year ago and I did this two years ago, this three years ago, this four years ago 
go and it’s all something dynamic and different and I’m going something kind 
of like common or cool now, but I can’t appreciate it because I’m in the moment 
of working towards a goal. I can’t even appreciate that moment because I was 
working towards something, right… That dynamic it’s there so you can think 
about that. If this has happened so much today must be a special day for me as 
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opposed to being told this holiday is why we celebrate it and it has no direct 
impact. So I think that’s the interesting dynamic. 
Here, Ethan reflects on the dynamic that comes with the app’s temporal framework (‘on this 
day a year ago’).  He states that the timing of when memories resurface on the memory app is 
a ‘more exploratory part’ for him, helping him see these resurfacing memories in a new light. 
They constitute something more than a mere documentation of a particular past date; rather, 
their timing gives them a weight which makes them feel ‘almost like my own holidays’ or 
‘something dynamic and different.’ He states that seeing these memories pop up on within the 
feature at such specific moments helps give value and meaning to something he would 
otherwise have forgotten because he is ‘working towards a goal’ in the present. This anniversal 
functionality creates an interesting dynamic for memory making because it gives the sense of 
that ‘this has happened so much today must be a special day for me’ (emphasis added). The 
inscribed temporality of the resurfacing mechanism adds to past experiences and events a 
weight that participates in engendering a sense of meaning and significance – a direct impact 
that for Ethan other more societally established holidays, festivals, or commemorations some-
times lack. In other words, seeing memories resurface on algorithmic remembrance techno-
logies such as Timehop engenders a sense of a date being particularly important, and seeing 
that something has ‘happened so much’ only emphasises the sense of today being a special day. 
Later on in the interview, Ethan goes into more detail about this relationship between timing, 
dates, and memory. He states: 
Now, I check these dates and I have noticed this day was an important day, and 
it’s always like that year in and year out. So those dates enable you internally to 
feel special. They probably have more meaning than Boxing Day or Columbus 
Day or President’s Day. These self-dates just have more internal feel, and that 
shows you that you really have control of what makes you happy and what 
innately gets you going versus being told by the government. 
Although the participant suggests that the timing of resurfacing memories gives him a sense of 
days being special and meaningful, he goes further and states that it also has an impact on the 
way these dates are conceptualised. As memories are surfaced on their precise annual anni-
versary, they not only ‘probably have more meaning than Boxing Day or Columbus Day’, but 
the timing feature also enables him ‘internally to feel special’. In other words, these become 
what the participant calls ‘self-dates’: dates which for Ethan have ‘more internal feel’ than 
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other more established anniversaries and events. He also points out that these dates can become 
really important for an individual especially since it is ‘always like that year in and year out.’  
Interestingly, these ‘self-dates’ give Ethan a sense of agency, an ability to decide for himself 
what is considered a memorable and meaningful event or memory. The ability to decide for 
himself both ‘what makes you happy’ and ‘what innately gets you going’ as opposed to being 
told by external, societal structures. In short, the ways in which the resurfacing of memories 
are timed helps personalise the encounter with the past whilst simultaneously add meaning and 
gravity to certain memories. The timing feature on algorithmic remembrance technologies is 
implicated in processes of personalisation, creating a closer intimacy between user and medi-
ated memories that are being resurfaced.  
This notion of the ‘self-date’ also echoes a crucial aspect of Facebook’s memory feature 
called Memories. In a Facebook research rapport outlining the software engineering that had 
gone into making Facebook’s On This Day, the prior iteration of Memories, Manohar Paluri 
and Omid Aziz (2016) emphasise the centrality of personalisation for the feature. They state 
that personalisation was a crucial aspect in seeking to optimise the user experience of the 
feature. Facebook developed a machine learning model to try and accurately predict what 
memories people would want to see more of on the memory feature. Central to this was also 
the decision to not only to do annual anniversaries (‘a year ago’) but also what they call 
‘memory recaps’ (e.g. ‘Your September Memories’, ‘Your Summer Memories’, and so on). 
The machine learning algorithm underpinning Memories and its prior iteration, On This Day, 
was trained using personalised data. That is, the Facebook engineers used signals such as users’ 
previous interactions with the On This Day feature, demographic information such as gender 
or age, and the attributes of particular memories. Personalisation was a way in which the 
Facebook engineers were able to determine the number of times they should resurface 
memories to what users: ‘If a person has shared many memories from On This Day in the past, 
we can dial up the number of memories we show them in News Feed in the future,’ but 
conversely, ‘If a person has dismissed many memories, then we reduce the number of On This 
Day stories they see in News Feed moving forward’ (Paluri and Aziz, 2016). For Paluri and 
Aziz, this sense of personalisation and greater intimacy is not only an effect that is produced 
by the interaction between technology and user; it is also baked into the very fabric of these 
technologies itself. The logic of anniversification is not limited to one feature or platform but 
can be seen to underlie multiple algorithmic remembrance features. In this context, the 
Facebook memory feature illustrates the way in which timing can be increasingly personalised 
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through the use of intricate machine learning algorithms (see also Prey and Smit, 2018). In 
other words, the Facebook memory feature demonstrates the way in which machine learning 
models may be used to sharpen the affective role of timing, which becomes an increasingly 
crucial aspect of memory making.  
The effects of Facebook Memories more specifically were also discussed in the inter-
view with Mary. She stated that she enjoyed their monthly or seasonal memory recaps more 
than the annual anniversary: 
MARY: I quite like this ‘your September memories’, because I thought it was 
only just ‘a year ago’ or ‘two years ago’ and I didn’t realise they did the previous 
month. I think it’s quite nice, just a recap.  
INTERVIEWER: Do you find it nicer than to be reminded of something more 
recent then than something five years ago?  
MARY: I think so because sometimes it’s nicer to be reminded of things in the 
past that you might not necessarily have thought of otherwise. But at the same 
time, a lot of those memories might not be things that are significant to you 
anymore, whereas like things that’ve happened more recently are more relevant 
to you today. The things that happened to me in the last month, I think, are more 
important to me in the moment than something I might have posted four years 
ago with somebody who I don’t talk to anymore, right, a relationship I’m not in 
anymore.  
As this participant suggests, so-called seasonal memory recaps may sometimes produce more 
of an effect on her than anniversaries from years back. This is because as the person changes, 
‘memories’ from further back in her Facebook history increasingly refer to events, experiences, 
or relationships that no longer seem relevant to who she is now (e.g. ‘a relationship I’m not in 
anymore’). On the other hand, seeing memories resurface from only a month ago or two may 
be ‘more important to me in the moment’ or may be ‘more relevant to you today.’ Of course, 
this raises questions about the processes through which relevance and meaning are compu-
tationally operationalised and generated. Still, Mary’s statement is indicative of the way 
memories can be personalised and made more relevant and significant through algorithmically-
engineered timing. In short, as algorithmic remembrance technologies demonstrate, the logic 
of anniversification is not an ontologically inherent quality of ‘time itself’, as Smith (1986) 
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would argue, but rather a sociotechnical effect, an engineered product, a thought-out construct 
and framework underlying the resurfacing mechanism.  
These notions of timing and personalisation, however, are not without tensions. For 
instance, some participants commented on the way the Facebook memory feature in particular 
did not seem to a have a clear-cut logic to when memories are resurfaced. As a user of both 
Timehop and Facebook Memories, I asked Emma which one she generally preferred using: 
I think I like Timehop the best because it does show me everything. There’s 
really no rhyme or reason to what Facebook shows me when it shows me. 
Sometimes I feel like I get my memories on Facebook and sometimes I’m like, 
‘oh gosh, I haven’t seen that notification in a few weeks so!’ Theirs feels incon-
sistent. 
Here, the more ‘random’ temporal structure of Facebook is contrasted with Timehop, which 
has a more predictable and less surprising resurfacing mechanism. Whereas Timehop follows 
a more ‘rigid’ rule-based algorithmic structure, only resurfacing memories on their annual 
anniversary, Facebook Memories utilises a machine learning algorithm to determine when to 
show what to users and how often. For users such as Emma, this sometimes resulted in the 
feature feeling ‘inconsistent’ in the way memories are resurfaced. Instead of personalisation 
creating a more frictionless experience of the past it can be seen to engender the opposite effect. 
In this instance, the issue is not so much that the memories being resurfaced are inappropriate 
or embarrassing, but that the timing of the memory reminder does not fit neatly with the 
expectations of the user. This is indicative of the tensions that are inherent in the logic of 
anniversification; the tensions inherent in any attempt to engineer and personalise memories as 
right moments in the present.  
On the one hand, the timing of when memories are resurfaced can add a sense of 
meaningfulness and emotional weight to the remembrance of the past; on the other hand, when 
ill-timed, the resurfacing of memories can be conceptualised as a misstep or inconsistency, as 
in the case of Emma. It does not align and is therefore construed as ill-fitting, as something that 
has ‘no rhyme or reason.’ Such instances are therefore crucial, because they demonstrate that 
just as well-timed resurfaced memories produce a sense of intimacy, meaning and significance, 
failures of timing produce a disconnect between the user and the memory feature. This echoes 
what I argued in chapter five that a crucial aspect of emplotment and remembering with algo-
rithms is users’ anticipatory positioning. Here, timing and anticipation can be seen to inter-
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weave, suggesting that if the timing of certain resurfacing mechanisms are seen as too ‘random’ 
it may engender a sense of discomfort and tension. 
 
6.2.3 ‘It reminds you so constantly’: Habituation 
Another salient aspect connected to both the exactness and personalisation of these temporal 
reminders was the way participants found them to be constant or perpetual. Many of the 
participants stated that the impact of memory reminders did not only depend on how they 
aligned with the past or how personalised they were, but also often they ‘popped up.’ Interes-
tingly, this particular turn of phrase – ‘popping up’ – was used by many of the participants. In 
chapter four, I mentioned reminding as one of the overall characteristics of algorithmic remem-
brance technologies. As Edward S. Casey (1986) observes, reminding is a crucial mechanism 
of encountering and remembering the past. It is a way to surface memories that may have been 
forgotten as well as a mode of revitalising past data as memories.  
The logic of anniversification presupposes the continual and repetitive resurfacing of 
certain memories for greater emotional impact. With algorithmic remembrance technologies, 
users are reminded of memories every day given that they have posted or documented some-
thing on that day in the past. Features such as Facebook Memories, which deploys machine 
learning algorithms to more intimately learn people’s mode of engagement with the feature, 
seek to capitalise on users that visit or otherwise engage with the memory feature by upping 
the number of memory reminders that users see on a regular basis. Here it is suggested that the 
logic of anniversification is predicated on processes of making data traces or mediated 
memories from the past continually visible, ‘year in and year out’ as Diana stated. As a result, 
this raises questions concerning the effects of repetition or cyclicality on people’s everyday 
memory practices. The idea of the constant reminder highlights ways in which algorithmic 
remembrance technologies come to matter in people’s everyday life and how they weave 
themselves into daily habits and routines. The constant resurfacing of memories ‘at the right 
time,’ in other words, seeks to legitimate and habituate a form of algorithmic memory making 
in users.  
This anniversal resurfacing of memories as something that repeatedly shows up in their 
Facebook Memories or Timehop was discussed by various participants in the interviews. One 
participant, Grace, noted that every time she was encountered with mediated memories from 
the past, ‘it sears it into your memory even more.’ As Diana put it, ‘it is very strange, to be 
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encountered with your past in this way, every single day.’ The strangeness of memory apps, 
Diana points out, does not necessarily reside in which particular ‘memories’ they resurface at 
what particular time, but how often they do it. Repetition, temporality, and memory become 
intimately linked on these memory devices, having the apparent ability to ‘sear’ past events 
into people’s memory.  
The issue of repetition has long preoccupied those that work with social, cultural, and 
collective understandings of memory (Connerton, 1989; Hoskins, 2009; Brighenti, 2015; Chun, 
2016). Maurice Halbwachs (1992), for instance, argued that people’s memories of the past are 
preserved through continual reproduction, that is, by a continual engagement with them. This 
in turn helps to legitimate and perpetuate people’s personal and social sense of identity in the 
present. As Halbwachs (1992, p. 47) put it, ‘these memories are repetitions.’ Repetition and 
reproduction, in other words, play a crucial role in how people manage to keep their memories 
alive ‘during otherwise dull routines of everyday life’ (p. 25). ‘It is of the nature of remem-
brances,’ Halbwachs concludes, ‘when they cannot be renewed by resuming contact with the 
realities from which they arose, to become impoverished and congealed’ (p. 106). Likewise, 
Andrea M. Brighenti (2015) has stressed the link between repetition, reproduction, and the 
continuation of memory. Drawing on the work of French sociologist Gabriel Tarde, Brighenti 
states that ‘memory as well as habit are the outcome of repetition’ (p. 45). The habitual 
occurrences of diverse rituals, traditions, celebrations, and commemorations help to counter 
the tendency of memories to fade through time. Repeated acts of remembrance or continual 
engagements with the past in the present constitute an attempt to keep memories from fading 
in a society that continues to adopt new values, new technologies, and new forms of sociality. 
As society changes, and its social and structural make up is re-arranged, the conditional frame-
works for memory are reconfigured accordingly, which only demonstrates even more the 
importance of repetition for memory making. 
In the context of algorithmic remembrance technologies, the resurfacing of memories on 
at the ‘right time’, demonstrates the importance of repetition for current modes of memory 
practices. It also highlights an important aspect of algorithms, namely their capacity to form 
novel patterns of behaviour. For instance, many participants pointed out that the particular 
timing aspect of resurfaced memories was conducive to everyday routines. The continual 
feedback loop, the constant resurfacing of memories, seeks to incentivise not only engagement 
on the platform but a habitual, ongoing engagement. One particular way this is done is through 
the so-called ‘Streak.’ Operational on applications such as Timehop and Snapchat, the Streak 
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is a device to amplify participation on a feature, a metrical incentive for users to stay engaged 
on the feature for a long period of time. Like the Streak functionality on Snapchat, the Streak 
on Timehop reflects how many days in a row one has been on the app to check memories. 
Many participants stated that the Streak had an impact on how they used Timehop. For Miriam, 
the Streak added a ‘competitive’ edge to her use of the memory app: 
MIRIAM: I remember before, you just scrolled through. You hook up your 
Facebook and you scroll through and it tells you everything. But I feel like once 
the Streak started, I got competitive about it. That’s how I ended up getting really 
into it (laughter). 
INTERVIEWER: Did that properly change it then, getting the Streak, making it 
into a daily routine? 
MIRIAM: Yeah, I think right now this is the longest I’ve actually been on it. 
Like every single day. The first thing I do when I wake up in the morning is 
check my Timehop. It’s kind of interesting too, because you see things from 10 
years ago, and I’ve been on social media since I was a kid, so to me I’ll see things 
that I’m just like, ‘oh wow!’ Every morning I’m just checking it and some things 
I do remember, I’m like, ‘oh I can’t believe that happened!’ or whatever. I started 
getting really competitive with it and when I lose the Streak, I get frustrated. 
Now I’m really addicted to it (laughter). 
Miriam stated that the streak encouraged her to check the app ‘like every single day,’ and if 
she lost the Streak, she would get frustrated. For her, the Streak made her ‘really addicted’ to 
the memory app. Moreover, the Streak functionality added a competitive edge to her memory 
app usage, resulting in frustration if the Streak was lost. Remembering the past, in this case, 
becomes equivalent to keeping up - keep producing, keep revisiting, keep sharing, keep up the 
numbers. It becomes a habit. For Paul Connerton (1989), the link between repetition, memory, 
and the self is made most salient in the way memory making is ritualised and transformed into 
embodied habits. Arguing that habit is crucial for the transmission and legitimation and 
collective memory, Connerton also suggests that memories are enacted and remembered and 
revitalised both through public, ceremonial rites but also through personal engagements with 
the past. Repetition, in other words, leads to embodied habituation. As Emma aptly stated: 
I do think it becomes more valuable as it goes on. I think probably the first few 
years that I used it was kind of ‘eh whatever.’ But now I know that there are 
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things in there that I look forward to seeing, or that will be neat to see one day 
in your Timehop. Now I think I’m more invested, like I need to check my 
Timehop today, I want to check my Timehop today. 
This suggests that the Streak, having the capacity to affect users emotionally and behaviourally, 
takes on a certain value over time. Emma pointed out that the Streak may not be valuable when 
she first started out but it became valuable over time. She suggests that if her use of Timehop 
at first was just ‘eh whatever’ it is now something she is ‘more invested in,’ that is ‘I need to 
check my Timehop today.’ For Emma, the Streak had the capacity to transform the emotional 
engagement with the app from detached curiosity to something she needs to do. This suggests 
algorithmic remembrance technologies seek to embed themselves in people’s lives, becoming 
‘habitual new media’ (Chun, 2016), whilst simultaneously seeking to legitimating their own 
presence through the repetitive resurfacing of memories and the Streak. Connerton (1989) 
similarly argues that repeated acts and embodied habits serve as tools of legitimation. As he 
observes, ‘we may say that our experiences of the present largely depend upon our knowledge 
of the past, and that our images of the past commonly serve to legitimate a present social order’ 
(p. 3). Legitimation of a social order therefore presupposes continual claims of continuity with 
the past, which in turn demonstrates the necessity and importance of repetition for ritualisation. 
In the case of Timehop and Snapchat, the Streak is a nexus, the point where the power of 
metrics meets algorithmic temporality and anniversification. It is the reward for continually 
engaging with the continually resurfacing memories. As users routinely engage with the 
platform, adding to their Streak daily, the power and artificiality of numbers, in turn, produce 
affective states and patterns of behaviour, infusing, for instance, notions of competition and 
production into users’ attitudes to digital memory making.  
The Streak embodies and typifies the aim of algorithmic media to be fundamentally 
addictive platforms. Through the continual resurfacing of memories at the opportune moment, 
algorithmic remembrance technologies not only try to manufacture kairos moments, instances 
of well-timed memory reminders; they always seek to engineer habituation through repetition. 
On one level, the reason for this is obvious. Any form of engagement with these apps and 
platforms is translated into data and thus rendered valuable, both in terms of knowing users 
more intimately and as a commercial outlet. Hence, using the Streak on Timehop and Snapchat 
as well as machine learning algorithms on Facebook to predict what ‘good’ memories users 
want to engage with become effective ways to keep users habitually engaged on their platforms. 
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More importantly, these examples show how anniversification, through repetition, seeks to 
habituate users to the platform and routinise the use of the platform in their everyday lives. 
Although using memory apps was part of many users’ daily routine, there were also 
participants that pointed out the problematic nature of repetitive resurfacing of memories. In 
the first focus group with local community group members, some of the participants were 
worried about the effects that may emerge as a result from this repetitive resurfacing. Discus-
sing the Facebook Memories feature in particular, a couple of the participants had used it before 
whilst the others had a rudimentary understanding of the feature. At the start of the focus group 
interview, Anna stated that: 
The other thing is the frequency with which it happens, cause if you look at a 
photo album you tend to do it very rarely, don’t you, or we do. We sort of do it 
on a special occasion, or you do it once a year if some elderly relative came 
around. You go ‘oh yeah, should get them out sort of thing.’ It’s not a daily thing 
to actually go through a physical photo album, not in my experience anyway.’  
Anna finds the ‘frequency with which it happens’ a noteworthy component of Facebook 
Memories. She compares it with the way she would look at photos, adding that ‘if you look at 
a photo album you tend to do it very rarely.’ This in and of itself poses an interesting contrast 
between algorithmic modes of memory making and other modes such as looking at photo 
albums, namely how often one does it. Later in the group interview, other members commented 
on Anna’s point about frequency. This is a longer discussion which I will quote it in full in 
order to give a sense of the variety of viewpoints on this matter. Wanting to return to Anna’s 
point about the repetitive nature of these memory apps, I ask whether they thought it would 
have any effect: 
INTERVIEWER: One thing that you [Anna] mentioned earlier, which I thought 
was quite interesting, I think there is something interesting about the fact that as 
you guys mention whenever you remind each other you cue each other oh I 
remember that or I remember this. But the fact that in many of these apps you’re 
being reminded of photos you have taken quite often, so maybe like every day. 
As you said, it seems to be so often, and I’m wondering what effect does that 
have that you’re seeing it so often? 
CATHERINE: You switch it off 
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ANNA: You could switch it off you could, but you become immune to it 
INTERVIEWER: But there are a lot of people that want to see it on a regular 
basis 
CATHERINE: Well you wouldn’t want to, would you 
ANNA: I mean, I want to see, and it also depends upon your level of usage and 
how many other distractions you have in life. Say, at the risk of, you know, 
generalising, say you have what we would view to be a normal life: you’re 
outgoing, you have social interactions, you’ve got a job, you don’t spend all day 
on the computer or on your phone, you know, physical exercise (overlapping 
agreement) – all the time if you live in a digital world – 
DANIEL: It’s a time waster 
ANNA: Is ultimately, you know, is it the extreme end, is there going to be a risk 
of your memory stream and your timeline going to be so confusing, you know – 
CATHERINE: It’s sad isn’t it if it got – 
ANNA: Get mixed up into it, I don’t know 
CATHERINE: The younger elements, it’s time they got themselves out, got 
crackin’ 
ANNA: Well 
This group exchange illustrates a variety of different attitudes towards how young people relate 
to their memory and their technologies.58 For Catherine, the prospect of these constant memory 
reminders is a source of unease, and proposes that one could indeed just ‘switch it off’ because 
‘you wouldn’t want to’ see them. Another participant, Daniel, echoes this sentiment, stating 
that these apps are a ‘time waster.’ However, Anna states that one of her worries about the 
frequency by which memories are resurfaced is the level of confusion it may engender in 
people. One of the effects, she suggests, is that people’s ‘memory stream and your timeline 
[are] going to be so confusing.’ Anna’s worry seems to presuppose a clear distinction between 
memory and someone’s social media timeline. It is grounded in the way continual reminders 
may conflate people’s lived experiences and memory stream, on the one hand, and their digital 
 
58 Note, the average age of this focus group was between 60-70.  
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timeline on the other. As she states, ‘the extreme end’ is that these two can become ‘mixed up’ 
into each other, which in turn would showcase how algorithmic remembrance technologies 
intervene and shape memories and particular representations of the past. 
Repetition and habituation therefore can become a source of anxiety for some when 
thinking about the ways it can affect people’s memory-making practices. When a certain form 
of remembering becomes habitual, whether that is in a social media context or not, it seeks to 
legitimate and perpetuate its own position in users’ lives. As Brighenti (2015, p. 46) points out, 
‘Repetition creates strata or plateaus where souvenirs and habits, beliefs and desires come to 
be stored.’ In this view, remembering always undergoes a process of stratification when repeat-
edly enacted, a process which constantly seeks to legitimate and reproduce itself. As Jacques 
Derrida (1996, p. 11) reminds us in his book Archive Fever, ‘there is no archive without a place 
of consignation, without a technique of repetition.’ Seen as digital archives, algorithmic 
remembrance technologies such as Facebook Memories, Google Photos, and Amazon Photos 
seem to fit this description. Through techniques of repetition, engagement with a memory app 
or a platform can be turned into user habits. In this view, the logic of anniversification, as an 
algorithmic technique of repetition, helps to nudge behaviours and engagement into habits and 
routines. 
For many participants, therefore, using algorithmic remembrance technologies was an 
everyday habit, part of their daily routine. For others, however, these technologies were a 
source of anxiety concerning the potential effects of continual reminders on people’s memories. 
Through the intersections of anniversification, kairos, repetition, and routinisation, memory 
practices are configured as both participation and habituation. It is my contention that the logic 
of anniversification, the constant resurfacing of memories ‘at the right time,’ seeks to legitimate 
and habituate a form of algorithmic memory making in users. That is, as algorithmic remem-
brance technologies become akin to ‘habitual new media’ (Chun, 2016), they become self-
legitimating. Writing on the notion of habits, legitimation, and digital remembrance, Lee 
Humphreys (2018) similarly points to the importance of repeated acts of documenting and 
remembering in legitimating our social order on social media. As she states, ‘remembrance is 
a media practice that ritualistically reinforces our social collective’ (p. 27) or, in other words, 
‘how the act of creating media traces of our experiences and of those around us transform 
experiences into ritualized accounts that can reflect and reinforce the social order’ (p. 115). 
However, these technologies both legitimate the social order and their own form of mediation, 
ultimately shaping the way people engage with the past. As Paul Connerton (1989, p. 4) 
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reminds us, ‘performativity cannot be thought without a concept of habit.’ Habituation, in a 
sense, is exemplary of the performative power of algorithmic remembrance technologies and 
their anniversal mode of resurfacing. The following section focuses on the logic of 
anniversification and how it can have a performative effect on users, both in terms of how they 
view the past and how they act in the present. 
 
6.2.4 ‘Sometimes it feels like you got to replicate it, make it a thing’: Performativity 
According to many of the participants, the way memories are temporally framed as kairos 
moments or anniversaries on algorithmic remembrance technologies had a performative effect 
on the way they viewed the past. Anniversification, as a temporal logic of algorithmic media, 
has the potential to shape how users see and understand their past experiences. It affects how 
memories and past experiences are perceived as well as enacted. For one of the participants, 
Raymond, seeing memories resurfacing on particular days and in this specific way, made 
remembering some experiences seem somehow ‘compressed.’ Talking about a very particular 
incident in his life, Raymond observes: 
I think it’s part of the experience. It is very specific, like the example of the 
graffiti phenomenon… It happened over time, so it’s not a thing that Timehop 
can exactly capture as a thing that happened on a day, because it happened over 
a couple of months. Like, ‘there’s another one!’ And then two days later, ‘there’s 
another one!’ and then three days later, ‘there’s another on!’... That’s sort of 
what Timehop does 95% of time is, ‘here is the boring picture I took on that one 
day.’ There’s always things that get compressed in terms of memory but it 
happened over the span of more than one day. 
As this respondent points out, being reminded of something continually skews the perception 
of a memory or the way a past experience progressed through time. In Raymond’s case, the 
extended, embodied remembering of past experiences seems temporally compressed. By this 
he means that the series of events went on for over two months, but as he only took one picture 
on ‘that one day,’ all those other memories attached to that event got compressed into one. The 
logic of anniversification has the capacity to compress multiple memories into one, altering the 
depth of the way past experiences or events are perceived and relived.  
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Similar ideas about the potential generative power of anniversification were also echoed 
in the interview with Diana. When I asked her whether she ever comes across memories she is 
surprised by on Timehop, she stated: 
Absolutely. Although, as I have used the app more, I found that because I have 
encountered myself of approximately 2007 to approximately, let’s call the date 
in the past 2013, I feel like I have sufficiently watched that cycle. Some of the 
emotional edges have been worn off, and it’s become a glossier past. I don’t 
know. Having seen my yearly cycle of artifacts that I have created publicly in 
some ways I think it is worn smooth the messier or undocumented memories that 
I might have of that time. Does that make sense?  
This respondent suggests that the way memories are packaged creates a ‘glossier past,’ a ver-
sion of the past where ‘the emotional edges have been worn off.’ One of the reasons for this is 
because Diana has gone through the Timehop yearly cycle of memories multiple times which 
in turn has ‘worn smooth the messier or undocumented memories that I might have of that 
time.’ Elaborating on this notion of the cyclicality of resurfaced memories and the question of 
temporality, she continued: 
DIANA: If I reflect on the past or remember something because something 
contextually came up in my life that feels a little different from being like I’m 
going to show a picture of something that you took a picture of a year ago to 
remind yourself to do something about and never did anything about it. Or I’m 
going to show you this status update that reminds you that you haven’t spoken 
to this friend in three years, I don’t know. Time is the element that forces you to 
think about it as different from day to day context. 
INTERVIEWER: In terms of time, what do you mean exactly? 
DIANA: I guess the cyclical nature of time forcing me to look back on x number 
of years to that day is in some ways an almost an objective feeling forcing 
function. I use the word objective, I think, because it makes me think I know 
why I don’t like this friend now, and maybe what I would do today is see a thing 
that she had done and be like, ‘oh she’s annoying!’ or whatever. But when I’m 
encountered with the evidence of the thing from the past because it’s in front of 
my face where I’m like, ‘oh we went to this thing together!’, I remember all these 
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things about it. I don’t think that I would extend that generosity if I were not 
faced with my literal self from the past who would have felt differently. 
Diana states that the effects of anniversification, of seeing memories pop up on their annual 
anniversaries year in and year out, has given her remembrance of the past a ‘more objective 
feeling forcing function.’ Given the cyclical nature of time and the way memories are 
resurfaced, users are forced to adapt to the platform’s particular resurfacing format, that is, 
“look on x number of years to that day.’ This is no longer an encounter with a memory as such; 
rather, it is an encounter with ‘the evidence of the thing from the past.’ For Diana, these 
anniversaries become more than memories to reminisce, celebrate and potentially share online; 
they also become evidence of past events, placed ‘in front of my face.’  
In a sense, the notion of a glossier past and the compression of memories can be under-
stood as collateral damage of the drive to render the world memorable and amenable to digital 
documentation. Geoffrey Bowker (2008, p. 71) stated that memory practices, whether mundane 
or scientific, always ‘skew our available ontological space,’ which both permits novel forms 
of capture and memory making whilst also excluding other forms. This performativity, inherent 
to algorithmic remembrance technologies, also resides at the very nature of the archive. As 
Jacques Derrida (1995, p. 16-17) argued, a fundamental trait of the archive is exactly that 
‘technical structure of the archiving archive also determines the structure of the archivable 
content in its very coming into existence’ (original emphases). With algorithmic remembrance 
technologies, not only are digital traces of past events compressed and rendered glossier in the 
present; they also seem to have a qualitative impact on users’ remembrance of the past. Anni-
versification, in a crucial sense, has the capacity to shape a user’s feel of the past, giving it a 
glossier tinge and shade, as Diana suggests.  
That being said, other participants also pointed out the potential of algorithmic remem-
brance technologies to accentuate certain memories of the past. In one of the interviews, 
Francis suggested that the way resurfaced memories are conceptualised as ‘anniversaries’ on 
Timehop helped to highlight certain things from the past. He states that: 
But when it’s the anniversary framing sense, maybe ‘diamond in the rough’ is 
like a good phrase to use, because it’s all these just mundane daily things that 
you did, and there’s one thing that is really specific. Those days and things like 
that, show up on Timehop, are more enjoyable than the days where it’s just me 
talking about work, school, just everyday life. 
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The temporal framing of certain experiences accentuates the meaning and significance of those 
memories. In this case, framing memories as anniversaries emphasises the ‘diamond in the 
rough’ amidst the mundane and every day. Conversely, Nicole points to the importance of all 
these small mundane events or discrete ‘micro events.’ She states that:  
I think that one of the things that Timehop has given me sort of permission to do 
is to be okay with this idea that who I am is constantly in flux, and that doesn’t 
mean that I’m being a phony version of self. It doesn’t mean that I’m dis-
honouring anything or anyone. It just means that all of these little ‘micro events’ 
they stack up on one another, and they kind of shape and shift the way that you 
think about yourself and your surroundings, and what is worthy of celebrating 
and what does celebration look like. 
Nicole states that ‘these little micro events’ stack up on one another and can be scaled in a 
sense, shaping the way she thinks about herself and her surroundings and what is worthy of 
celebration. The participant points to the performative power of the anniversary-like framing 
of memories and states that these ‘micro events’ in a way give her ‘permission’ to ‘be okay 
with this idea that who I am is constantly in flux.’ What this suggests is the power of potentiality 
embedded within algorithmic remembrance technologies and emanating from their temporal 
logic. As I pointed out earlier, participants mentioned different ways anniversaries could make 
them feel about certain memories. 
Another crucial performative effect has to do with the potentiality of anniversification. 
As software engineer and co-founder of memory app Timehop, Benny Wong, put it:  
BENNY: Yeah totally. And also, I’d say I think with all these memory products, 
if you look at the marketing material or the videos, demo these things, they go 
for the aspirational like weddings, graduations, those sorts of things, birthdays. 
And those are awesome and they are really fun to see in Timehop. But so much 
of the time it’s the other stuff that is really meaningful, so like the random coffee 
with a friend or going to the bar that you almost kicked out that night for being 
too drunk or something. That’s what most of your life is. To miss out on that 
stuff by only focusing on the birthdays and wedding stuff is also sort of a shame. 
At the end of the day, the mundane stuff is life, a lot of the stuff is really 
meaningful if not, you know, momentous or anything like that you know 
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INTERVIEWER: Was that also the reason why calling everything an anni-
versary, you’re adding that sense of these are important things even though they 
might not initially seem so? 
BENNY: Yeah totally. On the topic of showing everything, it’s so hard for us to 
know in the moment what is going to be important. What’s a good example? 
Like meeting someone who would end up being your colleague or your 
classmate or something like that. Those sort of things, you can’t make a real-
time judgment on how valuable this is until you have all of this context of what 
did that moment actually mean in my whole life story. 
As Benny Wong suggests, the aim of their memory app was never to focus solely on the 
birthdays and weddings and the big experiential markers. Rather, by resurfacing everything, 
including ‘the other stuff’ (e.g. ‘the random coffee with a friend’), Timehop was able to draw 
out and accentuate the meaningfulness of those events even if they were not ‘momentous or 
anything like that.’ Wong claims that conceptualising everything in terms of an anniversary 
was both an acknowledgement that mundane moments are indeed meaningful, but also an 
acceptance that one is unable to make a ‘real-time judgement’ on the value of certain docu-
mented traces of the past without knowing it will unfold ‘in my whole life story.’  
These timed anniversaries, however, have the capacity to do more than to draw 
meaningfulness from the well of these mundane events; they have the capacity to produce it. 
The potentiality of memories is algorithmically produced as well as temporally accentuated. 
This notion that potential memories are performative was also echoed in the interview with 
Nicole. When asked what she thought about the specific timing of memories, she stated rather 
extensively: 
Yeah, I think that I do look for something when it’s not an event or something 
like that. There is kind of a part of my mind that’s like, ‘this is going to pop up 
in Timehop in a year, so what might you want to remember about this? What is 
something that you might want to capture?’ I think the fact that it is not like a 
countdown, because Facebook shows you everyone’s birthday for the entire 
year… A celebration for me might look like something really small, like I’m 
going to treat myself to a piece of cake or I’m going to wear something, you 
know, that I wore on that day. That’ll be my way of kind of honouring that 
memory or that anniversary. I also think that it’s kind of seeped into other areas 
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of my life, where I’m kind of like if every day presents itself with an opportunity 
to show me something from my past that maybe was worth remembering and 
celebrating, then maybe I should be surrounding myself with that kind of stuff 
all the time. That has gone into my strategy for the things that I keep in my 
house… Every day is potentially a day that is going to come up and be remem-
bered. Timehop is going to remember this for you, can you celebrate it? Can you 
celebrate something about this day?... A celebration doesn’t have to be some-
thing that is huge and monumental and involving a whole bunch of other people. 
It can be something that is really specific to you and very private. 
There are a lot of different ideas in her statement that need further unpacking. Initially, Nicole 
suggests that she sometimes documents in the present with the knowledge that events will pop 
up on Timehop a year later. This leads her to ask, ‘what might you want to remember about 
this?’ Phrased in the subjunctive, this question is very indicative of Geoffrey Bowker’s notion 
of potential memory. The question implies that all events are potentially memorable and are 
therefore worthy of capture and documentation. This is the first point about potential memory: 
seeing everyday life as potentially memorable makes it likely valuable in the present. This is 
akin to what Nathan Jurgenson (2019, p. 7) has called ‘documentary vision,’ the positioning of 
the present ‘as a potential future past, creating a nostalgia for the here and now.’ Jurgenson 
argues that for a documentary vision, ‘life is experienced as increasingly documentable’ (p. 12) 
and it is therefore seen as ‘pregnant with documentary potential’ (p. 36). Therefore, seeing 
increasing parts of everyday life as potentially memorable has a qualitative effect on how 
people work on the present. For Nicole, ‘every day is potentially a day that is going to come 
up and be remembered,’ and celebrating these potentially memorable days is her way of 
‘honouring that memory or that anniversary.’  
Importantly, Nicole also states that the anniversary mentality has ‘seeped into other 
areas of my life.’ For example, sometimes she celebrates that she did not scream at anyone at 
work or cry. For Nicole, ‘a celebration doesn’t have to be something that is huge’ but it can be 
‘something that is specific to you and very private.’ What the participant is saying demonstrates 
the way the logic of anniversification can be diffused in the everyday and not only be contained 
to a memory app. This logic of anniversification states ‘Timehop is going to remember this for 
you, can you celebrate it?’ The fact that the feature can remember it, and the memory is framed 
as an anniversary, has a performative and generative effect on how Nicole lives her everyday 
life, asking herself what she can find to celebrate today. In other words, the temporal logic of 
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algorithmic media, anniversification, shapes and generates the present as well as how people 
work on the present. It affects how people enact their remembrance and habituation in the 
present.  
In the interview with Miriam, we discussed at length the effects of being reminded of 
memories on algorithmic remembrance technologies such as Facebook Memories. When asked 
if the temporal framing of memories had any effects on her, she responded: 
Sometimes. I feel like most of the little things to me just feel like that. It’s just 
sometimes I don’t know what the context of it is when it’s that small. If it’s 
something like grabbing a cup of coffee with a friend, I try to replicate that 
sometimes. I have a friend that lives probably about half an hour away from me 
and we’ll bring stuff up like that. I’ll go and visit her and we’ll try to get noodles. 
We went out and got ramen in Providence. It’s a little city, but we’re like, ‘okay, 
we got that four years ago, we got noodles there.’ And we’re like, ‘oh let’s got 
back, it’s so good, we should go back!’ Sometimes it feels like you got to 
replicate it, make it a thing, I guess. 
For Miriam, the impact of a memory depended on the original, whether she knew or it not. But 
seeing things like going for coffee with a friend encouraged her to ‘replicate that sometimes.’ 
Similarly, with her friend, she states that seeing certain memories resurface encouraged her to 
‘make it a thing.’ This notion of wanting to replicate a past memory as a result of a memory 
app was also suggested in the interview with Oliver. He stated that:  
OLIVER: Just yesterday, I think, popped up a group of chefs from Iceland came 
to my hometown here and did this whole tasting menu, and I had forgotten that 
I actually went to this thing. But then I saw it on Timehop yesterday and it was 
just like, ‘oh yeah that was really cool!’ I don’t really remember what it is that 
we ate, but seeing just, ‘oh this is where you checked in,’ that’s what that was 
for. It’s interesting just to be reminded of things that you’ve completely 
forgotten. 
INTERVIEWER: Does it kind of transport you back to that place as well, do you 
feel the same things there? 
OLIVER: A bit. It certainly makes me wish that programs like that continued to 
happen again. That was something that I did yesterday when I saw that I’m like, 
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‘is that group coming back this year? Because I would definitely go and book 
another table in order to do that again.’ It’s not something that I would have 
thought to look up on my own had I not been reminded of it. 
As with Miriam, Oliver states that seeing memories pop up on Timehop of certain events, like 
the chefs from Iceland, encourages him to ‘go and book another table in order to do that again.’ 
As Oliver suggests, these continual reminders are particularly powerful because there are 
certain memories that are not something that he would have thought ‘to look up on my own 
had I not been reminded of it.’ By continually resurfacing memories at the ‘opportune’ present 
moment, algorithmic remembrance technologies have the potential to shape how people 
perceive of their memories and how they are enacted in the present. As such, the logic of 
anniversification highlights the performative effects certain temporal framings of memory have 
on users and the way they remember the past. Moreover, the temporal framing of memories, 
resurfaced at ‘the right time,’ has the potential to shape how people live in the present, opening 
up possibilities for making certain past experiences ‘a thing’ in the present and future. 
 
6.3 Concluding Thoughts: Diffusing the Logic of Anniversification 
As I have demonstrated in this chapter, when memories are resurfaced by algorithmic 
remembrance technologies has an impact on the way the past is encountered, construed, and 
remembered by users.  I have been working with Taina Bucher’s (2018) claim that ‘right time’ 
is ‘the key temporal mode of algorithms,’ as well as the claim put forward by one of my 
participants, Alice, who said that when something is resurfaced is ‘not just an arbitrary date,’ 
which highlights the entanglement between temporality, algorithms, and memory making. I 
have argued that one can gain a deeper understanding of when algorithms come to matter in 
everyday life by investigating what I call the logic of anniversification, which underpins the 
automatic resurfacing of memories. Anniversification refers to a logic in which mundane 
events and everyday occurrences are pulled within the remit of the ‘anniversary’. In this frame-
work, everyday events become something that stand out, something to be remembered and 
celebrated. Within this logic, every ‘memory’ that is resurfaced is potentially worthy of remem-
brance, celebration, engagement, and repetition. I pointed out the ways that anniversification, 
as a temporal framing of memories, seeks to induce engagement and participation on the 
platform through the use of cyclical reminders. Timing becomes therefore a crucial tool for 
algorithmic remembrance technologies in the resurfacing of memories. Crucially, the logic of 
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anniversification accentuates the ways in which temporality is socio-technically constructed, 
and the processes through which timing is algorithmically engineered and operationalised. In 
other words, the ‘right time’ does not merely happen, but it is made.  
 This chapter has also examined the various ways in which anniversification impacts 
people’s memory-making practices. Participants pointed out that temporally framing memories 
as anniversaries helped shape both the way they remembered the past and how they worked on 
the present. They stated that the way memories resurfaced on features such as Timehop and 
Facebook Memories shaped the way they saw certain aspects of the past: as more real, more 
visceral, as something more acute, and more exact. They also pointed out that seeing memories 
resurface on their respective annual anniversaries gave them a sense of these memories as being 
more tangible, less nebulous, and vague, and more unique. Conversely, participants such as 
Diana noted that seeing memories resurface at such a time and in such a manner resulted in 
‘the emotional edges’ of memories having been ‘worn off.’ Some participants also worried that 
seeing memories resurface in this manner would eventually skew their perception of one’s past 
experiences. Moreover, some respondents, such as Miriam, pointed out how seeing 
anniversaries pop up had induced them to repeat the memory, whether that was to grab another 
coffee with a friend or book a table in a particular restaurant – in other words, to ‘make it a 
thing’ in the present. 
The logic of anniversification is not only a way to frame memories temporally in order 
to induce increased participation on the platform; it also shapes how the past is seen and relived. 
The logic of anniversification has the capacity to engender new rituals and habits as well as 
shaping the perception of the past experiences and their level of meaningfulness. I argue that 
examining the logic of anniversification in terms of alignment, personalisation, habituation, 
and performativity provides a broader as well as deeper understanding of the social power of 










What does it imply, then, Apple Memories’ tagline ‘you have a new memory’? What does it 
mean to remember with algorithms? In contemporary digital memory studies, the image of the 
archive has had a resurgence in attention (e.g. Hoskins, 2018). One can argue that contem-
porary social media platforms, apps, and other algorithmic systems, function as extensive 
digital archives, storing vast amounts of data about people’s lives and pasts. One could also 
argue that memory is increasingly mediatised (Couldry and Hepp, 2017), becoming dependent 
on and interwoven with these platforms and systems. Yet, the emphasis on the affordances of 
these archival structures does not fully make sense of how algorithmic media in their current 
iterations intersect with people’s memories and their memory practices in everyday life.  
In chapter four, for instance, I argued that algorithmic systems are changing our media 
and memory landscapes as well as the conditions for what it means to encounter and remember 
the past. What I called ‘algorithmic remembrance technologies’ afford the potential of 
memory-making practices being pulled within the threshold of datafication. In this view, 
memory practices are rendered increasingly malleable, readable, and manageable by the work 
of algorithms. As a result, memory apps, platforms, and the companies creating these 
technologies are carving out novel forms of practices, novel means of encountering and 
engaging with the past. In short, carving out spaces for remembering with algorithms. Chapter 
five examined how these features are, in turn, used by people in everyday life. The chapter 
argued that people do not merely revisit the past through these technologies, but also draw on 
their mediated memories as a means to emplot or weave a sense of self in the present. 
Moreover, I pointed out that there is scope to think of processes of emplotment in more 
sociotechnical terms. In this view, memory features can be seen to participate in the emplot-
ment of people’s sense of self, deciding what to resurface, when, and how often. Lastly, in 
chapter six, I examined the temporal logic underlying the functionality of memory features. 
The logic of anniversification, as I call it, showcases how timing can be programmed into 
memory features in order to shape how users engage with their past and work on their present. 
In the chapter, I also showcase that timing is a crucial way through which algorithms come to 
matter in the social world and in everyday life, producing various routines and affects. 
Remembering, therefore, refers to a multiplicity of acts and processes, both conscious 
and unconscious. As the analysis chapters have shown, it refers not only to the act of recalling 
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the past, the processes by which information or images are retrieved. Instead, when I have 
spoken of ‘remembering’, it has encapsulated processes of encountering and revisiting the past, 
negotiating its meaning, and making sense of it in the present. It implies issues of ordering, 
management, reconfiguration, and affect. In short, this thesis has worked with a notion of 
remembering that is complex, messy, dynamic, and profoundly social as well as technical.  
But what does it mean, then, to remember with algorithms? Does it mean using 
algorithmic systems merely as memory aids? Not quite. One could argue that we have always 
used technologies to capture, document, curate, and remember the past (that is if ‘technology’ 
is understood simply as a tool, i.e. techne). Throughout the years, technologies have affected 
and shaped how people experience and engage with the past as well how they share and 
communicate this past with others. From this perspective, the mediation of memory has always 
been technological to various degrees. The memory features that have been discussed here 
constitute, as a result, a continuance of a long and complex trajectory where technologies have 
always intimately figured as tools for memory. However, as this thesis argues, these 
algorithmic systems also constitute a rupture as well as an intensification of this trajectory. 
Whereas memory tools and media have always afforded the facilitation of how people capture 
the past, algorithmic remembrance technologies constitute active agents of memory. They 
actively participate in how the past is defined and what aspects of the past are resurfaced. In a 
sense, they are not merely active but have become pro-active. By datafying, analysing, and 
resurfacing what they consider ‘memories’, these algorithmic technologies are pushing a 
certain conceptualisation of what it means to remember and engage with the past. In short, 
algorithmic memory features broker a shift in how the past comes to matter in the present and 
how it is experienced qualitatively. 
  
7.1 From Remembering to Resurfacing 
After examining algorithmic remembrance technologies and how they are used in everyday 
life, the central argument of this thesis is that algorithms are facilitating an emerging shift from 
remembering to resurfacing. What is meant by this? It signals a shift from what people can and 
do remember, through various digital objects, to what memories algorithmic systems actively 
resurface and remind users of and when. As we saw in chapter six, the recursive resurfacing of 
the past has its own complex temporal structure and underlying logic. Instead of people 
engaging with the past through tools such as photo albums, diaries, or digital archives, 
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algorithmic remembrance technologies actively, recursively, and routinely resurface certain 
‘memories’ to people at certain times in order to achieve certain effects. In other words, the 
data past that users encounter on various social media platforms, apps, and features is not 
simply docile memories waiting to be excavated and found by users; instead, these technologies 
work to mine, repackage, and push certain data to the surface, repackaging and rendering them 
as ‘memories’ in the present. Deliberately and somewhat ironically, remembering with 
algorithms is less about human remembering and more about the computational conditions 
through which this remembering is made possible. It signals the increasing centrality of the 
resurfacing mechanism as well as the algorithmic operations that make these mechanisms 
possible. For example, chapter four examined various memory features such as Facebook 
Memories, Snapchat Memories, Google Photos, Timehop, and Apple Memories in order to 
highlight this. In short, we are now seeing a widespread shift from remembering to resurfacing 
in the current media landscape.  
I argue, in other words, that the intersections of algorithmic systems and memory 
practices in everyday life are best understood in terms of people’s personal memories being 
algorithmically ‘rolled-out’ on social media platforms and apps.59 Within this framework, the 
focus increasingly shifts from using tools to encounter the past to the algorithmic processes 
through which these encounters are repeatedly instantiated. As many participants noted in 
chapter five, being reminded of certain memories is a fundamental aspect of using memory 
features. The roll-out of resurfacing also has implications for what particular memories people 
engage with. As we have seen in chapters five and six, the resurfacing of memories is 
underpinned by specific computational and temporal criteria. For instance, features such as 
Facebook Memories seek to predominantly resurface ‘happy memories’ to people in the name 
of mental health, often sculpting so-called ‘digital voids’ around others (Jacobsen, 2020b). 
Moreover, apps such as Timehop have incorporated a ‘Hide’ button into their functionality, 
giving users the option to hide certain memories, preventing them from ever resurfacing again.  
 
59 This idea of ‘roll-out’ derives from Jamie Peck’s (2010) work on neoliberalism. Understanding it as a process, 
Peck argued that neoliberalisation comprises a ‘doubling’ movement (p. 22-23): the discouragement of state 
structures in favour of market values on the one hand (roll back), and the processes whereby the values and 
principles of neoliberalism such as competition and optimisation are permeated throughout the non-economic 
spheres of society on the other (roll-out). By using the notion of ‘roll-out’, I do not argue that memory practices 
are becoming part of the broader processes of neoliberalism – that would exceed the scope of this project. Instead, 
I evoke the notion that the shift from remembering to resurfacing is rolling out the logic of algorithms in terms of 
how memory is understood and instantiated in everyday life.  
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Before continuing, it is important to clarify what exactly is meant by ‘resurfacing’ and 
how it differs from other terms such as ‘reminding’, both conceptually and semantically. As 
the word ‘resurfacing’ denotes, memory features constitute a drive to bring certain aspects of 
one’s data past back to the surface, back into view, back within people’s parameters of 
attention. As chapter four showed, many features use machine learning algorithms, promising 
to reach ‘deep into your photo gallery’, ‘deep into your phone’, or ‘deep into your photo library’ 
in order to bring back ‘forgotten moments’ and memories. In such taglines, there is a clear play 
with imagery of depth, which on one level suggests the use of deep learning algorithms. Yet, 
on another level, suggests something unmanaged, neglected, and forgotten; something which 
must be brought back into view. Like deep-sea divers, memory features promise to bring back 
to the surface aspects of the past that users might appreciate or might have forgotten. As I use 
the term in in the project, ‘resurfacing’ is an attempt to conceptualise the underlying drive and 
logic of algorithmic deep diving. That is, the drive to use algorithmic systems to dive deep into 
people’s data past and to resurface it in order to make it matter in the present. 
Resurfacing also describes the various processes by which the data past comes to 
inhabit users’ present again. For instance, in chapter five I argue that timing is a crucial aspect 
for this process of resurfacing, that is, when the data past comes to matter in the present. The 
use of ‘resurfacing’ here stands in contrast to ‘reminding’, which is arguably a more commonly 
used term. As chapters five and six highlight, users often understood this process of memories 
being routinely resurfaced as kind of ‘reminders’, ‘memory jogs’, or ‘memory prompts’. 
Reminding was often evoked by participants to make sense of the processes by which mediated 
memories were resurfaced and brought to bear on their present, jogging their memory. Here, 
the logic of resurfacing is understood as reminding as people engage with and negotiate 
mediated memories in the present. In chapter four, ‘reminding’ as a term was also seen to be 
used by apps, features, and tech companies in order to describe how their memory features 
operated. Reminding, in this context, constituted a discursive strategy that obfuscates the 
underlying logic of resurfacing of these technologies, making it more benign and every day, 
giving it a more organic feel.   
It is also crucial to acknowledge that this shift from remembering to resurfacing is by 
no means a smooth, frictionless transition. As chapters 5 and 6 have suggested, some 
participants found the resurfacing of memories a helpful and beneficial feature, a mechanism 
to aid their memory. However, participants also raised many concerns. For instance, some 
participants found the resurfacing of memories boundary breaching, evoking a sense of 
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creepiness. Others saw the resurfacing of memories as emblematic of more entrenched issues 
such as data mining, access, and the right to one’s data and memories. It is therefore important 
to point out that the shift form remembering to resurfacing will likely engender sites of tensions 
between users and memory technologies. 
Yet, we need to specify exactly how this shift from remembering to resurfacing is 
emerging. The thesis argues that there are two concurrent processes or factors which are 
facilitating the shift from remembering to resurfacing: 
1. The eventfulness of algorithmic encounters 
2. The positioning of users 
The first process relates to the ontology of algorithms. It suggests that contemporary memory 
practices can be understood increasingly as a series of affective encounters, crossroads, or 
‘situations’ involving the coming-together of users and various algorithmic systems at specific 
times. The second process relates to the changing nature of ‘using’ platforms, features, and 
apps. It suggests that using algorithmic remembrance technologies becomes increasingly a 
matter of positioning oneself in relation to them so as to be able to receive and be affected by 
the memories that are resurfaced.  
 
7.1.1 The Eventfulness of Algorithms 
This notion of ‘algorithms as eventful’ derives from Taina Bucher’s (2018) discussion of the 
ontology of algorithms. This particular conceptualisation implies ‘a rejection of essences and 
permanences and an ontological shift towards a world of process and relation’ (Bucher, 2018, 
p. 48). Emphasising algorithms as processes of becoming rather than specific reified objects, 
Bucher states that algorithms should not be considered mainly in relation to their mathematical 
properties, but rather where, when, and to whom they are. In short, they need to be considered 
in relation to ‘what they do as part of specific situations’ (p. 49; original emphasis). As Nick 
Seaver (2017, p. 2) put it, a study of algorithmic systems should focus on ‘their empirical 
profusion and practical existence in the wild.’ As such, the emphasis is on the effects of 
algorithms in specific situations and as entangled parts of particular situated practices – in short, 
how and when they make things happen and to whom.  
 This notion of algorithms as eventful is crucial to how algorithmic remembrance 
technologies should be understood. These technologies are not merely databases or digital 
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archives hosting volumes of data about users; moreover, they do not only analyse, classify, and 
sort this data. Rather, they are eventful. They make things happen in particular contexts and as 
part of particular situated practices. As the chapter on the temporal structure of algorithmic 
remembrance technologies suggested, algorithms come to matter at specific points in time, 
resurfacing certain memories to people as opportune moments. Therefore, what counts as a 
mediated memory, or what is seen as a meaningful memory, is interwoven with the notion of 
anniversification and how timing is programmed into their functionality. Increasingly, the 
conditions of possibility for meaningful encounters with one’s past is becoming more and more 
tied up with algorithmic remembrance technologies and their underlying eventfulness. 
 The eventfulness of algorithms also suggests that memory work and memory practices 
become increasingly predicated on the diverse encounters between people, socialities, and 
algorithmic systems – in other words, a series of ‘situations’. In her book Cruel Optimism 
(2011), Lauren Berlant defines a ‘situation’ as:  
A state of things in which something that will perhaps matter is unfolding amid 
the usual activity of life. It is a state of animated and animating suspension that 
forces itself on consciousness, that produces a sense of the emergence of some-
thing in the present (p 5; original emphasis). 
 ‘Situations’, as I use it in this context, refers to the exact moments or contexts where people, 
memory, and algorithmic systems intersect; where a variety of human and nonhuman agencies 
can be seen to intersect, cross, and unfold. Situations refer to the kind of encounters, 
intersections, or crossings where algorithmic systems resurface past data as ‘memories’, where 
people encounter these ‘memories’ as somehow meaningful representations of the past, where 
affective states and remembering is actualised, and the past is made to matter in the present. 
Understanding remembering with algorithms as eventful situations highlights the active role of 
memory features in resurfacing certain memories from the past to certain people. These 
algorithmic systems do not just act as the extensions or exoskeletons for people’s memory 
practices, but are rather inextricably part of the situations in which the data past comes to matter 
in the present. The shift from remembering to resurfacing, therefore, is facilitated firstly by the 
eventfulness of algorithmic systems and the situations created by the encounters between algo-
rithms, platforms, data, mediated memories, programmed temporalities, users, and various 




7.1.2 The Positioning of Users 
Secondly, the shift from remembering to resurfacing has been facilitated by how users specifi-
cally relate to these algorithmic technologies. As the previous section suggests, the event-
fulness of algorithms and the encounters between people and algorithms should be thought of 
in terms of various intersecting currents of action and agencies. Rather than digging or seeking 
to find out the mediated memories buried deep in one’s social media history, remembering with 
algorithms is better understood as a form of positioning or what Jane Bennett (1997, 2001) 
calls ‘comportment’. Comportment, for Bennett, signifies the ways in which people position 
themselves in order to render themselves susceptible to a state of enchantment. For Bennett 
(1997, p. 5), a state of enchantment is achieved through a specific posture, an active positioning 
of oneself, which signifies an ‘active engagement with objects of sensuous experience.’  
As we saw in chapter five, comportment can help us understand how people specifically 
use algorithmic remembrance technologies in and through anticipation. As the chapter sug-
gests, using memory features, apps, and platforms is not simply to dig into one’s past, seeking 
to find particular mediated memory objects to enjoy or remember. Rather, remembering with 
algorithms often becomes equivalent to putting oneself in a position of being affected by 
algorithmically resurfacing memories. It becomes akin to positioning oneself in such a way as 
to continually encountering memories selected by memory features. As chapter five high-
lighted, remembering with algorithms is a form of ‘anticipatory positioning’: it is using 
memory apps because one anticipates being affected, being shocked, surprised, being encoun-
tered by the resurfacing past. As such, comportment suggests a form of positioning, a posture. 
It is a particular way of placing oneself in the way of algorithmic systems, becoming susceptible 
to their recursive resurfacing of memories. 
Yet, the ways in which algorithmic remembrance technologies become increasingly 
active in resurfacing memories in everyday life problematises this notion of the positioning of 
users. Although users do adopt specific postures in order to be affected by these memories, it 
is also important to acknowledge the ways in which these technologies actively seek to position 
users as receptacles for algorithmically resurfaced memories. As such, the increasingly 
automatic resurfacing of memories will likely engender tensions between how users position 
themselves and how are they are positioned by memory technologies, apps, and features. 
The shift from remembering to resurfacing is firstly facilitated by the eventfulness of 
algorithms and the affective encounters they produce between users, algorithms, and memory. 
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Secondly, it is facilitated by the ways in which people position themselves, or are positioned, 
in relation to algorithmic remembrance technologies. As algorithmic systems have become 
increasingly active in mining, selecting, and resurfacing past data as memories, the mnemonic 
agency of users more and more comprises reacting to what they are presented with or reminded 
of, rather than actively excavating those memories themselves in their own time. At a surface 
glance, it could be easy to equate this emphasis on the agency and dynamics of algorithmic 
technologies as somehow undermining people’s agency in memory, suggesting a deterministic 
view of both algorithms as well as human remembering. Yet, as Fuller and Ren (2019, p. 142) 
state, situations are ‘rich in variable potentialities enabled by particular conditions.’ The idea 
of reacting does not imply passivity nor technological determinism. Rather, this mode of 
reacting should be understood as a form of what Espeland and Sauder (2008) describe as 
‘reactivity’. In their analysis on quantification and the role of metrics in society, they state that 
‘measurement intervenes in the social worlds it depicts. Measures are reactive; they cause 
people to think and act differently’ (p. 412). As chapter fived showed, reacting to 
algorithmically surfaced memories is by no means a passive act. On the contrary, it involves 
negotiating and actively engaging with the memories one is presented with. In short, the 
eventfulness of algorithms and the positioning of users do not necessitate an inevitable, 
deterministic outcome. Rather, these situations are contingent and rich in potential outcomes. 
These encounters do not determine memory or memory practice in one way or another. These 
two concurrent processes I have just outlined, however, do suggest that we need to think of the 
intersections of human agency, algorithms, and memory in new ways. We especially need to 
think about the role of resurfacing in relation to how the past comes to matter in the present. 
 
7.2 Algorithms and Distributed Cognition 
As I mentioned, the concurrent processes of the eventfulness of algorithms and the positioning 
of users suggest that we need to rethink the balance between users and algorithms. One part of 
this means downplaying the often-heavy emphases on ‘human’ and ‘social’ in memory 
practices. One way to rethink this balance is to explore the scope for a more distributed 
approach to human and nonhuman agents. Arguing for a distributed understanding of cognition 




No longer is human will seen as the source from which emanates the mystery 
necessary to dominate and control the environment. Rather, the distributed 
cognition of the emergent human subject correlates with – in Bateson’s phrase, 
becomes a metaphor for – the distributed cognitive system as a whole, in which 
thinking is done by both human and nonhuman actors. 
Remembering with algorithms similarly accentuates memory practices in terms of distributed 
cognitive systems and cognitive functions. It highlights the ways in which memory and remem-
bering are distributed amongst human and nonhuman agencies, including memory features, 
apps, and social media platforms. The shift from remembering to resurfacing undermines, or 
at least problematises, the supremacy of the human and the social in emerging modes of 
memory practices. As Hayles (2017, p. 26) argues in her book Unthought, ‘both technical and 
biological systems engage in meaning-making within their relevant instantiated/embodied/-
embedded contexts.’ In the context of this thesis, remembering with algorithms can be seen as 
done by both human and nonhuman actors, and what we consider a ‘meaningful memory’ must 
therefore be considered in relation to both biological and technical actors. 
That being said, there is still a heavy emphasis on human agency in contemporary 
memory studies. Lee Humphreys (2018, p. 73), for example, proposes the notion of ‘remem-
brancing’ in order to focus our attention on ‘the active, social, and reflexive processes of 
memory.’ Drawing on Annette Kuhn’s term ‘memory work’, Humphreys (2018, pp. 73-74) 
seeks to highlight the way people ‘purposefully and strategically create media traces to help 
them remember events and experiences in their lives within particular narratives of the self, the 
social context, and the broader cultural environments.’ Remembrancing, in Humphreys’ view, 
signifies not only the cognitive aspects of memory work, but also its somatic dimension (p. 
74). By this she means that remembering is fundamentally an embodied process, a point that is 
also convincingly argued by others such as Paul Connerton (1989). The emphasis here is on 
the active, conscious human processes of remembering the past, where people engage with and 
interrogate mediated memories such as digital images in light of certain narratives of self. Of 
course, a more distributed understanding of memory practices does not mean ignoring the role 
of human reflexivity. Indeed, chapter five has sought to expound on the ways people actively 
use and engage with algorithmic remembrance technologies and the memories they routinely 
resurface. Yet, the thesis has also tried to problematise a too clear distinction between the 
human and the nonhuman, arguing that algorithmic systems participate in the emplotment of 
selves as well.  
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 José van Dijck (2007), in her book Mediated Memories in the Digital Age, proposed 
the notion of ‘mediated memories’ for some of the same reasons as Lee Humphreys: to 
emphasise the reflexive and embodied processes involved in our engagement with media 
technologies. As van Dijck states, mediated memories refer to the ‘activities and objects we 
produce and appropriate by means of media technologies, for creating and re-creating a sense 
of past, present, and future of ourselves in relation to others’ (2007, p. 74). Yet, crucially, van 
Dijck argues that mediated memories cannot be located ‘strictly in the brain’ nor in wider 
culture, but rather exists ‘in both concurrently’ (p. 28). As she states, mediated memories are 
‘manifestations of a complex interaction between brain, material objects, and the cultural 
matrix from which they arise’ (p. 28). This notion of mediated memories as an amalgamation 
of several elements or factors, or as a quantifiable field of frequencies as I argued in chapter 
four, has been explored throughout this thesis.  
In some ways, the argument of this thesis echoes van Dijck’s claim about the complex 
interactions underpinning mediated memories. Yet, it has also sought to go beyond this claim. 
By arguing for a shift from remembering to resurfacing, I have sought to argue that remem-
bering with algorithms increasingly constitutes a series of ‘situations’ or encounters, where 
people, memory, and algorithms intersect and cross. It refers to the complex intersections of 
various human and nonhuman agencies, all actively participating in the way the past is 
constructed, interpreted, understood, shared, and brought to bear upon the present. The shift 
from remembering to resurfacing is also facilitated, I argue, by the ways people comport or 
position themselves in relation to contemporary algorithmic remembrance technologies. In this 
framework, remembering with algorithms is partly a posture through which users render 
themselves susceptible to resurfaced memories and to the affective states that such memories 
engender. The shift I have suggested here does not seek to undermine human agency in memory 
work. On the contrary, by theorising a shift from remembering to resurfacing the thesis seeks 
to reconceptualise its position in remembering, highlighting the ways memory work rather 
comprises multiple intersecting agencies actively participating in its processes. Moreover, the 
shift from remembering to resurfacing seeks to extend our understanding of the power and 
politics of algorithms and how they come to matter in the social world, shaping how memory 




7.3 Why Resurfacing? Surveillance Capitalism, Nudge, and Captivating Algorithms 
Finally, having outlined the processes that are precipitating the shift from remembering to 
resurfacing, we must now scrutinize the political underpinnings and potential implications of 
this emerging shift. This means revisiting some ideas already discussed at the start of chapter 
four. Throughout the fieldwork period, participants often asked why apps and platforms were 
so incessant in their resurfacing of past memories whilst there did not seem to be any 
advertisements or explicit monetary motives attached to them. It is an interesting question. In 
other words, users found it odd that there were seemingly no immediate financial motives 
attached to these resurfacing memories. Was it then merely a sign of a platform’s good will? 
As chapter four suggests, even if they do not seem immediately monetised, it does not mean 
that algorithmic remembrance technologies are innocent tools, simply providing users with the 
means of revisiting their data past. They have been created and issued forth by app developers, 
software engineers, data companies, and multi-national social media platforms with financial 
interests. Algorithmic remembrance technologies exist within a variegated landscape that is 
financially and culturally underpinned by a logic of participation and data extraction. In chapter 
four, I argued that memory features, apps, and platforms must be viewed within a broader 
framework of surveillance capitalism (Srnicek, 2017), a metaprocess where increasing aspects 
of society, culture, and everyday life are rendered amenable to data extraction in order to 
produce value. These aspects are caught up in what José van Dijck (2013) has called ‘the 
ecosystem of connectivity’, where data is constantly produced, extracted, translated into ads 
and recommendations, and ultimately turned into value and revenue for companies and 
shareholders. Within the framework of surveillance capitalism, data, quite literally, has become 
the new gold. Data about people’s encounters with the past is no exception.  
 In what ways, then, does surveillance capitalism operate and how does it relate to 
algorithmic remembrance technologies? Nick Seaver’s (2018) work on recommender systems 
is one salient indicator of how surveillance capitalism emerges and is diffused in society. 
Seaver (2018) argues that modern recommender systems contained within platforms such as 
Netflix and Amazon may not be so ‘modern’ as sometimes assumed. Seaver shows there is a 
notable parallel between the logics of recommender systems and that of Indigenous American 
animal traps. Just as traps were tools that had to ‘persuade its prey to play the role scripted for 
it in its design,’ recommender systems similarly constitute ‘devices designed to alter the 
behaviour of their prey, in order to catch them’ (p. 425). More broadly, Seaver suggests that 
there is a certain logic that both defines and pervades the entire software industry, which he 
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calls ‘vernacular captology’ (p. 425). Vernacular captology highlights the ways in which the 
capture of data, the capture of people’s attention as well as their habits and routines figure as 
the bedrock and springboard on which modern platforms and media industries operate.  
 The algorithmic remembrance technologies that have been discussed and examined in 
this project can be understood as mundane examples of such ‘vernacular captology’ in action. 
In Seaver’s view, recommender systems imagine users as prey to be captured, drawing on their 
data in order to know them more intimately. The bait is whatever is recommended: a new 
Netflix series, a book other shoppers ‘like me’ bought on Amazon, and so on. But this capto-
logical equation is written slightly different with algorithmic remembrance technologies. With 
these, the prey remains the user, but the bait is no longer a specific product as we find on Netflix 
or Amazon. Instead, the bait is the user themselves or, more specifically, their variegated data 
past: ‘here is a memory of you from your past!’ Unlike Indigenous animal traps, it is not enough 
to only capture once. For this bait to be effective, it must be made continually visible; it must 
perpetually feature in users’ parameters of attention, and it must be an effective ‘technicity of 
attention’ (Bucher, 2012a). Vernacular captology implies that users must be continually 
captured and hooked for it to be of value to the hunter. Attention must be repeatedly and algo-
rithmically steered in certain (desirable) directions. This is why the resurfacing mechanism, or 
what the interview participants conceived as memory reminders or memory jogs, is so crucial 
for how these technologies operate. Namely, the shift from remembering to resurfacing entails 
that the mechanism of resurfacing memories becomes more and more prominent to contem-
porary modes of digital memory work. This is because it helps to ensure the continuous capture 
of users and their attention.60 
Drawing on Seaver’s (2018) idea of captology, it is apparent that the resurfacing mecha-
nism is a trap of sorts. As discussed in chapters five and six, resurfaced memories have the 
potential to capture peoples’ attention whilst also producing in them a more intimate relation-
ship to their data past. Moreover, they can shape how people work on the present. They have 
the potential to boost people’s stickiness and engagement on certain platforms or apps, even 
making it easier and more desirable to share and communicate mediated memories with others. 
They also make it easier for users to re-circulate pasta data rather than to create wholly new 
content, as chapter four suggested. In short, algorithmic remembrance technologies seek to add 
to their services’ stickiness ‘with this larger profit motive in mind’ (Prey and Smit, 2018, p. 
 
60 For a deeper investigation into the ways contemporary platforms and algorithmic systems seek to ‘hook’ users 
into enduring usage, see Wendy Chun’s (2016) Habitual New Media and Nir Eyal’s (2014) Hooked.  
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214). The resurfacing mechanism is a crucial ingredient for captivating users by attempting to 
‘alter the behaviour of their prey, in order to catch them’ (Seaver, 2018, p. 425). In a sense, the 
tagline ‘here’s a new memory’ can be understood as the trap waving its bait at the user. Yet, it 
is important here, Seaver suggests, that we do not see traps simply as brief moments of 
violence, but rather as something gradual, something which can seem luring or even natural. 
Traps can figure as so-called ‘agents of environmentalization’ (Seaver, 2018, p. 432), where 
they can almost seamlessly blend into whatever environment they are embedded, becoming 
indiscernible from the digital infrastructures in which they exist. The resurfacing mechanism 
can therefore be figured as a trap but also as an agent that convinces, that attracts, that is 
routinised – in short, an agent that ‘nudges’. 
Nudges are exemplary of the captological logic of algorithmic systems and a prime 
example of ‘vernacular captology’. The concept of ‘nudge’, originally proposed by Thaler and 
Sunstein (2008) in their book Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth and 
Happiness, describes how mundane cues, incentives, and cognitive biases can be utilised to 
shape human choices and behavioural patterns in certain (positive) directions. For example, 
users can be nudged towards healthier living by wearable technologies such as Fitbits or smart 
watches (e.g. Lupton, 2013; Schull, 2016). Nudges, as described by Thaler and Sunstein, are a 
powerful mechanism for not only shaping behavioural patterns, but also for producing and 
inculcating certain desirable habits and routines.61 Remembering with algorithms, the shift 
from remembering to resurfacing, also seems conditioned by the logic of nudges. Through the 
continual resurfacing of well-timed memories, users are induced to form habitual relationships 
to their data past, to the algorithmically resurfacing data past. The ‘roll-out’ of memory in the 
age of algorithms denotes an ever-pervading nudge towards participation, towards sharing, 
towards producing. Engaging with mediated memories becomes implicated in this logic of 
nudge and, in turn, algorithmic remembrance technologies are able to ‘creep more deeply into 
the texture of our lives’ (van Dijck, 2013, p. 55).  
 
61 Working in the field of behavioural economics, Thaler and Sunstein (2008) envisaged nudges as a force for 
good in society, engineering people’s choice architecture towards better and healthier decisions in subtle ways. 
From a more critical data studies perspective, nudge theory has been critiqued as yet another form of techno-
surveillance. Drawing on Foucault’s idea of environmentality, Mark Andrejevic (2020, p. 105) argues: 
Recently popularized versions of ‘nudge’ theory… are a pop-culture distillation of milieu-based 
governance in which ‘action is brought to bear on the rules of the game rather than on the 
players… in which there is an environment type of intervention instead of the internal subju-
gation of individuals.’  
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I want to argue that the shift from remembering to resurfacing, whilst being enabled by 
the eventfulness of algorithms and the positioning of users, is also underpinned by a particular 
economy or captology of participation. The shift is propelled by an underlying drive to capture 
users’ attention, transforming it into modes of participation, habits, and routines, ultimately 
turning it into value and revenue for the app or platform. This particular economy or captology 
constitutes a landscape where one is constantly nudged towards engaging with the past through 
the mechanism of resurfacing and memory features more generally; where one is continually 
encouraged to share these memories with others and to document and work on the present as a 
resurfaceable future past. In other words, it can be conceptualised as a form of ‘participatory 
normativity’ (Jacobsen, 2020a), where sharing and participating becomes the norm to comply 
with. As such, the shift from remembering to resurfacing can be seen to have political and 
economic implications. It is by no means a neutral shift; it is imbued with a certain politics, the 
capacity to act and to shape the actors operating within in its framework. As such, remembering 
with algorithms can be seen as a trap. But as Nick Seaver (2018, p. 432) reminds us, traps are 
not simply the ‘unilateral application of technical force,’ but rather, ‘a fundamentally uncertain 
effort to relate to others which thereby produces a world.’ Traps make worlds. The shift from 
remembering to resurfacing, this thesis ultimately argues, has the capacity and the potential to 
shape users, their perceptions of the past and others, their everyday memory practices, and the 
understanding of what it means to remember in the age of algorithms. The Apple Memories’ 
tagline ‘You have a new memory’ suggests how remembering with algorithms has the potential 
to produce new representations and realities of the past, of the self, of others, and of the wider 
social world.  
 
7.4 Future Work 
This thesis has sought to make sense of some broader trends in the way people relate to memory 
and algorithmic systems in everyday life, but it also raises multiple questions which are in need 
of further examination. One of the first questions prompted by the thesis is the nature and 
definition of what a memory is in the age of algorithms. In this thesis, drawing on the work of 
Jose van Dijck, I have proposed an amalgamated conceptualisation of memory, that is, memory 
as amalgamations of brain, body, sociality, culture, and technology. I have argued that seeking 
to somehow locate or fix memory in one of these factors fails to account for the ways in which 
memory always seems to operate in the interstices of things. That being said, there is a need 
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for further research that critically engages with this question of what a memory is in the age of 
algorithms in more depth.  
Secondly, the thesis also raises questions regarding the relationship between data and 
memory, especially as facilitated and mediated by social media platforms. Data has been 
mostly absent from this thesis as I have examined the ways in which memories come to matter 
in everyday life as part of particular socio-technical situations. Yet, there is still a need to 
examine the ways in which social media platforms such as Facebook define and conceptualise 
memory through mining user data and producing ‘meaningful’ patterns from this data. As a 
platform that heavily relies on mining and trading users’ data, Facebook is a particular apt 
avenue for future research into the intersections of platforms, data, and memory.  
Thirdly, there is also a need for a deeper examination of the impact of metrics on the 
conceptualisation and lived experience of memory. As suggested in chapter 6, metric systems 
such as Timehop’s ‘Streak’ and Facebook ‘likes’ seemed to have an affective impact on the 
way participants experience and view their digital pasts. The sociological literature on numbers 
and the social power of metrics is already well developed, but there is scope to develop this 
relationship between (social media) metrics and memory in future research.  
Fourthly, and lastly, there is scope to explore the potential relationship between neo-
liberalisation and the ways in which memory technologies conceptualise, manage, and resur-
face memories in everyday life. Throughout the data analysis period, I noted that the way social 
media platforms and other memory technologies approached the question of memory has 
several overlaps with characteristics develop in the neoliberalism literature. Indeed, there is 
scope to explore social media platforms as perpetuating what Philip Mirovski (2013) calls 
‘everyday neoliberalism’ through their reconceptualisation of memory in terms of optimi-







Appendix: Interview Guides 
 
In this appendix, I provide the final iteration of the interview guides for the remote interviews 
as well as the focus groups. As stated in the methodology chapter, the interview guides were 
constantly reworked and adapted to the data emerging from the interviews and focus groups. 
In the focus group section below, I also provide an outline of the start of the group interview, 
which technologies were discussed, and so on.  
 
Interviews 
• Intro: reiterate the information sheet and explain the project [remember to check 
recording] 
1. When did you start using Timehop? 
a. How long have you been using it? 
2. How did you find out about it? 
3. How do you normally use the app? / Take me through how you normally use 
Timehop 
a. Is Timehop part of your daily routine? 
b. Does the ‘streak’ have any effect on how you use the app? 
c. Do you get notifications from Timehop? 
i. If so, does getting notifications effect how you use the app? 
d. What about the pop culture references? 
4. What do you particularly like about using the app? / How have you found using 
Timehop during this time? / what experiences have you had of using the app? 
a. Is there anything you particularly like about using the app? 
b. Is there anything you particularly dislike? 
c. What about how it collates and categorises your memories from different 
platforms?  
5. How do you find being reminded of these memories (or photos, moments, events, 
times)?  
a. How does it make you feel? / how do you react? / how do you experience it? 
i. Can you describe it in more detail? 
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b. Are there any memories you particularly like being reminded of? 
i. Can you give me an example? 
c. Any you particularly don’t like? 
i. Have you come across any you would preferred to have avoided? 
6. Has using Timehop changed how you react to these memories? / do these memories 
feel different when using Timehop as opposed to not using it? 
a. If any, which ones? /could you please elaborate? 
b. Do you live differently knowing that you will be reminded by Timehop in the 
future?  
c. The fact that these memories become ‘anniversaries’, has that changed how 
you react to them? (how memories are framed) 
d. What do you think about the timing of the Timehop memories? 
7. Do you ever share memories you are reminded of? 
a. Have you ever shared memories?  
b. In your opinion, what photos/memories do you feel are appropriate / suitable / 
fitting / relevant for sharing with others? / in your opinion, when is it okay to 
share memories? / what memories are not suitable for sharing?) 
i. If so, when?  
8. Has using the app had any effects on how you interact with / see other people, friends 
or family? / has Timehop had any effects on your relationship with others? 
a. If so, how has it? 
b. If not, in your opinion, is Timehop primarily meant as a personal tool to 
remember?  
9. (Have you recently come across Timehop’s new feature ‘Hide-a-Memory’?) 
a. If so, what is your opinion of this new feature that they have rolled out? 
b. Do you ever find yourself wanting to ‘hide a memory’ on Timehop? 
i. If so, why? / could you give me an example? 
10. Do you use any other memory apps or features? 
a. If so, which ones?  
b. Take me through how you normally use them?  
c. How have you found using them?  
i. Has it been the same as using Timehop or has it been different? 




12. Before we finish (our time has run out), do you mind answering some demographic 
questions which will be helpful when I do my analysis? 
a. What age range are you in? (under 21, 21-30, 31-40, 41-50, 51-60, 61-70, 71-
80)  
b. What is your occupation?  
c. What country do you live in?  
13. We’ve come to the end. Is there anything else you would like to add before we finish? 
 
Focus Groups 
1. Introduction (approx. 3 min)  
At the beginning, welcome everyone and make sure that everyone has filled out the consent 
form and is aware of the information sheet. Briefly explain the project and what will be 
discussed in this focus group. Stress that people do not have to have used any of the features 
that will be discussed, but rather I am interested in their views on how these technologies 
affect our memory practices [remember to make sure the recording is working as it should 
– do a check]. 
 
2. Explain the functionality of the features (approx. 5 min) 
The presentation includes screenshots of the features explaining their functionalities (if any 
participants know how the features, encourage them to participate in explaining it to their 
peers for group interaction). The features put forward in the focus group interview are: 
• Facebook Memories  
• Apple Memories 
With each one, as whether they know the feature and if so, whether they can explain it to 
their peers (practice explaining these features one by one in a way that does not use jargon 
or too technical terms). Practically, Apple Memories is best demonstrated and explained 
through the phone (show them how it works), whereas Facebook Memories are arguably 
best showcased on the laptop (bring both to the interview). Participants will be encouraged 
to ask questions about something they do not understand or wish to know more about, and 
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it is likely that the group discussion will start here, rather than being a ‘separate’ stage 
altogether. Stage 2 and 3 will most likely flow into each other.  
 
3. Group discussion (approx. 50 min) 
This is the bulk of the interview and this is where the majority of the data will be generated. 
The participants should, at this point, be familiar with the features we will discuss and 
should hopefully have formed some ideas or opinions about them. Prepare questions 
beforehand (questions also derived from the other interview data set), but focus mostly on 
getting the ball rolling with the group interactions. In order to generate data that is 
comparable to the other data set, many of the questions are similar. The questions prepared 
beforehand are: 
 
1. What do you think of these features? / Any thoughts on what we have just seen? / 
Anything that strikes you about these features? 
o Anything you particularly like or dislike about these features? 
o What do you think about how they collate and curate online memories? 
2. Would you consider using these features yourself? If yes/no, why? 
3. What sorts of things do you use to access memories at the moment?  
4. Do you think you would remember something differently using these features as 
opposed any other way of documenting/remembering the past?  
o Say, writing a diary, having photo album, reminiscing with a friend or 
family member, etc.? 
5. How do you find these features reminding people of their memories? 
o How would you experience that?  
o Would you find it helpful, neutral, or problematic? 
o Would there be any memories you would particularly nice/problematic to 
be reminded of? 
6. What do you think about the fact that these memories are called ‘anniversaries’? 
o Would that change how you remembered something? If so, how? 
7. What do you think of the ‘timing’ of these memory reminders?  
o Do you think it matters when you are being reminded of some memories? 
8. If using these features, would you ever want share these memories with others? 
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